Category: Transversal topics

Categories
Reparations for victims Restorative justice Right to truth Transversal topics

Victims and Restorative Justice in Transitional Justice Scenarios

Memorial for victims of National Socialism in Stuttgart, Germany, built in 1970

Retributive justice is a justice paradigm responding to rather than preventing crimes, grounded on the relationship between crime and responsibility and proportional punishment (see Moore, 2009). In turn, restorative justice consists in processes whereby parties to crimes collectively resolve crime consequences, including how to repair the harm inflicted on victims and their communities (see Marshall, 1996). Furthermore, retributive justice and restorative justice interact with transitional justice concerning victims in post-atrocity scenarios. This blogpost briefly discusses how victims’ status is shaped by such interaction (see also Perez-Leon-Acevedo, 2014). This is discussed under two trinomials: victims, restorative justice, and transitional justice; and victims, combined retributive justice/restorative justice, and transitional justice.    

Victims, restorative justice, and transitional justice 

Restorative principles and processes are a central goal of transitional justice mechanisms tackling atrocities (Hoyle, 2021). Victims are central to transitional justice (Méndez, 2016). Restorative practices, which are present in truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) and reparations programmes, enable victims to play central roles and stand better chances to heal relationships between victims, offenders, and their communities.  

Since international and hybrid criminal tribunals (ICTs) mainly reflect hegemonic Western punitive criminal justice values focusing primarily on retribution and deterrence and only secondarily on restoration (Drumbl, 2005), TRCs may be more suitable to fulfil restorative justice and better voice victims’ needs and viewpoints. TRCs meaningfully contribute to recognising victims and restoring their dignity. TRCs and traditional restorative mechanisms such as local dispute resolution (ibid.) focused on societal reconciliation, victims, storytelling, and reparations are seemingly better options if the goal is healing individuals and post-atrocity societies (Minow, 1998). 

TRCs can focus on victims, facilitating their participation and that of perpetrators and victims’ and perpetrators’ communities. TRCs bring back the conflict to their original actors, enabling officials to grieve with victims (Minow, 1998). By involving all conflict stakeholders, TRCs address victims’ harm. As restorative justice is multidirectional (Aukerman, 2002), TRCs consider that the distinction between victims and perpetrators might sometimes be unclear in atrocity contexts: for example, child soldiers may hold the dual-status of victims and perpetrators. At TRCs, victims provide their testimonies in narrative forms, guaranteeing more inclusive processes for victims and avoiding re-victimization, which contrasts with criminal courts. This promotes national reconciliation and handles impunity collectively (Hayner, 2001). 

TRCs can provide platforms for hearing traditionally excluded victims (Ramírez-Barat, 2011). They can enhance victims’ status. At TRCs (e.g., South Africa), victim definitions can be broad. Victims’ dignity, victims’ rights to information and privacy and to have their views and submissions considered have been recognised. TRCs may be better than trials at addressing victims’ fear, trauma, or anger (Zalaquett, 1992). 

Nevertheless, some studies have questioned TRCs’ role in healing traumatized victims (Backer, 2004; Shaw 2005). Some TRCs failed in advancing victims’ needs (Brody, 1986). Even concerning well-organized TRCs, not necessarily victims regard truth-seeking mechanisms as options to meet their needs for justice and reparations (Fletcher et al., 2009).   

Armenian woman survived from the Genocide tattooed in Arabic captivity. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Reparations programmes can be fundamental regarding victims’ status in transitional justice scenarios. Actually, ‘For some victims reparations are the most tangible manifestation of the efforts of the state to remedy the harms’ (De Greiff, 2006, p.2). Reparations programmes are attractive compared to criminal prosecution because the latter may be perceived as a struggle against perpetrators rather than a victim mechanism. 

Reparations programmes constitute appealing options to enhance victims’ roles in transitional justice also vis-à-vis other restorative practices or restorative-oriented mechanisms. Truth-seeking may be only symbolic if tangible outcomes are absent (ibid.). Contextualised in transitional justice scenarios, reparations may also seek to achieve broader goals, namely, transformative and gender justice (Rubio-Marin, 2009; Hoyle and Ullrich, 2014), which should enhance victims’ situation.  

However, reparations also present weaknesses in transitional justice contexts since they may be disproportionate to damages, trivializing victims’ suffering (Minow, 1998). Reparations alone are insufficient because victims have diverse interests requiring comprehensive approaches (Fulton, 2014).

