The passage of the Victims’ Reparations Bill by the Gambian National Assembly on November 1, 2023, is in every sense a positive step towards ensuring justice for victims of ex-president, Yahya Jammeh’s cruel dictatorship. His rule was infamously characterized by horrific abuses and human rights violations. Between July 1994 and January 2017, Gambians experienced a violent repression of their human rights and liberties. The egregiousness of the violence is better imagined. Victims were denied medical care, tortured, raped, forcefully disappeared, murdered, and even dismembered.
Since Jammeh’s exile in January 2017, Gambians have bid farewell to his dictatorship. However, the legacy of the horrors he inflicted remains with victims who continue to suffer and live with the consequences of those dark times.
It is not difficult to immediately see how the advent of the Victims Reparations Bill has the potential to secure justice for victims who continue to live with the scars of injustice after surviving Jammeh’s 22-year spell. Rightly so, the law has been greeted with a lot of jubilation and hope, but while this may seem like the pinnacle of the struggle for justice, it is indeed, in some sense, just the beginning.
One of the major challenges facing transitional justice in Africa has been the lack of political will to pursue justice. There are several examples across the continent where political leaders have; failed to implement the recommendations of truth commissions, disregarded the terms of peace agreements, interfered with the decisions of bodies they themselves had constituted, and failed to implement necessary transitional justice initiatives and mechanisms. Gambia can easily go down this path if advocacy is not sustained. The justice-seeking momentum must be maintained and kept high.
While the government of Gambia deserves some commendation for; having set up a truth commission, paying out reparations to some victims, and enacting the Victims Reparations Bill, it is worthy of note that the quest for justice does not and should not end with this. Beyond this newly passed bill, lies the question of implementation.
Moreso, the Gambian Truth Reparations and Reconciliation Commission (TRRC) made 265 recommendations, the majority of whom were accepted by the government. Some of those recommendations include the prosecution of Jammeh and his associates for their crimes. A lot of progress has not been made in that regard and there is increasing doubt about the readiness of the Barrow-led government to commit to judicial remedies for victims of Jammeh’s atrocities. These concerns have grown in the light of a political alliance Barrow has created with a faction of the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) – Jammeh’s party. There are also members of Jammeh’s party who had contributed to widespread human rights violations in the Barrow-led government. A major test for the government in this regard will be how well it implements the newly passed ‘The Ban from Public Office (TRRC) Bill 2023’ which seeks to ban from public office, public officials recommended by the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC).
Overall, the advent of the victims’ reparations bill is a welcome development. However, it has to be complemented with a plan for speedy implementation and justice-seeking mechanisms. The provision of reparations should not be used as a substitute for criminal justice. While reparations are provided to victims, the government should ensure that those who committed atrocities are brought to book in accordance with the recommendations of the TRRC and the aspirations of victims who are yet to get a sense of justice.
Emmanuel Ayoola is a human rights lawyer and a transitional justice practitioner, he currently works with the Africa Transitional Justice Legacy Fund as a Grant and Programs Officer.
Memorial for victims of National Socialism in Stuttgart, Germany, built in 1970
Retributive justice is a justice paradigm responding to rather than preventing crimes, grounded on the relationship between crime and responsibility and proportional punishment (see Moore, 2009). In turn, restorative justice consists in processes whereby parties to crimes collectively resolve crime consequences, including how to repair the harm inflicted on victims and their communities (see Marshall, 1996). Furthermore, retributive justice and restorative justice interact with transitional justice concerning victims in post-atrocity scenarios. This blogpost briefly discusses how victims’ status is shaped by such interaction (see also Perez-Leon-Acevedo, 2014). This is discussed under two trinomials: victims, restorative justice, and transitional justice; and victims, combined retributive justice/restorative justice, and transitional justice.
Victims, restorative justice, and transitional justice
Restorative principles and processes are a central goal of transitional justice mechanisms tackling atrocities (Hoyle, 2021). Victims are central to transitional justice (Méndez, 2016). Restorative practices, which are present in truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) and reparations programmes, enable victims to play central roles and stand better chances to heal relationships between victims, offenders, and their communities.
Since international and hybrid criminal tribunals (ICTs) mainly reflect hegemonic Western punitive criminal justice values focusing primarily on retribution and deterrence and only secondarily on restoration (Drumbl, 2005), TRCs may be more suitable to fulfil restorative justice and better voice victims’ needs and viewpoints. TRCs meaningfully contribute to recognising victims and restoring their dignity. TRCs and traditional restorative mechanisms such as local dispute resolution (ibid.) focused on societal reconciliation, victims, storytelling, and reparations are seemingly better options if the goal is healing individuals and post-atrocity societies (Minow, 1998).
TRCs can focus on victims, facilitating their participation and that of perpetrators and victims’ and perpetrators’ communities. TRCs bring back the conflict to their original actors, enabling officials to grieve with victims (Minow, 1998). By involving all conflict stakeholders, TRCs address victims’ harm. As restorative justice is multidirectional (Aukerman, 2002), TRCs consider that the distinction between victims and perpetrators might sometimes be unclear in atrocity contexts: for example, child soldiers may hold the dual-status of victims and perpetrators. At TRCs, victims provide their testimonies in narrative forms, guaranteeing more inclusive processes for victims and avoiding re-victimization, which contrasts with criminal courts. This promotes national reconciliation and handles impunity collectively (Hayner, 2001).
TRCs can provide platforms for hearing traditionally excluded victims (Ramírez-Barat, 2011). They can enhance victims’ status. At TRCs (e.g., South Africa), victim definitions can be broad. Victims’ dignity, victims’ rights to information and privacy and to have their views and submissions considered have been recognised. TRCs may be better than trials at addressing victims’ fear, trauma, or anger (Zalaquett, 1992).
Nevertheless, some studies have questioned TRCs’ role in healing traumatized victims (Backer, 2004; Shaw 2005). Some TRCs failed in advancing victims’ needs (Brody, 1986). Even concerning well-organized TRCs, not necessarily victims regard truth-seeking mechanisms as options to meet their needs for justice and reparations (Fletcher et al., 2009).
Armenian woman survived from the Genocide tattooed in Arabic captivity. Source: Wikimedia Commons
Reparations programmes can be fundamental regarding victims’ status in transitional justice scenarios. Actually, ‘For some victims reparations are the most tangible manifestation of the efforts of the state to remedy the harms’ (De Greiff, 2006, p.2). Reparations programmes are attractive compared to criminal prosecution because the latter may be perceived as a struggle against perpetrators rather than a victim mechanism.
Reparations programmes constitute appealing options to enhance victims’ roles in transitional justice also vis-à-vis other restorative practices or restorative-oriented mechanisms. Truth-seeking may be only symbolic if tangible outcomes are absent (ibid.). Contextualised in transitional justice scenarios, reparations may also seek to achieve broader goals, namely, transformative and gender justice (Rubio-Marin, 2009; Hoyle and Ullrich, 2014), which should enhance victims’ situation.
However, reparations also present weaknesses in transitional justice contexts since they may be disproportionate to damages, trivializing victims’ suffering (Minow, 1998). Reparations alone are insufficient because victims have diverse interests requiring comprehensive approaches (Fulton, 2014).
