Category: Non-repetition / institutional reform

Categories
Domestic prosecutions Non-repetition / institutional reform Peru Prosecution initiatives Reparations for victims Right to truth

Transitional justice in Peru: progress and challenges

Relatives of enforced disappearance victims at the office of the European Commission of Human Rights in Huamanga, Ayacucho, located in the Huamanga municipality premises. July 1985. Photo: Ernesto Jimenez

Author: Andrea Trigoso

Disponible en español

In 2001 Peru entered a post-dictatorship and post-armed conflict transitional period. Since then, various transitional justice (TJ) mechanisms have been established to address the pillars of truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition required by the universal model of TJ. Nevertheless, after 20 years the TJ agenda receives little attention, as does the assessment of whether the TJ period has ended or if there are still pending challenges. This post briefly summarizes the current state of TJ in Peru and mentions some of the pending challenges for each TJ pillar.

1. The armed conflict in Peru

Soldiers escort Ramón Laura Yauli and Concepción Lahuana after declaring having been forcefully recruited by Shining Path. La Mar, Ayacucho. June 1985.
Photo Abilio Arroyo- Caretas

During the closing decades of the last century, Peru went through an internal armed conflict and was subject to an authoritarian regime. According to the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the armed conflict began in 1980 with the public burning of the electoral amphorae in the village of Chuschis, perpetrated by the terrorist organization Sendero Luminoso – Shining Path (SL), and it lasted until 2000. In the last decade of that period, Alberto Fujimori, who was democratically elected as president in 1990, perpetrated a coup on April 5, 1992. With the support of the armed forces, Fujimori dissolved the Congress and established an antidemocratic regime that ended in November 2000, when he resigned by fax from Brunei, where he was attending the APEC summit.

It is worth mentioning that prior to the internal armed conflict, Peru had a military dictatorship, which had been established in 1968.  The military junta appointed General Juan Velasco Alvarado as de facto president, who was himself deposed in 1975, after another coup. The new de facto president, General Francisco Morales Bermúdez installed a Constituent Assembly in 1979 and called for democratic elections in 1980.

Consequently, during the period of transition to a democratic government, an armed conflict started in Peru. Thus, the period in which mechanisms to deal with human rights violations committed during the military dictatorship should have been established, Peru had to face the uprising of terrorist violence, with young and weak democratic institutions, and an almost non-existent rule of law.

During the armed conflict, there were two terrorist organizations responsible for the attacks and mass atrocities. SL led by Abimael Guzmán, a group to which the TRC attributes the highest number of deaths (54%), and the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA), to whom the TRC attributes 1.5% of deaths. The latter group extinguished after the Chavín de Huántar operation, in which the armed forces broke into the Japanese Embassy in Lima to rescue the hostages taken by the MRTA.

Shining Path, on the other hand, has not ceased to operate in Peru. After the capture of Abimael Guzmán in 1992, and the consequent dismantling of a large part of the organization, SL continues to operate in the zone of the Valley of the rivers Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro (VRAEM). This is despite the capture of other SL leaders such as Oscar Ramírez Durand (a.k.a comrade Feliciano) or Jorge Quispe Palomino (a.k.a comrade Jose). However, the current group is divorced from the initial ideology of Abimael Guzmán (pensamiento Gonzalo) and survives through illegal activities such as drug trafficking, extortion, and murders.

Furthermore, the armed forces and the police were also responsible for serious human rights violations. State agents, self-defense committees, and paramilitary groups were responsible for 37% of deaths and disappearances reported to the TRC. Emblematic cases that illustrate this period are the Cabitos military base, and the Frontón prison before the Fujimori dictatorship, and the cases of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, during the Fujimori dictatorship.

2. Truth, justice, reparations

Victims of the armed conflict giving their testimonies in the TRC. 21 June 2002. Photo: Reuters

After the end of the authoritarian regime, Peru started a period of transitional justice, which seems to be still ongoing. The transitional government of Valentín Paniagua created the TRC in June 2001, with the task of establishing the facts about the terrorist violence and the serious human rights violations that occurred in the preceding decades. The mandate of the Commission included the clarification of the political, social, and cultural conditions that permitted the conflict; assist the judiciary to establish the truth about the crimes committed by the terrorist organizations and State agents, as well as to identify alleged responsibilities; submit proposals for reparation, recommendations for institutional reforms, and the establishment of monitoring mechanisms for the recommendations. In August 2003, the final report of the TRC was presented. It gathered the testimonies of 17.000 victims and calculated the loss of 69.000 lives during the conflict. In addition, its recommendations on reparations fostered the comprehensive reparations program, and the findings on human rights violations and terrorist acts contributed to the prosecution of these cases.

Moreover, the judicial bodies have also made efforts towards the investigation and prosecution of terrorist acts and serious human rights violations. The judiciary created the National Criminal Chamber and endowed it with jurisdiction for cases of terrorism and serious human rights violations. The Office of the Public Prosecutor also created a specialized subsystem for the same type of crimes. Within the framework of these subsystems the SL leader, Abimael Guzmán, and the SL’s leadership were retried in 2005. The new trial followed a decision of the Constitutional Court that declared the previous trial null and void, because it was conducted in the military jurisdiction, in summary manner, and with “faceless judges.” In 2006, Abimael Guzmán was sentenced to life imprisonment along with other SL leaders, who never apologized to the victims.