Victims, combined retributive justice/restorative justice, and transitional justice    

In transitional justice scenarios or mechanisms handling atrocities consequences, retributive justice and restorative justice should not be conflicting but, instead, complementary and mutually reinforcing. Retributive justice and restorative justice are necessary for democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in societies in transition (Villa-Vicencio, 2006). Integrating these justice paradigms should be applied to the relationship between ICTs or national criminal courts and other transitional justice mechanisms as well as within ICTs or national criminal courts. It is reasonable to talk about a ‘restorative side’ of (international) criminal justice (Villa-Vicencio, 2003). Combining retributive justice and restorative justice as the best option for victims in transitional justice contexts is argued below.    

First, ICTs may be transitional justice mechanisms in atrocities scenarios. Since transitional justice is a holistic approach including diverse mutually complementary measures (Kritz, 1995), ICTs that strengthen victims’ status arguably implement the transitional justice approach. Reparations at ICTs exemplify transitional reparatory practices that display backward-looking and forward-looking purposes regarding victims and their societies (Teitel, 2000). Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence on victims (e.g., Velásquez-Rodríguez), partially laid transitional justice foundations (ICTJ, 2009), emphasising victim participation in criminal justice and reparations. ICTs have considered and should further consider this. The transitional justice approach seeks to integrate retributive justice and restorative justice. Some transitional justice advocates resist ‘restorative justice’ labels, solely using them when mentioning communities’ resort to customary law and traditional practices (Méndez, 2001). Nevertheless, they assert that transitional justice is victim-centred as victims are central to transitional justice (Aldana, 2006; Zunino, 2019). Researchers and practitioners have become aware of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s function as one among diverse transitional justice mechanisms (UN Secretary-General, 2004; Okafor and U. Ngwaba, 2015). Hence, victim participation and reparations are intrinsically related to the ICC as a transitional justice mechanism (Méndez, 2016; Aldana, 2006). Although international criminal justice is not restorative justice, it can employ restorative practices through (primarily) reparations (Hoyle, 2012).                         

Second, there have been important international law developments towards combining retributive justice and restorative justice as the best alternative for victims in transitional justice. The UN Reparations Principles, which primarily deal with restorative justice, include satisfaction as a form of reparation (Principle 22(f)), and within satisfaction: judicial sanctions, which chiefly have to do with retributive justice. Under human rights law (e.g., Victims’ Declaration; UN Reparations Principles 11-15) and scholarship (Bassiouni, 2006; Ochoa, 2013), victims’ rights in criminal justice include: protection from re-traumatization; access to justice; be heard through active participation, including victims’ procedural rights to express their own views and concerns; and claim reparations.

Memorial for victims of National Socialism in Stuttgart, Germany, built in 1970. The wreaths commemorate victims of Kemalism. Author: Ikar.us. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

The ICC exemplifies the said synergy since its predominant retributive and deterrent goals incorporate restorative practices, contrasting with previous ICTs. The ICC Statute mentions both retributive and deterrent goals, and victims (ICC Statute, Preamble), underlying adapted restorative justice elements in the ICC Statute. Most ICTs created after the ICC have incorporated victims as important actors, being consistent with restorative practices. In principle, retributive justice and restorative justice are not mutually exclusive (Walgrave, 2008). Restorative practices may be adapted and incorporated into ICTs’ laws or practices: victim participation and reparations may be included in international criminal justice. This justifies that ICTs can adapt and incorporate restorative justice elements into their mandates. As adjusted and adapted to ICTs (Garbett, 2017), restorative justice has been a major force to strengthen victims’ roles at ICTs through victim participation and reparations (Moffett, 2014; McGonigle, 2011). This illustrates the influence of restorative justice elements at the ICC. 

Since restorative justice regards victims as subjects rather than objects (Pena and Carayon, 2013), victims hold enhanced procedural roles and procedural rights at the ICC and other ICTs (McGonigle, 2011). This is consistent with that transitional justice processes must acknowledge victims’ needs (Robins, 2012), counteracting critiques of earlier ICTs that precluded victims from properly expressing themselves (Pena and Carayon, 2013). In societies transitioning from mass atrocities, victims’ active roles in (international), criminal justice may illustrate restorative justice practices, guided by goals concerning victims (UNODC, 2020). Yet, studies on victims’ perceptions reveal a mixed picture of how victims’ roles are implemented at the ICC (Cody, 2017; Cody et al., 2015). Partial mishandling of these roles has also conflicted with defence rights and ICCs’ efficiency (see Safferling and Petrossian, 2021).  