Victims, combined retributive justice/restorative justice, and transitional justice
In transitional justice scenarios or mechanisms handling atrocities consequences, retributive justice and restorative justice should not be conflicting but, instead, complementary and mutually reinforcing. Retributive justice and restorative justice are necessary for democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in societies in transition (Villa-Vicencio, 2006). Integrating these justice paradigms should be applied to the relationship between ICTs or national criminal courts and other transitional justice mechanisms as well as within ICTs or national criminal courts. It is reasonable to talk about a ‘restorative side’ of (international) criminal justice (Villa-Vicencio, 2003). Combining retributive justice and restorative justice as the best option for victims in transitional justice contexts is argued below.
First, ICTs may be transitional justice mechanisms in atrocities scenarios. Since transitional justice is a holistic approach including diverse mutually complementary measures (Kritz, 1995), ICTs that strengthen victims’ status arguably implement the transitional justice approach. Reparations at ICTs exemplify transitional reparatory practices that display backward-looking and forward-looking purposes regarding victims and their societies (Teitel, 2000). Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence on victims (e.g., Velásquez-Rodríguez), partially laid transitional justice foundations (ICTJ, 2009), emphasising victim participation in criminal justice and reparations. ICTs have considered and should further consider this. The transitional justice approach seeks to integrate retributive justice and restorative justice. Some transitional justice advocates resist ‘restorative justice’ labels, solely using them when mentioning communities’ resort to customary law and traditional practices (Méndez, 2001). Nevertheless, they assert that transitional justice is victim-centred as victims are central to transitional justice (Aldana, 2006; Zunino, 2019). Researchers and practitioners have become aware of the International Criminal Court (ICC)’s function as one among diverse transitional justice mechanisms (UN Secretary-General, 2004; Okafor and U. Ngwaba, 2015). Hence, victim participation and reparations are intrinsically related to the ICC as a transitional justice mechanism (Méndez, 2016; Aldana, 2006). Although international criminal justice is not restorative justice, it can employ restorative practices through (primarily) reparations (Hoyle, 2012).
Second, there have been important international law developments towards combining retributive justice and restorative justice as the best alternative for victims in transitional justice. The UN Reparations Principles, which primarily deal with restorative justice, include satisfaction as a form of reparation (Principle 22(f)), and within satisfaction: judicial sanctions, which chiefly have to do with retributive justice. Under human rights law (e.g., Victims’ Declaration; UN Reparations Principles 11-15) and scholarship (Bassiouni, 2006; Ochoa, 2013), victims’ rights in criminal justice include: protection from re-traumatization; access to justice; be heard through active participation, including victims’ procedural rights to express their own views and concerns; and claim reparations.
Memorial for victims of National Socialism in Stuttgart, Germany, built in 1970. The wreaths commemorate victims of Kemalism. Author: Ikar.us. Source: Wikimedia Commons.
The ICC exemplifies the said synergy since its predominant retributive and deterrent goals incorporate restorative practices, contrasting with previous ICTs. The ICC Statute mentions both retributive and deterrent goals, and victims (ICC Statute, Preamble), underlying adapted restorative justice elements in the ICC Statute. Most ICTs created after the ICC have incorporated victims as important actors, being consistent with restorative practices. In principle, retributive justice and restorative justice are not mutually exclusive (Walgrave, 2008). Restorative practices may be adapted and incorporated into ICTs’ laws or practices: victim participation and reparations may be included in international criminal justice. This justifies that ICTs can adapt and incorporate restorative justice elements into their mandates. As adjusted and adapted to ICTs (Garbett, 2017), restorative justice has been a major force to strengthen victims’ roles at ICTs through victim participation and reparations (Moffett, 2014; McGonigle, 2011). This illustrates the influence of restorative justice elements at the ICC.
Since restorative justice regards victims as subjects rather than objects (Pena and Carayon, 2013), victims hold enhanced procedural roles and procedural rights at the ICC and other ICTs (McGonigle, 2011). This is consistent with that transitional justice processes must acknowledge victims’ needs (Robins, 2012), counteracting critiques of earlier ICTs that precluded victims from properly expressing themselves (Pena and Carayon, 2013). In societies transitioning from mass atrocities, victims’ active roles in (international), criminal justice may illustrate restorative justice practices, guided by goals concerning victims (UNODC, 2020). Yet, studies on victims’ perceptions reveal a mixed picture of how victims’ roles are implemented at the ICC (Cody, 2017; Cody et al., 2015). Partial mishandling of these roles has also conflicted with defence rights and ICCs’ efficiency (see Safferling and Petrossian, 2021).
ICTs are still predominantly retributive. Even ICTs such as the ICC where victims’ status is more robust are not restorative justice mechanisms, but they incorporate and adapt some restorative practices/elements and can be partially considered victim-oriented justice mechanisms. ICTs may integrate into their goals, victim-friendly/victim-oriented measures but without replacing their core mandate. These measures would provide victims with participatory rights, impacting criminal justice but without changing its rationale. This is different from pure restorative justice, which might question that rationale (Cavadino and Dignan, 1996). The victim rights movement inspired victim empowerment at the ICC (Moffett, 2014). Accordingly, victims participate in victim-oriented or restorative justice-oriented mechanisms at the ICC and other ICTs to influence criminal proceedings for victims’ interests by being participants or civil parties and claiming reparations. Nevertheless, unlike proper restorative justice mechanisms, ICTs involve judicial adjudication.
Third, balanced interactions between restorative justice-oriented mechanisms, especially TRCs, and retributive and deterrent justice mechanisms, e.g., ICTs, have been feasible. Although TRCs can be alternatives to prosecutions, TRCs and ICTs can work simultaneously through some coordination (Totten, 2009). The co-existing Sierra Leone TRC and Special Court for Sierra Leone overall had synergetic effects (Schabas, 2004; Cockayne, 2005). The latter recognized TRCs’ importance for victims and the mutually complementary mandates of ICTs and TRCs (Norman).
The necessary convergence of TRCs and criminal courts in transitional justice scenarios involves that whereas TRCs offer the advantage of listening to victims not as witnesses in a piecemeal fashion, the judicial ‘truth’ holds ‘a “tested” quality that makes it all the more persuasive’ (Méndez, 1997). The complementary relationship between TRCs and ICTs or national criminal courts ‘may have a synergistic effect on the search for post-conflict justice as part of the struggle against impunity’ (Schabas, 2004). The mutually complementary functions of restorative-oriented mechanisms and retributive or deterrent mechanisms stand more chances to enhance victims’ status in transitional justice contexts. This can be seen through ‘lenses of recognition’ as these mechanisms working together can ‘institutionalize the recognition of individuals with equal rights’ (De Greiff, 2006b). Victims’ perceptions about the ICC confirm the need for combining mechanisms, as victims consider that prosecution is important but not the sole accountability mechanism, and that the ICC is both a justice and peace-making mechanism (Cody et al., 2015). Yet, ICC’s justice goals are still unclear (Ullrich, 2016).