Angelica Mendoza Ascarza – Mama Angelica. Founding member of the National Association of the Relatives of the enforced disappeared, kidnapped, and unlawful detainees (ANFASEP)- most visible victim of the Cabitos case

The human rights violations perpetrated by State agents have also been prosecuted within the aforementioned judicial system: illustrated in the cases of Accomarca, Cabitos, Barrios Altos, and la Cantuta. Alberto Fujimori was also tried for the facts that concern these last two cases, and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Nevertheless, the prosecution of these cases has presented a series of technical challenges (related to the evidence and principle of legality), as well as obstructions of political nature. Proof of this is that emblematic cases such as Accomarca and Cabitos were sentenced and reached final judgments only 31 and 35 years after the events occurred (with many defendants removed from the process for health or other reasons), and that there are cases from that period that are still in trial, or even remain at the investigation stage (see cases Manta y Vilca, Fronton, and Forced Sterilizations), because they are investigating mass crimes committed by high-ranking military personnel and political leaders.

Following the TJ framework, Peru has gradually implemented a comprehensive reparations plan (CRP) recommended by the TRC. In 2005, the Congress enacted a law creating the CRP that was composed of the following 6 programs: restitution of citizens’ rights, reparations in education, reparations in health, collective reparations, symbolic reparations, and facilitation for housing access. Additionally, this law and its regulations established that the High Level Multisectoral Commission (CMAN), and the Reparations Council (RC) -in charge of the registry of victims – would be in charge of the implementation of the CRP.

The aforementioned normative framework for reparations considers the relatives of the disappeared or killed persons, displaced persons, persons who were arbitrarily detained, tortured victims, victims of rape, kidnapped persons, members of the armed forces, the national police, self-defense committees, and civil authorities wounded or injured in actions that violated their human rights as beneficiaries of the CRP. Likewise, indirect victims are also beneficiaries of the CRP, considered as such: children who were the product of rape, minors who were part of self-defense committees, people unduly accused of terrorism, and people who were undocumented because of the conflict. Peasants and native communities, and other small rural villages affected by the violence and groups of organizations of non-returning displaced persons are also beneficiaries of the CRP as collective victims. The exception to these categories are former members of the terrorist organizations, even if they suffered human rights violations, and victims who have already received reparations for other decisions or State policies.

A reburial ceremony for victims who were killed in the conflict. Photo: ICTJ

The report on reparations in Peru from the Queen’s University of Belfast indicated that until April 2018 there were 226.727 people registered in the single registry for victims; 5.712 communities and rural villages, and 127 organized groups of non-returnees were registered for collective reparations. Of this total, the CMAN has given reparations to 1.852 (32.5%) rural villages and communities in fifteen departments. Additionally, the report indicates that individual financial reparations were granted to 98.132 beneficiaries; 12.082 people were registered in the Special Registry of Beneficiaries of Reparations in Education; 139.296 beneficiaries of the health reparations program joined the National Comprehensive Health Insurance. The report also points out that as symbolic reparations, the Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion (LUM) was created, which is a space for pedagogical and cultural commemoration, and the Monument “the eye that cries” was built as an initiative from the civil society. Finally, the report mentions that the Ombudsman’s Office registered around 2.000 victims of enforced disappearance, which has allowed their declaration of absence and access to related civil rights for their family members.

Despite the progress in reparations, there are still many challenges Peru must face. These include the many provisions and registries established for the victims, because they are confusing and mutually exclusive, which makes it difficult for victims to benefit from the reparations programs. Other challenges to execute the reparations program include the lack of coordination between the State entities, the misperception of reparations as social programs, the failure to institutionalize the budget for reparations, the lack of symbolic reparations that include public expressions, and the lack of political will to carry them out.

3. Guarantees of non-repetition

Regarding institutional reform, the Peruvian State has had limited activity. An illustrative example of this is the TRC recommendation for strengthening the independence of the administration of justice that entailed the establishment of an independent system for the appointment, evaluation, and sanction of magistrates (judges and prosecutors), and the reestablishment of the judicial career. An effort in this regard was made with the enactment of the law for the judicial career. However, no structural change or vetting system was proposed, and a large number of provisional magistrates continued to be appointed. The more visible impact of this failure in the institutional reform of the judiciary happened in 2018, when a systematic corruption web involving judges and prosecutors of the highest level, and members of the National Council of the Magistracy (CNM), the body that evaluates and appoints magistrates, was discovered to be appointing magistrates through unlawful means. After this finding, the CNM was dissolved and a National Board of Justice was created to investigate these events, remove the magistrates involved, and propose reforms for the appointment and evaluation of magistrates.

In addition, the TRC recommended measures for the armed forces and the police, which involved training in human rights, the introduction of civilian control in the intelligence services, and the definition of the police as a non-militarized civilian institution in the constitution. Even though there have been efforts to improve the human rights training for both institutions, they have not reviewed their protocols to ensure compliance with human rights standards, no civil controls have been introduced to the armed forces, and the constitutional definition of the police has not changed. The consequences of this lack of reform are evident in the mismanagement of public order crisis, especially when facing protests, which have left citizens dead and others injured in recent years (see protests of November 14, 2020 and the agricultural strike of December 2020)

Street art in Cusco. Photo: Unknown

Furthermore, the TRC recommendation to strengthen the presence of the State throughout the territory, especially in the most neglected and affected areas by the conflict, has been hardly implemented. The causes of the conflict, according to the TRC, are related to the absence of the State and exclusion in the political, social, and economic representation of a sector of the population. This link was so strong that the TRC found there was a relationship between the situation of poverty and social exclusion and the probability of being a victim of armed violence. After twenty years, these structures have not changed, and this scenario does not guarantee the non-repetition of the violent past.

4. A final remark

Twenty-one years after the armed conflict ended, is clear that the TJ period in Peru has not yet finished, and there is still a lot to do for each TJ pillar. In the current state of affairs, the reconstruction of the social tissue and the re-founding of a social pact that generates trust between citizens and in the Peruvian State institutions is a distant but urgent aspiration that could generate reconciliation in the country. Therefore, the introduction of a TJ agenda in the public policies is a task that cannot be further postponed by the Peruvian government.