ICTs are still predominantly retributive. Even ICTs such as the ICC where victims’ status is more robust are not restorative justice mechanisms, but they incorporate and adapt some restorative practices/elements and can be partially considered victim-oriented justice mechanisms. ICTs may integrate into their goals, victim-friendly/victim-oriented measures but without replacing their core mandate. These measures would provide victims with participatory rights, impacting criminal justice but without changing its rationale. This is different from pure restorative justice, which might question that rationale (Cavadino and Dignan, 1996). The victim rights movement inspired victim empowerment at the ICC (Moffett, 2014). Accordingly, victims participate in victim-oriented or restorative justice-oriented mechanisms at the ICC and other ICTs to influence criminal proceedings for victims’ interests by being participants or civil parties and claiming reparations. Nevertheless, unlike proper restorative justice mechanisms, ICTs involve judicial adjudication.

Third, balanced interactions between restorative justice-oriented mechanisms, especially TRCs, and retributive and deterrent justice mechanisms, e.g., ICTs, have been feasible. Although TRCs can be alternatives to prosecutions, TRCs and ICTs can work simultaneously through some coordination (Totten, 2009). The co-existing Sierra Leone TRC and Special Court for Sierra Leone overall had synergetic effects (Schabas, 2004; Cockayne, 2005). The latter recognized TRCs’ importance for victims and the mutually complementary mandates of ICTs and TRCs (Norman).

The necessary convergence of TRCs and criminal courts in transitional justice scenarios involves that whereas TRCs offer the advantage of listening to victims not as witnesses in a piecemeal fashion, the judicial ‘truth’ holds ‘a “tested” quality that makes it all the more persuasive’ (Méndez, 1997). The complementary relationship between TRCs and ICTs or national criminal courts ‘may have a synergistic effect on the search for post-conflict justice as part of the struggle against impunity’ (Schabas, 2004). The mutually complementary functions of restorative-oriented mechanisms and retributive or deterrent mechanisms stand more chances to enhance victims’ status in transitional justice contexts. This can be seen through ‘lenses of recognition’ as these mechanisms working together can ‘institutionalize the recognition of individuals with equal rights’ (De Greiff, 2006b). Victims’ perceptions about the ICC confirm the need for combining mechanisms, as victims consider that prosecution is important but not the sole accountability mechanism, and that the ICC is both a justice and peace-making mechanism (Cody et al., 2015). Yet, ICC’s justice goals are still unclear (Ullrich, 2016).   

Fourth, the victims’ right to truth reveals some similarities or convergences between different mechanisms, e.g., TRCs and criminal courts. Although ICC instruments do not include victims’ right to truth, ICC’s jurisprudence has regarded it as a victim participants’ central interest at the ICC (Lubanga). This is coherent with human rights bodies’ case-law recognizing the right to truth as the victims’ right to access to justice and a remedy (Cyprus v. Turkey; Nech v. Guatemala). UN Reparations Principles 22(b) and 24 reflect this. Individual and collective dimensions of the right to truth are recognised (UN-OHCHR, 2006).  

The victims’ right to truth can expand ICTs’ approaches to victims’ status. Criminal proceedings have upheld the victims’ right to truth (UN-OHCHR, 2007), which connects with victims’ roles in criminal justice (UN-Commission on Human Rights, 2005). This right can be implemented through several transitional justice mechanisms including ICTs, national criminal courts, and TRCs (ibid.). If trials are used for what they are intended for (Méndez, 1997), they can contribute to the truth (Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002). Accordingly, trials should not become places for ‘historic’ judgments or settlement of long-term socio-political conflicts, as this produces an unsatisfactory ‘truth’ (Méndez, 1997). Actually, historical truth has been sometimes ‘presented as a by-product of the international criminal proceedings rather than as an objective’ (Schabas, 2012, p.100).  

Conclusion

Restorative justice should further be adapted and incorporated into transitional justice mechanisms, to enhance victims’ roles. Victims’ roles in transitional justice depend on each transitional justice mechanism’s mandate: more retributive- or restorative-oriented. However, the interplay among adapted restorative justice, retributive justice/restorative justice combinations, and transitional justice should mean more meaningful victims’ roles and rights. 

Juan-Pablo Perez-Leon-Acevedo

Researcher and lecturer Jyvaskyla University (Finland); Affiliated researcher, PluriCourts, Oslo University

   

References

* Aldana, R., ‘A Victim-Centered Reflection on Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and Prosecutions as a Response to Mass Atrocities’ (2006) 5 J. Human Rights 107-126. 

* Aukerman, M., ‘Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 39.

* Backer, D., ‘Exit, Voice and Loyalty in Transitional Justice Processes’, 2 September 2004.

* Bassiouni, C., ‘International Recognition of Victims’ Rights’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 203-279. 

* Brody, R., ‘Impunity continues in Haiti’ (Report on the Americas, Sep.-Oct. 1986).