Fourth, the victims’ right to truth reveals some similarities or convergences between different mechanisms, e.g., TRCs and criminal courts. Although ICC instruments do not include victims’ right to truth, ICC’s jurisprudence has regarded it as a victim participants’ central interest at the ICC (Lubanga). This is coherent with human rights bodies’ case-law recognizing the right to truth as the victims’ right to access to justice and a remedy (Cyprus v. Turkey; Nech v. Guatemala). UN Reparations Principles 22(b) and 24 reflect this. Individual and collective dimensions of the right to truth are recognised (UN-OHCHR, 2006).
The victims’ right to truth can expand ICTs’ approaches to victims’ status. Criminal proceedings have upheld the victims’ right to truth (UN-OHCHR, 2007), which connects with victims’ roles in criminal justice (UN-Commission on Human Rights, 2005). This right can be implemented through several transitional justice mechanisms including ICTs, national criminal courts, and TRCs (ibid.). If trials are used for what they are intended for (Méndez, 1997), they can contribute to the truth (Fletcher and Weinstein, 2002). Accordingly, trials should not become places for ‘historic’ judgments or settlement of long-term socio-political conflicts, as this produces an unsatisfactory ‘truth’ (Méndez, 1997). Actually, historical truth has been sometimes ‘presented as a by-product of the international criminal proceedings rather than as an objective’ (Schabas, 2012, p.100).
Conclusion
Restorative justice should further be adapted and incorporated into transitional justice mechanisms, to enhance victims’ roles. Victims’ roles in transitional justice depend on each transitional justice mechanism’s mandate: more retributive- or restorative-oriented. However, the interplay among adapted restorative justice, retributive justice/restorative justice combinations, and transitional justice should mean more meaningful victims’ roles and rights.
Juan-Pablo Perez-Leon-Acevedo
Researcher and lecturer Jyvaskyla University (Finland); Affiliated researcher, PluriCourts, Oslo University
References
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The information that I bring here is unprecedented and very important, so Maastricht Blog on Transitional Justice deserves to be the first of all to report it.
As already reported by Prof. Flávio de Leão Bastos Pereira in January, 2022, a judicial process is underway in Sao Paulo-Brazil that aims to transform the former Doi-Codi facilities into a memorial. This memorial has two main purposes: to pay tribute to the thousands of tortured people and the dozens murdered by that agency between 1969 and 1983; to promote a better understanding of how the largest and most important center of repression of the Brazilian civil-military dictatorship functioned and was structured.
Created in 1969 from a consortium formed between the Government of the State of Sao Paulo, the Army and large companies, Doi-Codi was initially called Operação Bandeirante. It was installed on the premises of the Army’s 2nd Mechanized Reconnaissance Squadron, just 1km away from where it was later transferred, at Rua Tutoia, 921, occupying half of the 36th Police Station and an annex building at the back of the land. Understanding the importance of this place, in addition to its undoubted historical relevance, but also material and as an element of documentary evidence of the commission of felonies by the Brazilian State, it has been part of my work at the Historic Heritage Preservation Unit of the Secretary of Culture of the State of São Paulo since 2010.
In that year, the Council for the Defense of Historical, Artistic, Archaeological and Tourist Heritage of the State of Sao Paulo (Condephaat) was required to list as cultural heritage such buildings, considering “their historical importance and relevant didactic role that the aforementioned building has for generations of young Brazilians, who ignore the atrocities committed there, the listing will guarantee the preservation of this important physical document of our recent history” (SEIXAS apud NEVES, 2018). The request was presented by Ivan Akselrud Seixas – arrested at Doi-Codi in 1971 at the age of 16 along with his father Joaquim Seixas, murdered under torture days later. Five human rights organizations endorsed his request, including the State Council Defense of Human Rights (Condepe), state agency linked to the Secretariat of Justice and Citizenship. Provided for in the state constitution, Condepe’s main purpose is to “investigate human rights violations in the territory of the state of São Paulo” (CONDEPE, https://justica.sp.gov.br/index.php/servicos/condepe/).
From this request, initial technical reports prepared between September and December 2010 pointed to the historical importance of the place, consisting of four buildings, a patio and covered garage, with two possible entrances: one through Rua Tutoia, leading to the police station, and another along the perpendicular street – Tomás de Carvalhal. There were no outstanding or notable architectural values there – they were mass-produced buildings, probably in the 1960s, due to their stylistic characteristics. Like these buildings, there were many other police stations throughout the state of Sao Paulo. Two other buildings were out of tune: one resembled a residence and the other had exposed bricks and a garage on the ground floor, surrounded by a wall with two guardhouses, a typical feature of military installations.
In May 2012, Condephaat decided to preliminarily protect the building, guaranteeing the preservation of the property until the end of the technical studies and final decision of the Council. Between May 2012 and October 2013, the deepening of the studies allowed us to understand the dynamics of the Doi-Codi operation in each of the buildings. It also allowed us to understand how the military occupation of government buildings originally destined for civilian use took place. Based on research, very important documents were found:
Decree 36.628/1960, which permitted the expropriation of three lands for the construction of the police station, and the respective transcripts of the land registry office. The Decree confirms the thesis of serial construction policy, since several other expropriations were authorized in different cities of the State of Sao Paulo;
Two administrative processes that deal with the agreement for the transfer of part of the land from the State Public Security Secretariat to the Second Army Command;
Aerial photographs from 1958, 1962, 1968, 1973 and 1977 that allowed identifying the evolution of construction. Initially, the police station and its annex building. In 1960, buildings in reinforced concrete, with external coating made of ceramic tiles, two floors, longitudinal and wide windows. Between 1968 and 1973, the common residence, with symmetrical sides and ceramic roof, with a facade protected only by painting, and a brick building built on structures above ground level. These constructions, therefore, were constructed by the Army and therefore were different from the first ones.
Based on these documents, inspections were carried out with people who were kidnapped by Doi-Codi between 1969 and 1975 and who reported where they were detained, where they were interrogated and tortured, where they entered the buildings and what they were able to recognize from this visit. In Brazil, it was the first time that a heritage preservation agency and former political prisoners worked in partnership for the recognition and preservation of a building related to the forces of governmental repression.
However, we did not find the original architectural plans for the buildings. The administrative processes indicated that the Army did not present the plans for the constructions that it carried out from 1969, but we believe that they exist. The buildings built to house the police station in 1960 should have blueprints since they were included in the State Government’s Action Plan, which provided for the construction of hundreds of public facilities. However, they were not located at the time of the study, which led us to create an alternative simple plan to the building. This plan helped the ex-prisoners to identify where they were interrogated and tortured; and it allowed the technical team of the Historic Heritage Preservation Unit (UPPH) to choose different degrees of preservation for the buildings, considering the use and the value of material evidence.
Ten years after the beginning of the studies, UPPH learned that the collection of the Department of Public Works, which was responsible for the Action Plan, had been incorporated into the Public Archive of the State of Sao Paulo after being inaccessible for least two decades. In consultation with the Cartography Center, we requested a search of the collection and finally the plans were located thanks to the commitment of the Archive employees involved in the search, bringing us joy and the possibility of furthering archaeological and architectural research to support the creation of the memorial.