PS. Some of the pictures were taken from Yuyanapaq, a graphic account of the conflict. It can be visited here

Categories
Non-repetition / institutional reform Peru Prosecution initiatives Reparations for victims Right to truth

Balance general sobre la justicia transicional en el Perú

Familiares de desaparecidos acuden al Concejo Municipal de Huamanga, Ayacucho, van a rendir sus testimonios ante la oficina de la Comisión Europea de Derechos Humanos . Julio 1985. Foto: Ernesto Jimenez

Autora: Andrea Trigoso

Available in English

En el año 2001 Perú entró en un periodo de transición post-dictadura y post-conflicto armado.  Desde entonces se han recurrido a diversos mecanismos de justicia transicional (JT) con el objetivo de cubrir los pilares de verdad, justicia, reparación, y no repetición que requiere el modelo universal de JT. Sin embargo, 20 años después, casi nada se habla de la agenda de JT ni de si se ha superado ese periodo o si quedan desafíos pendientes. Este post resume brevemente el panorama actual de la JT en el Perú, y señala algunos desafíos pendientes de cada pilar de la JT.

a. Conflicto armado en el Perú

Efectivos del Ejército acompañan a los esposos Ramón Laura Yauli y Concepción Lahuana, quienes declararon haber sido reclutados a la fuerza por Sendero Luminoso. La Mar, Ayacucho, junio de 1985.
Foto: Abilio Arroyo – Revista Caretas

En las últimas décadas del siglo pasado, Perú sufrió un conflicto armado interno y un gobierno antidemocrático. De acuerdo al informe final de la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR), el conflicto armado se inició en 1980 con la quema pública de las ánforas electorales en la población de Chuschis, perpetrada por la organización terrorista Sendero Luminoso (SL) y duró hasta el año 2000. En la última década de ese periodo, Alberto Fujimori fue elegido democráticamente como presidente de la República (1990), quien el 5 de abril de 1992 dio un golpe de Estado. Con el apoyo de las Fuerzas Armadas, Fujimori disolvió el congreso nacional e instauró un orden antidemocrático que terminaría en noviembre de 2000, cuando renunció a la presidencia del Perú por fax desde Brunei, en donde se encontraba para asistir a la cumbre APEC.

Cabe mencionar que, con anterioridad al conflicto armado interno, Perú sufrió una dictadura militar instaurada tras el golpe de Estado de 1968. La junta militar nombró al general Juan Velasco Alvarado como presidente de facto, quien fue depuesto tras otro golpe de Estado en 1975. El nuevo presidente de facto, el general Francisco Morales Bermúdez, convocó a una Asamblea Constituyente en 1979 y elecciones democráticas en 1980.

Así que, durante el periodo de transición a una democracia, un conflicto armado estalló en el Perú. En el periodo en el cual se tendría que haber buscado mecanismos para lidiar con la masiva violación de derechos humanos perpetradas por el gobierno militar, el Perú tuvo que afrontar la escalada de violencia terrorista con instituciones democráticas nacientes y aún débiles, y con un estado de derecho casi inexistente.

Ahora bien, durante el conflicto armado hubo dos organizaciones terroristas responsables de los ataques y crímenes masivos. SL, liderado por Abimael Guzmán, grupo al que la CVR adjudica el mayor número de víctimas fatales (54% ); y el Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA), a quien la CVR le adjudica el 1.5% de víctimas fatales, y que se desintegró luego de que las Fuerzas Armadas liberaran, por medio del operativo Chavín de Huántar, a los rehenes tomados por el MRTA en la Embajada de Japón en Lima.

Por su parte, SL no ha cesado de operar en el Perú. Luego de la captura de Abimael Guzmán en 1992 y la consecuente desarticulación de gran parte de la organización, SL se ha mantenido operando en las zonas de Valle de Río Apurímac Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM), aun cuando se han capturado a otros líderes  como Oscar Ramírez Durand —camarada Feliciano— o Jorge Quispe Palomino —camarada José—. Sin embargo, los remanentes senderistas del VRAEM están divorciados de la ideología inicial (pensamiento Gonzalo) de Abimael Guzmán, y sobreviven por sus actividades relacionadas al tráfico de drogas, la extorsión y los asesinatos.

Por otro lado, las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía también fueron responsables de graves violaciones a los derechos humanos. Los agentes del Estado, los comités de autodefensa y los grupos paramilitares fueron responsables por el 37% de muertos y desaparecidos reportados a la CVR. Como casos emblemáticos podemos citar el caso del cuartel los Cabitos, y el penal del Frontón pre-dictadura fujimorista, y los casos el de Barrios Altos y la Cantuta,  durante la dictadura fujimorista.

b. Medidas de justicia transicional: verdad, justicia, reparación

Víctimas dan su testimonio ante la CVR -21 Junio 2002- Fotografía : Reuters

Tras la caída del régimen dictatorial, el Perú entró en un periodo de justicia transicional, del que parecería no haber salido aún. El gobierno de transición de Valentín Paniagua creó la CVR en junio de 2001, con el encargo de esclarecer los hechos sobre la violencia terrorista y las graves violaciones de derechos humanos de las últimas décadas. Dentro de su mandato, la CVR debía esclarecer las condiciones políticas, sociales y culturales que permitieron el conflicto; contribuir al esclarecimiento por los órganos jurisdiccionales de la verdad sobre los crímenes cometidos por las organizaciones terroristas y agentes del Estado y a la determinación de responsabilidades; elaborar propuestas de reparación; recomendar reformas institucionales; y establecer mecanismos de seguimiento de sus recomendaciones. En agosto de 2003, se entregó el informe final de la CVR, el cual reunió los testimonios de 17.000 víctimas, y calculó la pérdida de 69.000 vidas durante el conflicto. Además, sus recomendaciones sobre reparaciones han impulsado el Programa Integral de Reparaciones (PIR) y sus descubrimientos sobre las violaciones de derechos humanos y actos terroristas han contribuido para la judicialización de estos casos.