* Cavadino, M., and Dignan, J., ‘Toward a framework for conceptualizing and evaluating models of criminal justice from a victim’s perspective’ (1996) 4 International Review of Criminology 153.

* Cockayne, J., ‘The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War Crimes Tribunals’ (2005) 28 Fordham ILJ. 616,

* Cody, S., ‘Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Victim Participation in Uganda’, in N. Hayashi and C. Bailliet (eds), The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals (2017) 376-398. 

* Cody, S. et al. ‘The Victims’ Court? (2015). 

* De Greiff, P., ‘Introduction. Repairing the Past’, in P. de Greiff (ed), The Handbook of Reparations (2006).

* Drumbl, M., ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment’ (2005) 99 Northwestern U. Law Review 539.

* European Court of Human Rights, Cyprus v. Turkey, Judgment, 10 May 2001. 

* Fletcher, L. and Weinstein, H., ‘Violence and Social Repair’ (2002) 24 Human Rights Quarterly 573.

* Fletcher, L. et al., ‘Context, Timing and the Dynamics of Transitional Justice’ (2009) 31 Human Rights Quarterly 163.

* Fulton, S., ‘Redress for Enforced Disappearance’ (2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 769-786.

* Garbett, C., ‘The International Criminal Court and Restorative Justice’ (2017) 5 Restorative Justice 198-220.   

* Hayner, P., Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (2001).

* Hoyle, C., ‘The Case for Restorative Justice’, in C. Cunneen and C. Hoyle, Debating Restorative Justice (2010).

* Hoyle, C., ‘Can International Justice be Restorative Justice? The Role of Reparations’, in N. Palmer et al. (eds), Critical Perspectives in Transitional Justice (2012).

* Hoyle, C. and Ullrich, L., ‘New Court, New Justice? The Evolution of “Justice for Victims” at Domestic Courts and at the International Criminal Court’ (2014) 12 Journal of International Criminal Justice 681.

* International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), ‘What is Transitional justice?’ (2009).

* Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment, 29 July 1988.

* Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Nech v. Guatemala, Judgment, 25 May 2010. 

* International Criminal Court, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1119), Decision on victims’ participation, Trial Chamber I, 18 January 2008.

* Kritz, N., ‘The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice’, in N. Kritz (ed), Transitional Justice, vol I (1995).

* Marshall, T., ‘The Evolution of Restorative Justice in Britain’ (1996) 4 European Journal on Criminal Policy Research 21.

* McGonigle, B., Procedural Justice? Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings (2011).

* Méndez, J., ‘Accountability for Past Abuses’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 255

* Méndez, J., ‘National Reconciliation, Transnational Justice, and the International Criminal Court’ (2001) 15 Ethics & International Affairs 25.

* Méndez, J., ‘Victims as Protagonists in Transitional Justice’ (2016) 10 Int. J. of Transitional Justice 1-5.

* Minow, M., Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: A Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence (1998).

* Moffett, L., Justice for Victims before the International Criminal Court (2014). 

* Moore, M., ‘The Moral Worth of Retribution’, in A. von Hirsch et al. (eds), Principled Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy (3rd edn,, 2009). 

* Ochoa, J., The Rights of Victims in Criminal Justice Proceedings for Serious Human Rights Violations (2013).

* Okafor, O. and Ngwaba, U., ‘The International Criminal Court as a “Transitional Justice” Mechanism in Africa’ (2015) 9 Int. J. of Transitional Justice 90-108.

* Pena, M., and Carayon, G., ‘Is the ICC Making the Most of Victim Participation?’ (2013) 7 IJTJ 518,

* Perez-Leon-Acevedo, J.-P., Victims’ Status at International and Hybrid Criminal Courts. Victims’ Status as Witnesses, Victim Participants/Civil Parties and Reparations Claimants (2014).

* Ramírez-Barat, C., Making an Impact (2011).

* Robins, S., ‘Challenging the Therapeutic Ethic: A Victim-Centred Evaluation of Transitional Justice Process in Timor Leste’ (2012) 6 IJTJ 83-105.

* Rubio-Marin, R., The Gender of Reparations (2009) 383. 

* Safferling, C. and Petrossian, G., Victims Before the International Criminal Court (2021).

* Schabas, W., ‘A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone’ (2004) 15 Criminal Law Forum 3.

* Schabas, W., Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War Crimes Tribunals (2012).

* Shaw, R., ‘Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone’ (2005).    

* Special Court for Sierra Leone, Norman (SCSL-2003-08-PT), Decision on the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman, Trial Chamber, 29 October 2003.