Three initial aspects of these documents draw attention:
One, the annex building was originally designed to be a training and housing unit, whose character was perverted and transformed into a place of interrogation, torture and murder;
Two, the existence of a barber shop on the first floor confirms the testimony of Ivan Seixas, who reported that it was in that room that his father was tortured in the Dragon Chair (a kind of electric chair), because he remembered the sink installed there. The sink was provided for in the original plan;
Three, the last aspect resolves a doubt as to why only two buildings were built in the early 1960s, leaving the land empty. With access to the original project, the police station and the annex would be used as a kind of training center, containing two classrooms, a barber shop and 5 bedrooms with beds. In the area where the Army built its intelligence sector and accommodation, the construction of a Court was originally planned.
Thus, in that place where thousands of people were tortured and dozens were murdered, the principles of Justice passed away, distorting its initial purpose. As Flávio de Leão Bastos Pereira reported here, it was only in 2021 that Justice really filled in that space, on the occasion of the conciliation hearing between the State and the Public Ministry. It was the first time that Justice entered Doi-Codi, but it was not the first time that it was designed for that space. Education will also have space, not to train the Police, but to transform it.
These original documents are still under analysis and will serve as a basis for archaeological research scheduled to begin in July 2022 as part of a project to create and build a memorial, transforming the space into a place of memory and consciousness. However, they already show the importance of public records and of scientific research for serving transitional justice, which is moving slowly in Brazil.
Deborah Neves is Ph.D. in History, specialized in cultural heritage and sites of difficult memories. Historian at Historical Heritage Preservation Unit, Government of the Sao Paulo State, Brazil
Primer juicio en la ciudad de Córdoba. Mes de mayo de 2008.
La cuestión del juzgamiento de las graves violaciones a los derechos humanos cometidas en los años 70 y principios de los 80 ha sido un tema central en estos casi 40 años de democracia. La demanda de verdad y justicia, asumida activamente por gran parte de la sociedad civil, fue generando respuestas del Estado que, no sin dificultades, permitieron desarrollar uno de los procesos de justicia más vastos del mundo.
El “Nunca Más”.
No bien terminada la dictadura a fines de 1983, el Estado argentino puso en marcha un proceso de justicia que se enfocó principalmente en los mayores responsables de la represión ilegal. En 1985 se llevó a cabo el juicio oral y público contra nueve comandantes de las juntas militares. Se trató de un juicio inédito, casi sin precedentes en el mundo, y fue sumamente importante para establecer los hechos. El tribunal condenó a cinco de los acusados y dio por probado que la represión ilegal, el secuestro, la tortura, el asesinato y la desaparición de personas habían formado parte de un plan sistemático impulsado desde el Estado, con todos sus recursos. El juicio vino a ratificar las conclusiones de la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP), una comisión de la verdad también creada apenas asumió el nuevo gobierno y que, luego de un arduo y veloz trabajo, publicó el informe conocido comoNunca Más en el que describió de una manera muy precisa las características centrales del plan represivo y los delitos cometidos.
Juicio a las juntas militares. Fuente: diario La Nación, Argentina.
Poco tiempo después se inició una etapa de retracción del poder punitivo mediante la sanción de ciertas normas -leyes de punto final, obediencia debida e indultos presidenciales– que fueron impidiendo los juicios y el cumplimiento de las condenas. Estas normas, sancionadas entre 1986 y 1991, consagraron una etapa de impunidad de la que Argentina logró sobreponerse a partir del nuevo siglo.
Marcha contra la Ley de Punto Final. Buenos Aires, Argentina.
La anulación de las normas de impunidad y la reapertura de los juicios fue un proceso gradual que comenzó con un fallo judicial en 2001, la sanción de una ley en 2003 y un fallo de la Corte Suprema en 2005. Los fundamentos de estas decisiones se apoyan fuertemente en argumentos de derecho internacional y en la consideración de los hechos como crímenes de lesa humanidad.
Ahora bien, más allá de la remoción de los obstáculos jurídicos, la puesta en marcha de un proceso de justicia que debe abarcar miles de hechos y de responsables no fue sencilla. Por un lado, Argentina optó por llevar a cabo los juicios con los tribunales penales ordinarios y con las reglas procesales comunes. Esta elección permite prevenir los posibles cuestionamientos que podrían generarse frente a la creación de tribunales creados ad hoc o procedimientos especiales. Claro que la intervención de tribunales no especializados y no habituados a juzgar hechos de criminalidad masiva implica enfrentar importantes desafíos metodológicos y de organización. A estas dificultades debe sumarse la resistencia, muchas veces por motivos ideológicos, de integrantes de los órganos judiciales.
Los primeros años de la reapertura de los juicios fueron particularmente difíciles. Por un lado, debe entenderse que no se trató de una reapertura planificada y decidida de manera centralizada; fue un proceso gradual en el que se fueron abriendo investigaciones sin mucha certeza acerca del futuro y sin una metodología de trabajo diseñada para hechos de tanta magnitud. Inicialmente muchos tribunales, en lugar de adecuar la metodología de trabajo a la escala del fenómeno criminal, hicieron lo contrario: se intentó adecuar el fenómeno criminal a la metodología de trabajo habitual, ya conocida, esto es, la tramitación de casos individuales o de grupos de casos relativamente pequeños. Esto implicó una tendencia a descomponer en fragmentos pequeños un fenómeno criminal complejo y de gran envergadura.
Frente a este panorama, se intentó, especialmente desde el Ministerio Público Fiscal, impulsar ciertas pautas de trabajo para mejorar la metodología de tratamiento de los hechos, para agrupar las investigaciones según denominadores comunes (así, por ejemplo, analizar en conjunto los hechos ocurridos en un centro clandestino de detención o en un área territorial determinada). Por otra parte, se fueron elaborando documentos sobre temas jurídicos relevantes para el impulso del proceso; por ejemplo, sobre el análisis dogmático de los principales tipos penales aplicables en estos casos, la consideración de las privaciones de libertad en ciertas condiciones como tortura, y el juzgamiento de los abusos sexuales cometidos contra personas secuestradas.
A su vez, en casi todas las regiones del país donde se fueron reactivando las causas, se fueron creando grupos de trabajo especializados a cargo de fiscales, que fueron asumiendo un rol protagónico en el proceso, aun pese a la ausencia de un sistema procesal acusatorio (o adversarial). Estos equipos funcionaron como fiscalías especializadas que comenzaron a trabajar coordinadamente a partir de su interacción, apoyo y seguimiento constante de una Unidad Fiscal central, con sede en la Procuración General de la Nación, órgano de gobierno de todo el Ministerio Público Fiscal. De este modo se buscó implementar de manera bastante uniforme en todo el país un modelo estratégico de impulso de los procesos por crímenes contra la humanidad orientado al aprovechamiento máximo de la prueba para el rápido arribo de la mayor cantidad de casos e imputados a la etapa del debate oral, con la menor exposición de testigos posible. En gran medida, estos criterios fueron aceptados por la mayor parte de los tribunales federales, lo que permitió ir desarrollando juicios más grandes en cantidad de acusados y de víctimas.