Por otro lado, desde los órganos judiciales, se han hecho esfuerzos para investigar y judicializar los casos de actos terroristas y graves violaciones de derechos humanos. El Poder Judicial creó la Sala Penal Nacional, con jurisdicción en casos de terrorismo y graves violaciones de derechos humanos. El Ministerio Público creó un subsistema especializado para el mismo tipo de delitos. Dentro de estos órganos especiales, es que se reabre el proceso al líder de SL —Abimael Guzmán— y su cúpula dirigencial en 2005, después de que el Tribunal Constitucional declarara nulo el proceso judicial anterior, por haber sido sumario, en el fuero militar, y con jueces “sin rostro”. Al año siguiente, Abimael Guzmán fue condenado a prisión perpetua junto con otros líderes de SL, quienes nunca ofrecieron disculpas a las víctimas de sus crímenes.

Angelica Mendoza Ascarza – Mamá Angelica- Fundadora de la la Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú – rostro emblemático del caso Cabitos

Dentro de estos subsistemas, se han judicializado también casos de violaciones de derechos humanos perpetrados por agentes del Estado, como los casos Accomarca, Cabitos, Barrios Altos y la Cantuta.  Alberto Fujimori fue juzgado también por los hechos que conciernen a estos dos últimos casos y se le condenó a 25 años de cárcel. No obstante, es necesario resaltar que la judicialización de estos casos ha presentado una serie de retos de corte técnico (en relación a la evidencia y tipificación), así como obstaculización política. Prueba de ello es que casos emblemáticos como Accomarca y Cabitos hayan logrado alcanzar una sentencia 31 y 35 años después de ocurridos los hechos (con varios de los imputados apartados del proceso por razones de salud u otras) y que hayan casos de ese periodo que aún están en juicio oral o incluso en etapa de investigación (ver casos Manta y Vilca, Frontón, y Esterilizaciones Forzadas), porque incluyen dentro de los acusados a altos mandos militares y políticos, como ex ministros de Estado.

Siguiendo el marco de la JT, el Perú ha ido paulatinamente implementando el plan integral de reparaciones (PIR) recomendado por la CVR. En 2005, mediante una ley, se creó dicho plan que estaría compuesto de seis programas: restitución de derechos ciudadanos; reparaciones en educación; reparaciones en salud; reparaciones colectivas; reparaciones simbólicas; y promoción y facilitación al acceso habitacional. Mediante esta ley y su reglamento se estableció que la Comisión Multisectorial de Alto Nivel (CNAM) y el Consejo de Reparaciones (CR) —este último a cargo del registro único de víctimas—, estarían a cargo de la implementación del plan de reparaciones.

Según el marco normativo, los beneficiarios de este plan son los siguientes: familiares de personas desaparecidas o asesinadas; los desplazados; las personas encarceladas arbitrariamente; las víctimas de tortura, violación sexual o secuestros; miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas, de la Policía Nacional, de los Comités de Autodefensa y autoridades civiles heridas o lesionadas en acciones violatorias de sus derechos humanos. Así mismo, son beneficiarias del PIR las víctimas indirectas, consideradas como tales: los hijos producto de violaciones sexuales, los menores de edad que pertenecieron a un Comité de Autodefensa, personas indebidamente acusadas por terrorismo y con orden de captura, y las personas que resultaron indocumentadas a causa del conflicto. También son beneficiarias del PIR las víctimas colectivas que incluyen a las comunidades campesinas, nativas y otros centros poblados afectados por la violencia y grupos de organizaciones de desplazados no retornantes provenientes de las comunidades afectadas. Están excluidos del PIR los miembros de organizaciones subversivas, aunque hayan sufrido violaciones de derechos humanos, y aquellas personas que ya hayan recibido reparaciones por otras decisiones o políticas de Estado.

Familiares de víctimas asesinadas llevan ataúdes durante una ceremonia de re-entierro. Foto: ICTJ

El informe sobre reparaciones en el Perú de la Universidad Queen Mary de Belfast señala que, hasta abril de 2018, había 226.727 personas inscritas en el registro único de víctimas; y 5.712 comunidades y centros poblados y 127 grupos organizados de no retornados inscritos para las reparaciones colectivas, de los cuales la CMAN ha reparado 1.852 (32,5%) centros poblados y comunidades en quince departamentos. Además, el informe indica que se han otorgado reparaciones económicas individuales a 98.132 beneficiarios, 12.082 personas han sido inscritas en el Registro Especial de Beneficiarios de Reparaciones en Educación, y se afilió al Seguro Integral de Salud a 139.296 beneficiarios del programa de reparaciones en salud. Asimismo, indica que, como reparación simbólica, se crearon el Lugar de la Memoria, Tolerancia e Inclusión Social (LUM), que es un espacio de conmemoración pedagógico y cultural, y el Monumento El Ojo que Llora, impulsado desde la sociedad civil. Por último, el Informe señala que la Defensoría del Pueblo había registrado alrededor de 2.000 víctimas de desaparición forzada, lo que permitió su declaración de ausencia y el acceso al ejercicio de derechos civiles relacionados por parte de sus familiares.