* Totten, C., ‘The International Criminal Court and Truth Commissions’ (2009) 7 Northwestern UJIHR 1.

* Ullrich, L., ‘Beyond the “Global-Local Divide”: Local Intermediaries, Victims and the Justice Contestations of the International Criminal Court’ (2016) 14 JICJ 543.

* UN-Commission on Human Rights, ‘Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity’, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005.   

* UN-Commission on Human Rights, ‘Right to Truth’, E/CN.4/RES/2005/66, 20 April 2005.

* UN-OHCHR, ‘Study on the Right to Truth’, E/CN.4/2006/91, 8 February 2006.

* UN-OHCHR, ‘Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251’, A/HRC/5/7, 7 June 2007. 

* UN General Assembly, Declaration of the Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, A/RES/40/34/Annex, 29 November 1985. 

* UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, A/RES/60/147, 16 Dec. 2005. 

* UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), Handbook on Restorative Justice Programmes (2020).

* UN Secretary-General, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2004/616, 23 August 2004.

* Villa-Vicencio, C., ‘Restorative Justice. Ambiguities and Limitations of a Theory’, in C. Villa-Vicencio and E. Doxtader (eds), The Provocations of Amnesty (2003).

* Villa-Vicencio, C., ‘Transitional Justice, Restoration and Prosecution’, in D. Sullivan and L. Tifft (eds), Handbook of Restorative Justice (2006) 390.   

* Walgrave, L., Restorative Justice, Self-Interest and Responsible Citizenship (Willan 2008).

* Zalaquett, J., ‘Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints’ (1992) 43 Hastings Law Journal 1425-1438.

 * Zunino, M., Justice Framed: A Genealogy of Transitional Justice (2019).  

Categories
Mexico Non-repetition / institutional reform Reparations for victims Right to truth Transversal topics

The limits and possibilities for transitional justice in Mexico

Search in Tamaulipas. Foto: Comisión Nacional de Búsqueda.

Mexico is undeniably experiencing a human rights crisis. Since 2006, the year that the administration of former President Felipe Calderon launched a so-called “War on Drugs”, the State’s armed forces have engaged in confrontations with numerous armed drug-trafficking groups operating across the country. This has fueled a spike in human rights violations and abuses. One of the most telling symptoms of the crisis is the alarming number of missing persons in the country– over 90,000, according to governmental records. Entrenched corruption in the justice system, as well as a lack of resources to adequately respond to the rise in violations, have ensured that perpetrators are rarely brought to account. This has resulted in a climate of generalized impunity.

Against this background, some scholars and practitioners have pondered over the applicability of transitional justice (TJ) measures for Mexico, specifically for the victims of the War on Drugs and the era of government repression known as the Dirty War (1960s-1980s). Certainly, the country does not fit a traditional TJ scenario as it is neither transitioning from an authoritarian to a democratic regime nor moving from a conflict to a post-conflict scenario. And still, in the context of its current human rights and impunity crisis, the Mexican government has implemented some measures and programs traditionally adopted in TJ settings. It also has a record on implementing some TJ measures in the past, albeit with limitations. More importantly, perhaps, the country has a strong presence of victims’ associations calling for truth and justice for those who have endured violations. But beyond debates of applicability– the biggest question is whether the State has the political will to apply a holistic transitional justice agenda.

Truth Commission of Ayotzinapa. Photo: Secretaría de Gobernanción.

The TJ agenda under Mexico’s current President

Current President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (2018-2024), known as AMLO, hinted at the possibility of adopting transitional justice measures during his presidential campaign. His proposed Peace and Security Plan made peace-building a priority, stating that “it [was] necessary to … adopt models of transitional justice that guarantee the rights of the victims.” His campaign also included what he named “Listening Forums,” consultation spaces where his team met with groups of victims across the country to discuss relevant human rights issues. The Peace and Security Plan noted that these Forums had evidenced that access to justice was a pending issue for most victims, and as such, it would be a priority for AMLO’s administration.

Upon assuming office in 2018, AMLO took some steps that suggested some commitment to victims’ rights and to the adoption of transitional justice measures. With great symbolic value, one of his first actions as President of Mexico was the establishment of the Commission for Truth and Access to Justice for the case of the 43 missing students from Ayotzinapa. The Commission has made important progress in determining some key perpetrators and in continuing the outstanding work that the IACHR did for the case. It has also ensured that the families of the victims and their accompanying allies actively participate in its implementation. But indeed, the work of the commission is limited to the extent that it is addressing a singular case. It might even be argued that it is creating an unfair hierarchy of victims, by securing access to truth and justice for a small group, while excluding access for the broad majority.