En el ámbito del Poder Judicial de la Nación, también se observó una política de promoción del proceso de reactivación. Fundamentalmente, a partir de la jurisprudencia de la Corte en casos testigo y del mensaje reflejado en algunas acordadas emitidas como cabeza institucional del Poder Judicial de la Nación, donde se advirtió a todos los jueces federales del país sobre la necesidad de imprimir mayor celeridad a estos procesos
Juicio oral en la ciudad de Rosario, provincia de Santa Fe.
También desde el Poder Ejecutivo se han realizado importantes contribuciones que acompañaron el desarrollo de los juicios. Por un lado, a través, de la Secretaría de Derechos Humanos de la Nación, que ha venido actuando como querellante en centenares de procesos en todo el país, demostrando el especial interés en el juzgamiento de estos crímenes aberrantes como política de Estado. Pero, más allá de ello, el Poder Ejecutivo ha puesto en marcha numerosas agencias y programas que vienen colaborando con los procesos de diferentes maneras, por ejemplo, en materia de protección y asistencia a testigos y víctimas, archivos documentales, e identificación de desaparecidos mediante muestras de ADN.
En suma, el trabajo realizado desde los distintos poderes del Estado, principalmente el de fiscales y jueces que intervinieron en los procesos, los querellantes, las víctimas y organismos de derechos humanos que han impulsado las causas desde el primer día, y todas las instituciones involucradas, ha permitido un crecimiento exponencial de la actividad procesal en todo el país, tanto en la etapa de investigación, como en la cantidad de juicios realizados y condenas logradas.
¿Cuál es el panorama actual, qué nivel de desarrollo se ha alcanzado? El avance general y la actividad de estos procesos pueden verse reflejados en algunas cifras: por ejemplo, según los informes de la Procuraduría de Crímenes contra la Humanidad (PCCH), encargada del seguimiento de los juicios, vemos que en 2010 existían 66 condenados, mientras que para noviembre de 2021 ya se había logrado la condena de 1044 personas en 264 sentencias. A esto se suman 162 absueltos en juicio oral y público. Además, por entonces había 19 debates en curso y otros 67 aguardaban fecha de inicio. A junio de 2021 existían 2321 personas en investigación, con distintos grados de avance procesal.
Los juicios han venido abarcando toda clase de hechos y autores: se ha juzgado a autores mediatos y directos, con diferentes grados de participación en los hechos, a integrantes de las diversas fuerzas armadas y de seguridad, pertenecientes a distintas jerarquías en la cadena de mandos y también -aunque en menor medida- a jueces, fiscales, empresarios y eclesiásticos.
Primer juicio en la ciudad de Córdoba, mes de mayo de 2008. Fuente: www.apm.gov.ar
En este marco, se destaca, por ejemplo, que, de acuerdo con un relevamiento realizado por la PCCH, hacia fines del año pasado se contabilizaban 59 personas investigadas por su intervención como integrantes del sistema de administración de justicia en crímenes cometidos durante la última dictadura. Trece imputados obtuvieron sentencia -11 condenados y dos absueltos-.
El camino es más arduo en el ámbito de la responsabilidad del sector civil y, en particular, del sector empresarial. Si bien existen varios procesos avanzados y algunas condenas, como, por ejemplo, las registradas contra dos gerentes de la empresa Ford por los delitos cometidos contra 12 empleados de la automotriz, en muchos casos se han observado serias dificultades para el avance de los procesos. Un caso paradigmático probablemente lo sea el del empresario Carlos Blaquier. Luego de una parálisis de seis años de las investigaciones que lo involucraban, finalmente, el 8 de julio de 2021, la Corte Suprema dictó un fallo que permitió la reactivación del proceso. Este y otros casos en los que no hubo avances o se revocaron condenas de empresarios muestran una mayor resistencia para el juzgamiento de sectores económicos poderosos que colaboraron y se beneficiaron con el terrorismo de Estado.
El proceso de juzgamiento también ha ido ampliando sus horizontes en lo que respecta a la clase de delitos investigados. En este aspecto, resultan especialmente significativos los avances en el juzgamiento de la violencia por medios sexuales, faceta del terrorismo de Estado que en los primeros años se encontraba claramente invisibilizada. En el primer juicio a las juntas militares no existieron condenas por delitos sexuales, pero con la reactivación de los procesos esta temática fue tomando protagonismo poco a poco y de manera creciente en los últimos años.
Ciertamente, en 2012 la Unidad Fiscal especializada de la Procuración General de la Nación emitió un documento titulado Consideraciones sobre el Juzgamiento de los Abusos Sexuales Cometidos en el Marco del Terrorismo de Estado, donde se problematizaba esta cuestión y se mostraba la deuda de la justicia en esta materia. Para ese entonces, había sólo una condena por agresiones por medios sexuales, y para marzo de 2021 se contaba ya con 121 condenados por esta clase de delitos, en 36 juicios celebrados en 18 secciones judiciales del país, por hechos cometidos contra 136 víctimas (112 mujeres y 24 varones).
Vale acotar aquí que el 13 de agosto de 2021 se dictó una sentencia condenatoria por los delitos sexuales cometidos en la Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA), uno de los centros clandestinos de concentración más sangrientos, por el que pasaron miles de desaparecidos. Ya se habían realizado varios juicios por las detenciones, tortura y homicidios cometidos en ese lugar, entre ellos, el más grande de la historia argentina, que luego de cinco años de audiencias concluyó con una sentencia respecto de 54 imputados (48 condenados) con relación a 789 víctimas. Sin embargo, recién ahora se pudieron juzgar algunos de los abusos sexuales y violaciones a las que se sometieron a las víctimas de ese centro clandestino, en tanto delitos autónomos del tipo penal de tormentos, figura en la que hasta el momento quedaban subsumidos los hechos. En esta sentencia se condenó a dos imputados por la violencia por medios sexuales ejercida contra tres mujeres. Sin dudas, el pronunciamiento judicial representa un paso hacia delante, pero a la luz de la magnitud del fenómeno en el sistema represivo implementado en ese y otros centros clandestinos a lo largo de todo el país, al mismo tiempo nos debe llamar la atención sobre el importante trabajo que aún queda pendiente en esta materia.
Juicio por crímenes en el Centro Clandestino de Detención ESMA. Fuente:www.notasperiodismopopular.com.ar.
Si bien podemos hablar de un proceso de juzgamiento ya consolidado a nivel nacional, no dejan de enfrentarse varias dificultades. La más importante es la lentitud de los procedimientos. A modo de ejemplo, se advierte que uno de los principales problemas que caracterizan al nuevo escenario es la excesiva demora, particularmente en la etapa recursiva. En efecto, entre el requerimiento de elevación a juicio y el pronunciamiento de la Corte Suprema que otorga firmeza a las sentencias transcurren, en promedio, cinco años y cuatro meses, mientras que entre la sentencia de los tribunales orales y la sentencia correspondiente de la Corte Suprema pasan en promedio tres años y seis meses.