A pesar de los avances en reparaciones, existen aún muchos retos, como la existencia de varios registros y disposiciones sobre beneficios para las víctimas que al ser excluyentes entre sí confunden y dificultan el acceso de las víctimas a las reparaciones, la  falta de coordinación entre entidades estatales, la confusión de reparaciones con programas sociales, la falta de institucionalización de presupuesto, la ausencia de reparaciones simbólicas que contemplen expresiones públicas, y la falta de voluntad política.       

c. Garantías de no repetición

En lo que concierne a reforma institucional, el Estado peruano ha tenido actividad limitada. Un ejemplo de ello es que dentro de las recomendaciones de la CVR para tal reforma se propuso fortalecer la independencia de la administración de justicia mediante un sistema independiente de designación, evaluación y sanción de magistrados, y el restablecimiento de la carrera judicial para jueces y fiscales. Se hizo algún esfuerzo en este sentido con la promulgación de la ley de la carrera judicial, pero no se promovieron cambios estructurales ni de depuración de funcionarios, y se siguieron nombrando un gran número de magistrados provisionales. El impacto más grave de la deficiencia en las reformas  se ha visibilizado en 2018, cuando se descubrió una mafia que involucraba jueces y fiscales del más alto nivel, y miembros del Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura (CNM) —el órgano que evalúa y nombra a los magistrados— en nombramientos indebidos. Este descubrimiento ha significado la disolución del CNM y la creación de la Junta Nacional de Justicia encargada de investigar estos hechos y destituir a los magistrados involucrados, así como de proponer reforma para el nombramiento y evaluación de magistrados.

Igualmente, la CVR propuso algunas medidas para las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional, que implican formación en derechos humanos, la introducción de control civil en los servicios de inteligencia y la definición de la policía como institución civil no militarizada en la constitución. Si bien se han realizado esfuerzos para mejorar la formación en derechos humanos, aún no se han revisado los protocolos de aquellas fuerzas para que se ajusten a dichos estándares. Tampoco se han introducido controles civiles a las Fuerzas Armadas, ni se ha introducido en la constitución cambios en la definición de la Policía. El impacto de ello se ve reflejado en el manejo del orden público, sobre todo frente a la protesta social, que ha dejado en los últimos años ciudadanos muertos y heridos ( ver protestas del 14 de Noviembre de 2020 y el paro agrario de Diciembre 2020).

Mural en la ciudad de Cusco. Fuente de Foto desconocida.

Por otro lado, la recomendación de fortalecer la presencia del Estado en todo el territorio, especialmente en las zonas más afectadas por el abandono y la violencia, ha sido poco implementada. Las causas de conflicto, según la CVR, están relacionadas con esta ausencia del Estado y con la exclusión en la representación política, social y económica de un sector de la población, al punto tal que existía una relación entre situación de pobreza y exclusión social y la probabilidad de ser víctima de violencia armada. Estas estructuras, después de veinte años no han cambiado, y este escenario no garantiza la no repetición del pasado de violencia.

d. Reflexión final

Veintiún años después de terminado el periodo de violencia, es claro que el periodo de JT en el Perú no han concluido y que todavía hay que trabajar desde todos los pilares de la JT.  Ahora mismo la reconstrucción del tejido social y la refundación de un pacto social que genere confianza entre ciudadanos y con las instituciones del Estado produciendo la reconciliación, es una aspiración lejana pero urgente que hace impostergable la introducción de una agenda de JT en las políticas públicas del gobierno peruano.

Pd. Algunas de las fotos pertenecen a Yuyanapaq, el relato visual del conflicto armado interno en el Perú. Se puede ver más aquí .

Categories
Brazil Indigenous peoples Non-repetition / institutional reform

The indigenous lands rights timeframe case

Xoqleng children. Photo source: www.fld.com.br

The Indigenous Lands Rights Timeframe Case before the Brazilian Supreme Court deals with the issue of whether indigenous communities can claim only the lands that they were already occupying on the date the Brazilian Federal Constitution came into force—October 5, 1988. This argument is defended by the Parliamentary Front for Agribusiness—also known as the ‘Rural Caucus’ in the National Congress—and by entities linked to agricultural and cattle-raising activities, whereas indigenous peoples fear losing the right to occupy and use lands that are in the process of demarcation.

The case reached the federal Supreme Court after decades of national discussion about the demarcation of indigenous lands in Brazil. The Rural Caucus and like-minded entities have been consistently opposing such demarcation for considering it an outrage to the right to property and an obstacle to land development. In the opposite side, the indigenous peoples have continuously requested the consolidation of indigenous lands rights, as established in Article 231 of the 1988 Constitutional Text.

Historical remarks about indigenous peoples in Brazil

In Brazil, what we call ‘modernity’ began with the arrival of the Europeans in America for colonization purposes, who used the excuse of bringing ‘civilization’ to establish organization models based on exploitation and plundering. The colonizers and their successors see themselves as the ones who developed the corners of the country, which once were only vegetation, to become civilized places. As a result, indigenous peoples are not seen as creditors of this process, but only as representatives of a past time associated with backwardness and failure. 

In this vein, when Brazil declared its independence from Portugal, the idea of indigenous peoples as historical, idyllic, and animalistic peoples was—and still is—deeply rooted in the national mindset and permeated the ensuing pedagogical model for many years.

Indigenous land Pirititi, Roraima State, Brazil. Photo: Felipe Werneck (IBAMA)

Indigenous peoples claims in the case

Brazilian indigenous peoples allege they have an original right to land because they were occupying the land well before the creation of the national State. Furthermore, they hold that the proposed timeframe ignores the indigenous peoples who have been dispossessed of their lands since the beginning of the colonial era in 1500 through violence or as a result of rural and urban expansion. Consequently, it would be impossible for indigenous peoples to occupy certain territories at the time the Federal Constitution was promulgated. 

They also argue that certain lands are means for connecting with their ancestors, for conserving their own culture, and for surviving the unbridled urban and rural expansion that is taking place in Brazilian territory. Thus, they are claiming areas that are still meaningful to their specific social organization.