Another important development has been the establishment of the National System for the Search of Missing Persons. It comprises a federal-level search commission, state-level search commissions for all Mexican states, and specialized units within state-level prosecution offices for the crime of disappearances. Innovatively, the law separates the search for the missing persons from the criminal investigation, so that the search is not delayed. Moreover, the law acknowledges that disappearances might be committed by state and non-state actors, something of much relevance to Mexico, given that the majority of these crimes are committed by the latter.

The creation of the system and the law from which it emanated was the result of lobbying efforts by the families of missing persons and their international and local allies. At the start of his administration, AMLO appointed Karla Quintana, a renowned human rights expert, as the Head Commissioner for the National System. Under her leadership, the System has taken important steps, such as drafting a standardized protocol for the search of missing persons, carrying out dozens of open-field searching missions across the country, and creating a center for the identification of human remains in northern Mexico.

Along with the System, AMLO’s administration also approved the creation of an extraordinary mechanism for forensic identification, known as MEIF. It is yet another example of a measure commonly adopted in TJ scenarios. The MEIF was envisioned as a tool to cope with the forensic crisis that the country is experiencing, by which an estimate of 52,000 unidentified bodies lie in government facilities, like burial pits and morgues. Presumably, some of those bodies belong to those missing in the country. This past month, AMLO also announced the creation of the “Presidential Commission for Truth, Justice, Reparation, Memory, and Non-Recurrence” for the victims of the Dirty War period. The name suggests a broad mandate seeking to address multiple victims’ rights. Yet, as the mandate has not been published, it remains to be seen what this new commission will seek to accomplish.

These actions show some degree of political will to address the human rights crisis of the country, through the adoption of measures traditionally associated with transitional justice. However, the scope of these measures is mostly limited to the fulfillment of the right to truth and particularly, to the duty to determine the whereabouts of missing persons derived from this right. The collective aspect of the right to truth is generally excluded from these measures. Moreover, no specific extraordinary programs have been established to guarantee the rights to justice, reparations and non-recurrence for the victims during his administration, suggesting that a genuine commitment to uprooting impunity has been absent.

Memorial, Truth Commission of Guerrero. Photo: Secretaría de Gobernación.

Truth, justice, and reparation measures in the past

AMLO’s administration is not the first to adopt measures from the transitional justice repertoire. Most notably, former President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) established a special prosecutor’s office, known as FEMOSPP, to investigate and prosecute federal authorities implicated in crimes committed during the Dirty War. Unlike AMLO’s, Fox’s administration took place during a transition period, marked by the end of the PRI-party regime, which ruled the country for over 70 years. FEMOSPP opened between 700 to 1000 investigations leading to around a dozen indictments; yet it is unclear whether it achieved any convictions. Beyond criminal investigations, it also published a large report –similar to one that would be published by a truth commission–detailing the context in which violations took place. While it was a first notable effort to apply transitional justice measures in Mexico, its results were limited. 

Mexico also has a precedent of two truth commissions at the state level. The first one was established in 2011 in Guerrero, a state that experienced the rise of guerrilla movements and a consequent wave of government repression during the Dirty War. (It is also the state where the Ayotzinapa case took place, suggesting the urgent need for guarantees of non-repetition). In 2014, the Commission concluded that the State had committed enforced disappearances, torture and extrajudicial killings. The second commission was established in 2014 in Oaxaca, in response to the government repression against a broad coalition social movement known as APPO. Here, the commission concluded that the local government had been implicated in human right violations.

During the administration of Enrique Pena Nieto (2012-2018), and following nation-wide mobilizations, the government approved the Victims’ Law, which established the National System for Attention to Victims. Akin to Colombia’s victims’ system under law 1448, the Mexican system consists of state-based commissions across the country that may provide victims with access to assistance measures, legal support, and reparations. The implementation of the law, however, has been extremely slow and the System has operated with insufficient budget and personnel, making access to benefits for victims difficult. In spite of its operational issues, the System is yet another notable effort to respond to the mass victimization that has come with the rise in violence in the country and that is typical to transitional justice scenarios.

Overall, these scattered measures have contributed to the fulfillment of the rights to truth, justice, and reparations to some victims in Mexico, albeit in an insufficient manner. The vast majority of victims, however, have remained excluded, and those who were able to access benefits did so in a limited form.

Transitional justice in Mexico? Some steps forward, many more ahead

To remedy its situation of generalized impunity, Mexico has adopted measures traditionally associated with transitional justice contexts. In previous administrations, the government has experimented with the creation of a special prosecution office, two local truth commissions, and the establishment of a reparations system, which is still operating. Under current President Lopez Obrador, important actions have been taken to fulfill the right to truth of the families of missing persons.