La conclusión del proceso de juzgamiento en tiempos razonables evidentemente reclama, entre otras cuestiones, que las máximas instancias del Poder Judicial, como la Cámara Federal de Casación Penal y la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, se aboquen con urgencia a la resolución de los recursos pendientes. El problema del tiempo es particularmente relevante, dado que se trata de procesos aún en trámite por hechos cometidos hace más de cuarenta años. Obviamente, muchas víctimas, testigos e imputados tienen una edad avanzada, por lo que se corre un serio riesgo de que la justicia llegue demasiado tarde.
A modo de balance final, puede decirse que Argentina transita desde hace años un proceso de juzgamiento sumamente extenso, que se ha consolidado en todo el país y ha mostrado avances muy relevantes. Aún queda una gran cantidad de causas en etapa de investigación y muchos juicios por realizar. El tiempo transcurrido desde la fecha de comisión de los delitos hasta que se produjo la reactivación de los juicios impone un escenario que hace cada vez más urgente la agilización de los procesos.
Pablo Parenti, fiscal en causas de lesa humanidad. Titular de la Unidad Especializada para Casos de Apropiación de Niños Durante el Terrorismo de Estado, del Ministerio Público Fiscal de la República Argentina.
Iván Polaco, auxiliar fiscal en causas de lesa humanidad, Ministerio Público Fiscal de la República Argentina.
Texto de la presentación virtual realizada por el Dr Fabián Raimondo para el Instituto Internacional de Responsabilidad Social y Derechos Humanos el 6 de diciembre de 2021.
Buenas tardes.
Antes que nada, agradezco públicamente al Instituto Internacional de Responsabilidad Social y Derechos Humanos por la invitación a exponer en este taller virtual. Como ustedes saben, mi presentación versará sobre la participación de la víctima en los procedimientos de la CPI, a la luz de la investigación de la situación en Venezuela. Durará unos 35-40 minutos, los que nos permitiría contar con tiempo suficiente para formular preguntas, ensayar respuestas y debatir cuestiones conexas.
Introducción
Venezuela ratificó el Estatuto de Roma de la CPI (Estatuto) el 7 junio de 2000.
El Estatuto entró en vigor el 1 de julio de 2002. En consecuencia, la CPI tiene competencia respecto de los crímenes del Estatuto cometidos en Venezuela, o por nacionales de Venezuela en el exterior, a partir de la última fecha.
En febrero de 2018, la Fiscalía de la CPI inició un examen preliminar de la situación en Venezuela desde abril de 2017.
En septiembre del mismo año, Argentina, Canadá, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay y Perú — todos ellos Estados Partes del Estatuto — remitieron a la Fiscalía la situación en Venezuela, requiriendo la apertura de una investigación por crímenes de lesa humanidad presuntamente cometidos en Venezuela desde febrero de 2014.
En el Informe sobre las Actividades de Examen Preliminar de 2020, publicado en diciembre del año pasado, la Fiscalía afirmó que existe base razonable para creer que miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad y las fuerzas armadas han participado en la comisión de crímenes de lesa humanidad, en particular, detención arbitraria, tortura, violación y persecución por motivos políticos. al menos desde abril de 2017.
Fiscal de la CPI Karim Khan QC (izquierda) y Presidente de Venezuela Nicolás Maduro (derecha)
A comienzos de noviembre de este año, el Fiscal de la CPI visitó vuestro país y se reunió con el gobierno, como ustedes ya saben. Luego de que, el 3 de noviembre, anunció la terminación del examen preliminar, la decisión de comenzar una investigación y la adopción de un memorándum de entendimiento con el gobierno venezolano. Por medio de este memorándum, las partes acordaron que Venezuela adoptará las medidas necesarias para garantizar la administración de justicia en el país, establecer mecanismos de cooperación para facilitar el trabajo de la Fiscalía en Venezuela y trabajar “para que el principio de complementariedad tenga un efecto adecuado y significativo”, aunque confieso que el significado este último punto del memorándum no me queda claro. Como sea, les cuento que, en el lenguaje de la CPI, complementariedad significa que una situación o un caso será admisible ante la CPI solo si el Estado competente — Venezuela, en este caso — no puede o no quiere investigar o enjuiciar a las personas presuntamente responsables de un crimen del Estatuto. Les recuerdo que los crímenes del Estatuto comprenden el genocidio, los crímenes contra la humanidad, los crímenes de guerra y el crimen de agresión (Artículo 5 del Estatuto).
A esta altura, ustedes se estarán preguntando qué significan todas esas palabras técnicas, como “situación”, “examen preliminar”, “investigación” y “caso”, así que intentaré explicarlas, a fin de que podamos comprender un poco mejor las posibilidades de participación de la víctima en los procedimientos de la CPI.
Una situación fija los límites geográficos y temporales dentro de los cuales se llevan a cabo un examen preliminar, una investigación y, eventualmente, uno o más casos concretos; por ejemplo, la situación en Venezuela desde 2017 (“Venezuela I”).
Un examen preliminar es la actividad por medio de la cual la Fiscalía evalúa si existe base razonable para creer que se ha cometido o se está cometiendo algún crimen del Estatuto, si el Estado competente ha investigado o enjuiciado a las personas presuntamente responsables y si una investigación por la Fiscalía serviría los intereses de la justicia y las víctimas.
En cambio, durante una investigación la Fiscalía se aboca a recoger pruebas de la comisión de crímenes del Estatuto, a identificar las personas presuntamente responsables y, eventualmente, a solicitar el libramiento de órdenes de detención y entrega contra las personas presuntamente responsables. El libramiento de tal orden da inicio a un caso en el contexto de una situación, como por ejemplo el caso de la Fiscalía contra el ex presidente Omar Al Bashir, relativo a la situación en el Sudán.
Si la persona objeto de la orden de detención y entrega se encuentra a disposición de la CPI, ya sea porque fue arrestada y entregada o porque se entregó voluntariamente, la Sala de Cuestiones Preliminares actuante procederá a informarle los cargos que se le imputan y los derechos que le asisten; y, de haber confirmado uno o más cargos, fijará una fecha para el comienzo del juicio (Arts. 60 y 61 del Estatuto).
Ahora bien, ustedes se preguntarán qué se entiende por víctima y cuáles son los requisitos y modalidades de participación de la víctima en tal contexto.
Concepto, requisitos y modalidades de participación
Según las Reglas de Procedimiento y Prueba, el término víctima comprende a las personas naturales que hayan sufrido daño como consecuencia de un crimen del Estatuto y a las instituciones cuyos algunos de sus bienes destinados a fines religiosos, educativos, artísticos, científicos o caritativos hayan sufrido daño como consecuencia de un crimen del Estatuto (Regla 85).
La definición de víctima ha sido objeto de una interpretación amplia por parte de las salas de la CPI, lo que ha dado lugar a una jurisprudencia que reconoce tal estatus no solo a la víctima directa, sino también a la indirecta. Víctima directa es aquella que fue objeto de un crimen del Estatuto y ha sufrido un daño como consecuencia de tal crimen; por ejemplo, una persona objeto de una violación sexual. En cambio, la víctima indirecta es aquella que ha sufrido daño como consecuencia de un crimen del Estatuto cometido contra una víctima directa, como podría ser el caso de aquella que ha sufrido daño psicológico como consecuencia del haber presenciado la comisión de un crimen del Estatuto particularmente violento o atroz, o el caso de aquella que haya sufrido daño como consecuencia del homicidio cometido contra alguno de sus progenitores o descendientes directos, siempre que los dos crímenes referidos puedan calificarse como crímenes de guerra, crímenes contra la humanidad o actos de genocidio, claro está.