Claims in favor of the expiration timeframe for indigenous lands rights

The Rural Caucus and like-minded entities are in favor of the timeframe. As there is no set deadline for the creation of indigenous lands, they argue that new lands can only be demarcated in favor of indigenous peoples who were already occupying the disputed territory on the date of the entry into force of the Federal Constitution. This argument is based on the interpretation of the phrase “traditionally occupy” used in Article 231 of the Constitution in the following context: “The social organization, customs, languages, beliefs and traditions of Indians are recognized, as well as their original rights over the lands they traditionally occupy“. The Rural Caucus submit that the rejection of their thesis  would result in impediments to “national development”, “free initiative” and the exercise of “productive activities for the benefit of all”.

The legal status of indigenous lands

In Brazil it is common to hear “there is too much land in the country for too few Indians”. Such expression generally supports the following propositions: a) indigenous communities hold too much land; b) indigenous lands fall short of their productive capacity, are underutilized, and constitute an obstacle to development, either because indigenous peoples are incompetent to exploit them properly, or because the current legislation hinders their exploitation; and c) indigenous lands adjacent to the national frontiers are susceptible to invasion, putting national sovereignty into risk. This type of argument is sustained by the groups interested in the natural resources of the indigenous lands, which in turn have been supported by the mass media and certain members of the judiciary.

According to the Federal Constitution, indigenous lands are spaces traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples; it is the Federal State’s responsibility to demarcate them, and to protect and ensure respect for all their resources. The lands belong to the Federal State, but indigenous peoples have an exclusive and permanent right to explore and exploit the natural resources and the right to practice their customs therein. It is worth noting that indigenous lands can be occupied by more than one ethnic group and are demarcated in accordance with the procedure laid down by Decree No. 1775 of 1996.

It should also be noted that the above-referred constitutional provision and the indigenous lands timeframe concern only traditionally occupied indigenous lands, as it is possible to create new indigenous lands in Brazil following a certain procedure. Once demarcation has been approved by the Ministry of Justice, occasional ‘non-Indians’ residing in those lands will be re-settled through the National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA). As the last step, the President of Brazil should decide on the approval of the new indigenous land by decree.

Xoqleng children. Photo source: www.fld.com.br

We may further note that, in February 2019, the federal Supreme Court held that Extraordinary Appeal No. 1.017.365/SC, which deals with the constitutionality of the creation of an indigenous land for the Xokleng, constitutes a binding precedent for future similar cases. The holding is important because many demarcation and possessory disputes concerning traditional lands are currently pending before various courts, while several legislative projects that aim to remove or relativize indigenous constitutional rights over land are being considered.

Conclusion 

In our view, the judgment to be rendered by the federal Supreme Court should acknowledge the obvious: indigenous peoples who live in Brazil are Brazilians and they deserve to occupy and use the lands they have traditionally occupied. Sometimes, the obvious is hard to acknowledge: the timeframe thesis, besides being embarrassing, is a real absurdity: The history of indigenous peoples in Brazil did not begin only with the promulgation of the Federal Constitution in 1988 and the Supreme Court cannot ignore this fact.

Alvaro de Azevedo Gonzaga, Professor of Law, Pontifical Catholic University of Sao Paulo

Felipe Labruna, University Researcher, Pontifical Catholic University of Sao Paulo

Categories
Mexico Non-repetition / institutional reform Reparations for victims Right to truth Transversal topics

The limits and possibilities for transitional justice in Mexico

Search in Tamaulipas. Foto: Comisión Nacional de Búsqueda.

Mexico is undeniably experiencing a human rights crisis. Since 2006, the year that the administration of former President Felipe Calderon launched a so-called “War on Drugs”, the State’s armed forces have engaged in confrontations with numerous armed drug-trafficking groups operating across the country. This has fueled a spike in human rights violations and abuses. One of the most telling symptoms of the crisis is the alarming number of missing persons in the country– over 90,000, according to governmental records. Entrenched corruption in the justice system, as well as a lack of resources to adequately respond to the rise in violations, have ensured that perpetrators are rarely brought to account. This has resulted in a climate of generalized impunity.

Against this background, some scholars and practitioners have pondered over the applicability of transitional justice (TJ) measures for Mexico, specifically for the victims of the War on Drugs and the era of government repression known as the Dirty War (1960s-1980s). Certainly, the country does not fit a traditional TJ scenario as it is neither transitioning from an authoritarian to a democratic regime nor moving from a conflict to a post-conflict scenario. And still, in the context of its current human rights and impunity crisis, the Mexican government has implemented some measures and programs traditionally adopted in TJ settings. It also has a record on implementing some TJ measures in the past, albeit with limitations. More importantly, perhaps, the country has a strong presence of victims’ associations calling for truth and justice for those who have endured violations. But beyond debates of applicability– the biggest question is whether the State has the political will to apply a holistic transitional justice agenda.

Truth Commission of Ayotzinapa. Photo: Secretaría de Gobernanción.

The TJ agenda under Mexico’s current President

Current President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (2018-2024), known as AMLO, hinted at the possibility of adopting transitional justice measures during his presidential campaign. His proposed Peace and Security Plan made peace-building a priority, stating that “it [was] necessary to … adopt models of transitional justice that guarantee the rights of the victims.” His campaign also included what he named “Listening Forums,” consultation spaces where his team met with groups of victims across the country to discuss relevant human rights issues. The Peace and Security Plan noted that these Forums had evidenced that access to justice was a pending issue for most victims, and as such, it would be a priority for AMLO’s administration.