Notwithstanding the progress made by these initiatives, none have been adopted as part of a holistic transitional justice agenda. This has limited the ability of these measures to positively contribute to the dismantling of structures of impunity, the meaningful redress of victims, and the cease of violence in the country. If indeed the current administration has taken important steps to fulfill the right to truth, the State has a huge debt when it comes to the right to justice. Out of the 92,000 cases of missing persons, only 35 have reached a guilty verdict. As such, it is not surprising that the families of the victims have little hope that perpetrators will ever be brought to account. Firm steps should also be taken to guarantee the non-repetition of violations. Of particular concern is the increased militarization of the country and the continuation of the War on Drugs. It is unlikely that disappearances stop as long as a militarized approach to security continues, as it has been proved that this strategy has been a key factor for the increase of violence and the empowerment of drug cartels in Mexico. In the meantime, victims will continue to mobilize and demand that their rights to truth, justice, and reparations are fulfilled. It is because of their relentless commitment to the fight against impunity that the government has been pushed to take some action. Some public servants within the government have been key allies in ensuring these measures are implemented. And still, a holistic transitional justice agenda will remain an unlikely possibility for Mexico without the firm commitment of the State –as a whole– to uproot impunity once and for all.

Camila Ruíz Segovia, Correspondent in Mexico.

Categories
Transversal topics

“Autoritarismo líquido”: un nuevo desafío para la justicia transicional

Brasilia, 7/9/2021. Foto: TV Globo/Reproduçao

En la Edad Contemporánea, en el tiempo del Estado subordinado a la ley, cuando la democracia se ve amenazada o derribada, el régimen autoritario que toma su lugar lo hace con la ayuda del derecho. El autoritarismo necesita una forma jurídico-política para ascender – si no lo ha hecho por un golpe – y para mantenerse; por lo tanto, el derecho siempre es necesario. Es una falsa imagen la idea de subyugación del derecho a la voluntad política arbitraria. Lo que tiene lugar es una aproximación, una relación de confianza y mutuo apoyo que gradualmente se elabora hasta que el derecho se torna un fuerte aliado que, en una “servidumbre voluntaria” (una idea política de Étienne de La Boétie del siglo XVI), proporciona discursos que pretenden dar legitimidad a las acciones tiránicas.   

Sin embargo, hay alguna cosa que ha cambiado significativamente a partir de este milenio: los regímenes autoritarios pasaron a contar mucho más intensamente con el derecho como aliado. En este punto me gustaría esclarecer que por derecho me refiero tanto a los actos del poder ejecutivo como a las leyes y también a las sentencias del poder judicial y dictámenes del ministerio público, y extiendo el concepto a toda la “comunidad jurídica”: la enseñanza del derecho en las universidades, las manifestaciones de juristas en la prensa, las declaraciones de las asociaciones de jueces, abogados, fiscales y otros. 

En la primera mitad del siglo XX surgieron dos especies distintas de regímenes autoritarios: los totalitarismos y las dictaduras. De los primeros son ejemplos los regímenes nazifascistas y sus pretensiones de crear un “hombre nuevo” y un “mundo perfecto” y tienen como características históricas: a) “Todo en el Estado, nada contra el Estado, nada fuera del Estado” – el lema del dictador Benito Mussolini; b) el romanticismo: idealización de un pasado místico; c) el terror y miedo como forma de control social; d) el uso de fuerzas paramilitares; e) un partido único; f) el culto al líder. Ya las dictaduras no tenían ese ideal totalizante; sin embargo, igualmente han herido de muerte a las democracias, y por supuesto que, más allá de las dictaduras europeas, deben ser recordadas las que se esparcirán por América Latina en las décadas siguientes.

Foto histórica de Benito Mussolini, sin registro de autor.

Las dos especies, totalitarismos y dictaduras, contaron con el derecho como aliado, pero con una participación más modesta: su papel es el de un simple instrumento de la violencia de Estado. Sin embargo, desde el inicio del siglo XXI ha surgido una nueva modalidad de régimen autoritario que reúne tres características distintivas: 

a) Es fantasmagórico: porque el autoritarismo es un proceso en constante construcción y no tiene una fecha que simbolice su comienzo. No hay uniformes, insignias ni frases de saludo a los líderes. Doy como ejemplo al presidente Nayib Bukele de El Salvador: en abril de 2020 mantuvo encerradas en “centros de contención” a personas de las cuales el gobierno sospechaba que habían contraído COVID-19 y se rehusó a cumplir órdenes de libertad de la Corte de Justicia; en febrero de 2021 ingresó a la Asamblea Legislativa acompañado del ejército con el claro propósito de intimidar a los legisladores; en mayo de 2021 cinco jueces del Tribunal Supremo que juzgaban al gobierno fueran exonerados de sus cargos. ¿En qué fecha empezó el autoritarismo en El Salvador? No se puede precisar. Como dice el profesor Pedro Serrano, de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de São Paulo, en nuestro tiempo vivimos un “autoritarismo líquido”.    