A diferencia de los estatutos de los tribunales penales internacionales que la precedieron, el de la CPI consagra dos derechos importantes a favor de la víctima: el derecho a expresar opiniones y observaciones en el curso de los procedimientos y el derecho a obtener una reparación por el daño sufrido (Arts. 68 y 75, respectivamente).
¿Cuáles son los pasos a seguir para participar en los procedimientos? En primer lugar, la víctima debe enviar una solicitud de participación a la Dependencia de Víctimas y Testigos de la CPI. A tal fin se recomienda que utilice el formulario creado por la Dependencia, si bien, por el momento, no se encuentra disponible en castellano. En dicho formulario deben indicarse: la identidad del peticionario; la situación o el caso en el que se desea participar u obtener una reparación; el crimen del que se es víctima y el daño sufrido en consecuencia; el tipo de reparación que se persigue; las preocupaciones existentes en torno a la seguridad personal o de su familia; y, finalmente, si se cuenta con representación letrada o se desea contar con la representación letrada de un miembro de la Lista de Abogados de la CPI, como es mi caso, o de la Oficina Pública de la Defensa de las Víctimas.
Sede de la Corte Penal Internacional. La Haya, Países Bajos.
Si la solicitud es enviada durante el curso de una investigación, como la presente sobre la situación en Venezuela, la Dependencia toma nota de ella en el registro respectivo y la mantiene como información confidencial. No la transmite inmediatamente a la Sala de Cuestiones Preliminares interviniente. La enviará a la Sala cuando esta requiera que se le transmitan las solicitudes presentadas hasta el momento o cuando la víctima solicite autorización para expresar opiniones o preocupaciones con respecto a un incidente procesal concreto.
Las salas de la CPI aceptan o rechazan las solicitudes de participación sobre la base de los criterios establecidos en el Estatuto y las Reglas de Procedimiento y Prueba de la CPI, a saber, si existe fundamento razonable para creer que el peticionario ha sufrido daño físico, moral o psicológico, y si el daño resulta de la comisión de un crimen del Estatuto.
Cuando la investigación da lugar a un caso, la sala interviniente evalúa los méritos de las solicitudes de participación al comienzo de cada etapa procesal del caso en cuestión, es decir, al comienzo de la etapa preliminar del juicio, al comienzo del juicio y, de apelarse el veredicto o la sentencia pronunciada por la sala de juicio, al comienzo del procedimiento de apelación. Esto conlleva dos cosas. Una, que la autorización para participar en una etapa del proceso no implica autorización para participar en la etapa posterior; por ejemplo, una víctima autorizada a participar en la audiencia de confirmación de cargos podría no ser autorizada a participar en la fase siguiente, es decir, el juicio. También conlleva lo opuesto, esto es, que una víctima podría ser admitida a participar en una fase del proceso aun cuando no haya participado en la anterior; por ejemplo, una víctima que no haya participado en la audiencia de confirmación de cargos podría ser autorizada a participar en el juicio.
Ahora bien, es importante tener en cuenta que, una vez concedida la autorización a participar en una etapa concreta del proceso, la víctima puede ejercer su derecho a expresar opiniones y observaciones solo si sus intereses personales se encuentran afectados y si la sala interviniente lo considera apropiado (Artículo 68(3) del Estatuto).
Las posibilidades de participación de la víctima durante un examen preliminar son muy escasas, pero no por ello irrelevantes. En primer lugar, la víctima puede enviar información relativa a la comisión de crímenes del Estatuto, por medio de una comunicacióndirigida a la Fiscalía. Si bien el Estatuto no especifica el tipo y la calidad de información que la comunicación debería proporcionar, resulta evidente que debería ser lo suficientemente detallada y creíble para que la Fiscalía pueda valerse de ella a la hora de determinar si existe fundamento razonable para abrir una investigación. En segundo lugar, la víctima podría contar con la posibilidad de formular observaciones, luego de que la Fiscalía haya solicitado a la Sala de Cuestiones Preliminares que la autorice a comenzar una investigación (Art. 15(3); Regla 50(3)).
Las oportunidades de participación durante una investigación, como la de la situación en Venezuela, también son muy escasas, pero no son insignificantes. Por ejemplo, cuando la Fiscalía comunica a los Estados Partes que ha decidido comenzar una investigación, y un Estado Parte del Estatuto cuestiona la admisibilidad de la investigación, la Sala de Cuestiones Preliminares podría autorizar a la víctima a presentar su opinión al respecto (Arts. 18(2) y 68(3) del Estatuto; Rule 55). Esto bien podría ocurrir en la investigación relativa a Venezuela, ya que el gobierno venezolano probablemente cuestione la admisibilidad de la investigación dentro de los 30 días contados a partir del día de la notificación de la apertura de la investigación, plazo que probablemente venza esta semana.
Sin dudas, las posibilidades de participación se acrecientan notablemente con la apertura de un caso. Durante la etapa preliminar del juicio, la víctima cuenta con varias oportunidades. En primer lugar, puede acceder, antes y durante la audiencia de confirmación de cargos, al expediente del caso, incluso a la prueba que será presentada por la Fiscalía y la defensa. En segundo lugar, la víctima tiene derecho a ser notificada de todos los desarrollos procesales ocurridos durante esta fase preliminar al juicio. En tercer lugar, tiene derecho a peticionar en relación con cualquier cuestión relativa a la admisibilidad y pertinencia de tal prueba, así como también el derecho a examinarla durante la audiencia de confirmación de cargos, por ejemplo, interrogando un testigo. En cuarto lugar, tiene derecho a asistir a las audiencias públicas tanto como a aquellas que son llevadas a cabo a puertas cerradas. Y, en quinto lugar, tiene derecho a formular observaciones relativas a toda otra cuestión que afecte sus intereses personales, siempre que la sala de cuestiones preliminares la haya autorizado a hacerlo.
Como ya expliqué, si, luego de la audiencia de confirmación de cargos, la sala de cuestiones preliminares confirma uno o más cargos contra la persona imputada, fijará una fecha para el comienzo del juicio. Durante el juicio solo podrán participar las víctimas de los crímenes que forman parte de los cargos confirmados, siempre que sus intereses personales se vean afectados y la sala de juicio lo encuentre apropiado. Las posibilidades de participación de la víctima durante el juicio también son relativamente amplias, por ejemplo:
Puede asistir a audiencias públicas y a puertas cerradas.
Puede presentar alegatos de apertura y de clausura de juicio.
Puede ofrecer testigos.
Puede interrogar testigos o al acusado.
Ahora bien, tengamos en cuenta que la víctima tiene derecho a contar con representación letrada a lo largo de todos los procedimientos y, de hecho, siempre participa a través de su representante legal. Incluso las notificaciones procesales son dirigidas al representante legal y no a la víctima personalmente.