Upon assuming office in 2018, AMLO took some steps that suggested some commitment to victims’ rights and to the adoption of transitional justice measures. With great symbolic value, one of his first actions as President of Mexico was the establishment of the Commission for Truth and Access to Justice for the case of the 43 missing students from Ayotzinapa. The Commission has made important progress in determining some key perpetrators and in continuing the outstanding work that the IACHR did for the case. It has also ensured that the families of the victims and their accompanying allies actively participate in its implementation. But indeed, the work of the commission is limited to the extent that it is addressing a singular case. It might even be argued that it is creating an unfair hierarchy of victims, by securing access to truth and justice for a small group, while excluding access for the broad majority.

Another important development has been the establishment of the National System for the Search of Missing Persons. It comprises a federal-level search commission, state-level search commissions for all Mexican states, and specialized units within state-level prosecution offices for the crime of disappearances. Innovatively, the law separates the search for the missing persons from the criminal investigation, so that the search is not delayed. Moreover, the law acknowledges that disappearances might be committed by state and non-state actors, something of much relevance to Mexico, given that the majority of these crimes are committed by the latter.

The creation of the system and the law from which it emanated was the result of lobbying efforts by the families of missing persons and their international and local allies. At the start of his administration, AMLO appointed Karla Quintana, a renowned human rights expert, as the Head Commissioner for the National System. Under her leadership, the System has taken important steps, such as drafting a standardized protocol for the search of missing persons, carrying out dozens of open-field searching missions across the country, and creating a center for the identification of human remains in northern Mexico.

Along with the System, AMLO’s administration also approved the creation of an extraordinary mechanism for forensic identification, known as MEIF. It is yet another example of a measure commonly adopted in TJ scenarios. The MEIF was envisioned as a tool to cope with the forensic crisis that the country is experiencing, by which an estimate of 52,000 unidentified bodies lie in government facilities, like burial pits and morgues. Presumably, some of those bodies belong to those missing in the country. This past month, AMLO also announced the creation of the “Presidential Commission for Truth, Justice, Reparation, Memory, and Non-Recurrence” for the victims of the Dirty War period. The name suggests a broad mandate seeking to address multiple victims’ rights. Yet, as the mandate has not been published, it remains to be seen what this new commission will seek to accomplish.

These actions show some degree of political will to address the human rights crisis of the country, through the adoption of measures traditionally associated with transitional justice. However, the scope of these measures is mostly limited to the fulfillment of the right to truth and particularly, to the duty to determine the whereabouts of missing persons derived from this right. The collective aspect of the right to truth is generally excluded from these measures. Moreover, no specific extraordinary programs have been established to guarantee the rights to justice, reparations and non-recurrence for the victims during his administration, suggesting that a genuine commitment to uprooting impunity has been absent.

Memorial, Truth Commission of Guerrero. Photo: Secretaría de Gobernación.

Truth, justice, and reparation measures in the past

AMLO’s administration is not the first to adopt measures from the transitional justice repertoire. Most notably, former President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) established a special prosecutor’s office, known as FEMOSPP, to investigate and prosecute federal authorities implicated in crimes committed during the Dirty War. Unlike AMLO’s, Fox’s administration took place during a transition period, marked by the end of the PRI-party regime, which ruled the country for over 70 years. FEMOSPP opened between 700 to 1000 investigations leading to around a dozen indictments; yet it is unclear whether it achieved any convictions. Beyond criminal investigations, it also published a large report –similar to one that would be published by a truth commission–detailing the context in which violations took place. While it was a first notable effort to apply transitional justice measures in Mexico, its results were limited. 

Mexico also has a precedent of two truth commissions at the state level. The first one was established in 2011 in Guerrero, a state that experienced the rise of guerrilla movements and a consequent wave of government repression during the Dirty War. (It is also the state where the Ayotzinapa case took place, suggesting the urgent need for guarantees of non-repetition). In 2014, the Commission concluded that the State had committed enforced disappearances, torture and extrajudicial killings. The second commission was established in 2014 in Oaxaca, in response to the government repression against a broad coalition social movement known as APPO. Here, the commission concluded that the local government had been implicated in human right violations.

During the administration of Enrique Pena Nieto (2012-2018), and following nation-wide mobilizations, the government approved the Victims’ Law, which established the National System for Attention to Victims. Akin to Colombia’s victims’ system under law 1448, the Mexican system consists of state-based commissions across the country that may provide victims with access to assistance measures, legal support, and reparations. The implementation of the law, however, has been extremely slow and the System has operated with insufficient budget and personnel, making access to benefits for victims difficult. In spite of its operational issues, the System is yet another notable effort to respond to the mass victimization that has come with the rise in violence in the country and that is typical to transitional justice scenarios.

Overall, these scattered measures have contributed to the fulfillment of the rights to truth, justice, and reparations to some victims in Mexico, albeit in an insufficient manner. The vast majority of victims, however, have remained excluded, and those who were able to access benefits did so in a limited form.

Transitional justice in Mexico? Some steps forward, many more ahead

To remedy its situation of generalized impunity, Mexico has adopted measures traditionally associated with transitional justice contexts. In previous administrations, the government has experimented with the creation of a special prosecution office, two local truth commissions, and the establishment of a reparations system, which is still operating. Under current President Lopez Obrador, important actions have been taken to fulfill the right to truth of the families of missing persons.

Notwithstanding the progress made by these initiatives, none have been adopted as part of a holistic transitional justice agenda. This has limited the ability of these measures to positively contribute to the dismantling of structures of impunity, the meaningful redress of victims, and the cease of violence in the country. If indeed the current administration has taken important steps to fulfill the right to truth, the State has a huge debt when it comes to the right to justice. Out of the 92,000 cases of missing persons, only 35 have reached a guilty verdict. As such, it is not surprising that the families of the victims have little hope that perpetrators will ever be brought to account. Firm steps should also be taken to guarantee the non-repetition of violations. Of particular concern is the increased militarization of the country and the continuation of the War on Drugs. It is unlikely that disappearances stop as long as a militarized approach to security continues, as it has been proved that this strategy has been a key factor for the increase of violence and the empowerment of drug cartels in Mexico. In the meantime, victims will continue to mobilize and demand that their rights to truth, justice, and reparations are fulfilled. It is because of their relentless commitment to the fight against impunity that the government has been pushed to take some action. Some public servants within the government have been key allies in ensuring these measures are implemented. And still, a holistic transitional justice agenda will remain an unlikely possibility for Mexico without the firm commitment of the State –as a whole– to uproot impunity once and for all.