b) Es disimulado: porque esconde su carácter autoritario. Por el contrario, hace uso frecuente de la palabra “democracia” y de los derechos fundamentales como vida, libertad e igualdad, para hostigar estos mismos valores. Son ejemplos Hungría y Polonia y tantas medidas legislativas contra la libertad de expresión.

c) Es fragmentado: porque no se presenta por entero, no pretende ser totalitario, sino que debilita los diversos ámbitos de la vida democrática con ataques de intensidades distintas e intermitentes. Hay una circularidad de atentados: ora contra la prensa; después al Poder Judicial si este se opone; más adelante, contra la educación y la cultura; a continuación, al medio ambiente, etc., y entonces se vuelve a atentar contra los primeros enemigos. A cada vuelta el círculo se cierra un poco más. Es por esa característica que sugiero llamar a la nueva forma político-jurídica del “autoritarismo líquido” estados de excepción. Uso el plural, estados, porque los asaltos contra la democracia son fragmentados. Brasil es un trágico ejemplo. Hay una alternancia de los “enemigos” elegidos por el presidente Bolsonaro: ora es la prensa, ora la educación (bajo una mirada homofóbica y sexista), ora la cultura (con desprecio por el pasado esclavista y el presente racista, y otros temas más), ora el medio ambiente, ora el Poder Judicial y otras instituciones, públicas o privadas, valores constitucionales (como la pluralidad, la diversidad y la paz), personas vivas y muertas (como el educador internacionalmente reconocido Paulo Freire). Cada semana hay un nuevo enemigo a ser combatido. No importa quién o lo que se confronta. Lo importante, para los estados de excepción, es tener enemigos. Golpearlos con alternancia, circularidad. Lo que parece una fragilidad del autoritarismo líquido es, en realidad, su estrategia: la fragmentación de los ataques a cada vuelta del círculo de amenazas contra enemigos distintos hace que el cerco autoritario contra la democracia se cierre cada vez más.

7 de septiembre de 2021. Bolsonaro incita contra el Tribunal Supremo Federal durante un acto en Brasilia. Foto: br.noticias.yahoo.com.

El autoritarismo líquido es una forma de burlar los ideales democráticos de la justicia transicional. En general, hay cuatro ideas principales en torno de la justicia transicional: el derecho a la reparación (indemnizaciones individuales y colectivas para quienes fueron perseguidos políticamente); el derecho a la memoria (políticas de esclarecimiento de los actos estatales de violencia y homenajes a los perseguidos políticos, por ejemplo); el derecho a la verdad (acceso a las informaciones de los archivos del Estado acerca de la represión o por medio de comisiones que investigan la verdad de los hechos) y el derecho a la justicia (investigación y responsabilidad de los agentes públicos que cometieron violaciones a los derechos humanos). Muchos países no tuvieron una justicia transicional efectiva (es el caso del Brasil, único país en América Latina sin ninguna responsabilización de los agentes públicos que torturaron y mataron, o mandaron hacerlo, a los opositores del gobierno). Incluso donde hubo justicia transicional, el autoritarismo líquido que actúa en una forma jurídico-política de estados de excepción dificulta entender que existen serias amenazas a la democracia porque la prensa ejerce su oficio sin la censura tradicional (se utilizan otros medios de presión) y las asambleas legislativas y los tribunales continúan formalmente en funcionamiento (el objetivo es capturar su independencia). No obstante, la memoria es gradualmente borrada y la verdad, corrompida, pues, por supuesto, como ocurre en la novela distópica de George Orwell, “Quien controla el pasado controla el futuro; quien controla el presente controla el pasado”.           

Es urgente darnos cuenta de esa nueva modalidad de régimen autoritario, el autoritarismo líquido y su original forma jurídico-política, los estados de excepción, para que sea posible efectivamente oponerles resistencia y preservar la democracia.

Luis Manuel Fonseca Pires

Juez de Derecho del Estado de São Paulo. Profesor de Derecho Administrativo en la Pontificia Universidad Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP). Autor de “Estados de exceção. A usurpação da soberania popular”, Ed. Contracorrente, 2021.