Camila Ruíz Segovia, Correspondent in Mexico.

Categories
Non-repetition / institutional reform Peru

¿Qué tiene que ver la justicia transicional con la condena al ex Fiscal de la Nación en Perú?

Foto de Diario Correo. Izq. Ex fiscal Pedro Chávarry. Der. Ex fiscal Blanca Nélida Colán

Autora: Andrea Trigoso

En la historia del Perú dos ex Fiscales de la Nación han sido condenados por corrupción. La primera fue Blanca Nélida Colán, quien sirviera al régimen dictatorial de Alberto Fujimori, que fue procesada en 2001 luego de la caída de régimen y condenada a 10 años de prisión por los delitos de encubrimiento personal, omisión de denuncia, y enriquecimiento ilícito.

Como si no hubiera pasado el tiempo, 20 años después de este episodio,  el 7 de septiembre de 2021 el ex Fiscal de la Nación del Perú, Pedro Chávarry fue condenado a cuatro años de prisión suspendida por el delito de encubrimiento real, que se vio configurado por la solicitud de información reservada del caso Odebrecht, que implicaba los aportes a la campaña de Keiko Fujimori y el cese de los fiscales del equipo especial Lava Jato en diciembre de 2018.

Más que una anécdota, o la perspicaz observación que un Fujimori está involucrado en ambos casos, es necesario reflexionar sobre por qué la historia de la corrupción de funcionarios de más alto nivel se repite en el Perú, y ambos, más que casos aislados, responden a medidas estructurales para reformar las instituciones de justicia, que no se han tomado.

Luego que la dictadura de Alberto Fujimori cayera en noviembre de 2000, el Perú entró en un período necesario de justicia transicional, pues además de salir de un régimen autoritario, salía de un conflicto armado interno que había dejado mas de 69 mil víctimas según cifras oficiales de la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR). A partir de ese momento, con aciertos y desaciertos se han implementado distintas medidas para responder a este período de transición.

Ahora bien, desde el campo de la justicia transicional se han establecido cuatro pilares para reestablecer la paz y el tejido social en el periodo post-violencia. Estos pilares son: justicia, verdad, reparación y garantías de no repetición. En el Perú, se ha puesto énfasis por responder a los tres primeros pilares. Se ha respondido al pilar justicia con procesos penales para juzgar las graves violaciones a los derechos humanos, algunos todavía en etapas iniciales; se ha respondido al pilar de verdad con la CVR, y se ha ido paulatinamente respondiendo al pilar de reparaciones con el plan de reparaciones implementado recientemente; sin embargo, el pilar de garantías de no repetición ha sido casi ignorado en las políticas públicas.

Las garantías de no repetición son tal vez el pilar más importante de la JT. En el informe sobre garantías de no repetición del Relator Especial de Naciones Unidas para la verdad, justicia, reparación y garantías de no repetición, se incorpora como función de la justicia transicional la prevención de la repetición del pasado autoritario o conflictual, y se señala que todas las medidas adoptadas en relación a los otros pilares tienen como objetivo y como hilo unificador la prevención. Así mismo, se señala que estas garantías implican intervenciones institucionales (ratificación de tratados, reformas jurídicas, judiciales, constitucionales, etc.), intervenciones en la sociedad (eliminación de obstáculos a representantes de la sociedad civil, empoderamiento jurídico a quienes han sido excluidos de la protección del Estado, etc.) e intervenciones en las esferas cultural e individual (medidas de educación, arte y cultura; manejo de los archivos; asesoramiento post-traumático y apoyo psicosocial). 

En el Perú, las medidas dentro de las garantías de no repetición que son ahora más evidentes (y más atacadas), son las creaciones del Monumento El Ojo que Llora y el Lugar de la Memoria, como expresión de intervenciones culturales. Sin embargo, no ha habido una intervención institucional sistemática que revise las prácticas de las instituciones de justicia, en lo administrativo y en lo judicial.

Después de la caída del régimen de Fujimori no se reestructuró el Poder Judicial ni el Ministerio Público, ni tampoco otras entidades encargadas de la administración de justicia. No se realizaron reformas que promovieran la integridad, legitimidad, y dieran una imagen de independencia de estas instituciones. Más allá de procesar penalmente a quien fuera la Fiscal de la Nación durante el régimen de Fujimori, no hubo un proceso de depuración de funcionarios, ni de prácticas administrativas en las entidades de justicia. Esto es relevante porque en ambos casos se les acusa de encubrimiento (personal y real) a los ex Fiscales de la Nación, es decir, que aprovecharon esta falta de regulación administrativa y la jerarquía de su cargo para interferir en la labor de los fiscales de investigación. 

Que la historia se repita en Perú 20 años después de la caída del régimen de Fujimori no es coincidencia. No se han instalado mecanismos preventivos para prevenir prácticas similares. Ello trae como consecuencia que, a pesar del paso de tiempo, no se haya reestablecido la confianza cívica entre ciudadanos y hacia las instituciones del Estado, fracasando en uno de los objetivos más importantes de la justicia transicional: reestablecer el tejido social. Por lo tanto, la condena de un ex Fiscal de la Nación debe llamar la atención hacia el proceso de justicia transicional peruano, que, lejos de avanzar y menos aún de haber terminado, lamentablemente parece estar involucionado.