Más allá de su participación en los procedimientos en calidad de víctima, esta también podría participar como testigo; en tal caso, la víctima tendrá un doble estatus ante la CPI: víctima y testigo. Ahora bien, existen algunas diferencias considerables entre ambos modos de participación, por ejemplo: (i) la participación como víctima es voluntaria, mientras que el prestar declaración testimonial no lo es; para que esto ocurra es necesario que la víctima sea citada a declarar por la Fiscalía, la defensa o el representante legal de víctimas; (ii) como ya dije, la participación como víctima podría ocurrir en cualquier fase del proceso; sin embargo, el prestar declaración testimonial solo podría ocurrir en la etapa de juicio; y (iii) como también ya dije, la participación de la víctima como tal en los procedimientos siempre se lleva a cabo por medio del representante legal; por el contrario, el testigo declara por sí mismo.
En otro orden de cosas, siempre deberíamos tener presente que la participación de la víctima en los procedimientos podría conllevar riesgos para su seguridad personal o la de su familia. Por esta razón es importante que la víctima evalúe tales riesgos antes de presentar la solicitud de participación y que, una vez presentada, se abstenga de contárselo a propios y a extraños. Además, una vez que haya sido aceptada como participante, debería comunicar todo temor por su seguridad a su representante legal, a fin de que este considere la posibilidad de peticionar la adopción de medidas de protección adecuadas.
Finalmente, quiero hacer unas muy breves consideraciones acerca del derecho a obtener reparación.
El procedimiento de reparación puede llevarse a cabo solo si persona acusada fue encontrada culpable de un crimen y si la víctima de tal crimen peticiona el otorgamiento de una reparación.
Si la petición es aprobada, la sala interviniente decide el tipo de reparación a otorgar. Puede ser individual o colectiva, según si está destinada a una víctima o a un grupo de víctimas, respectivamente. Los tipos de reparación comprenden la indemnización pecuniaria, la restitución de bienes apropiados ilegítimamente, la rehabilitación — tal como un tratamiento médico — y la satisfacción — es decir, medidas tales como una disculpa pública, una conmemoración o la construcción de un monumento de la memoria —.
Bueno, mi presentación termina en este momento, ya que no quiero restar tiempo para formular preguntas, ensayar respuestas y debatir ideas. Muchas gracias por vuestra atención.
Photos of victims of Iran's 1988 massacre of political prisoners outside the US Congress, August 2021
By Hanif Jazayeri
Thirty-three years ago, on the orders of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran carried out a systematic slaughter of thousands of political prisoners who refused to renounce their beliefs in what became known as the 1988 massacre. For over three decades, families of the victims have faced imprisonment and torture for seeking justice. While key perpetrators of those mass atrocities have now risen to positions of power, the world is, belatedly, only just starting to wake up to the crisis of impunity that exists in Iran.
The 1988 massacre
In July 1988, at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran’s then-Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a fatwa, or religious decree, ordering the execution of imprisoned opponents who had already been tried and were serving their prison terms. Thus began what turned out to be the biggest massacre of political prisoners in recent history. It is estimated that some 30,000 inmates were extra-judicially executed or forcibly disappeared within several months.
Khomeini’s Fatwa
Khomeini’s fatwa targeted political prisoners affiliated to the main opposition group People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI or MEK) who remained loyal to the organization. The fatwa stated: “As the [PMOI] do not believe in Islam … and as they are waging war on God … It is decreed that those who are in prison throughout the country and remain steadfast in their support for the [PMOI] are waging war on God and are condemned to execution.”
‘Death Commissions’ were formed across Iran sending thousands of prisoners who refused to abandon their beliefs to execution. The victims were buried in secret mass graves across the country.
Eminent human rights experts have stated that the extrajudicial executions of 1988 amount to crimes against humanity and genocide. Former UN judge Geoffrey Robertson has described the killings as genocide, arguing that according to Khomeini’s decree, the principal reason for the call to annihilate PMOI supporters was that they were “waging war on God.” According to renowned international humanitarian law expert Prof. Eric David, what happened in 1988 “amounts to genocide.”
A culture of impunity
Iranian society is today at serious risk of further mass atrocities, with top perpetrators of the 1988 massacre being appointed to the head of both the Executive and Judiciary branches in 2021. Iran’s current President Ebrahim Raisi was in 1988 Deputy Tehran Prosecutor and a member of the ‘Tehran Death Commission’ that sent thousands of political prisoners to death, while Iran’s new Judiciary Chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei supervised the mass executions of 1988 as the Judiciary’s representative in the Intelligence Ministry.
The failure of the international community to hold the perpetrators of the 1988 massacre accountable has emboldened the Iranian authorities to commit further atrocities against dissident protesters and political prisoners, as was witnessed during the deadly crackdown on the nationwide protests of 2019.
Meanwhile, families of the victims, survivors, and human rights defenders are today the subject of persistent threats, harassment, intimidation, and attacks because of their attempts to seek information on the fate and whereabouts of the victims and their demands for justice. Simultaneously, the authorities are systematically destroying the mass graves in an attempt to wipe the evidence of their crimes.
Protest Rally, Place des Nations, Geneva,26/02/2019 – Hundreds of Iranian exiles supporters of the Peoples Mojahedin Organization of Iran, carried Iranian flags and banners opposed to the Iranian regime in a rally on Tuesday February, 26,2019 in front of the UN Headquarters in Geneva to protest grave violations of human rights in Iran.
The families seek justice
In 2016, at the request of the families, a group of human rights lawyers formed ‘Justice for the Victims of the 1988 Massacre in Iran’ (JVMI) in London to help the campaign for accountability, truth, and justice.
Based on interviews with dozens of survivors and hundreds of families, JVMI has identified nearly 100 members of the 1988 Death Commissions in two published reports. It has also identified 59 mass graves where victims are believed to be buried. JVMI has presented its findings to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Time for a UN inquiry
In a major breakthrough, seven UN Special Rapporteurs wrote to the Iranian authorities on 3 September 2020, pointing out that the 1988 extrajudicial executions may amount to “crimes against humanity.”
The seven experts stated that the failure of UN bodies to act over the 1988 massacre has “had a devastating impact on the survivors and families” and “emboldened” the Iranian authorities to “conceal the fate of the victims and to maintain a strategy of deflection and denial.”
They suggested that the international community should “investigate the cases including through the establishment of an international investigation.”
With Iran failing to respond to the Special Rapporteurs, some 152 former UN officials and renowned international human rights and legal experts wrote to UN High Commissioner Michelle Bachelet on 3 May 2021, calling for the formation of a Commission of Inquiry into the 1988 massacre.
In addition to JVMI, the letter’s signatories included a former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, a former UN Deputy Secretary-General, 28 former UN Special Rapporteurs on human rights, and the chairs of previous UN Commissions of Inquiry into human rights abuses in Eritrea and North Korea. Distinguished legal professionals who signed the appeal included the former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, a former Special Prosecutor at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and the first President of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone.
Furthermore, Amnesty International in a statement on 19 June 2021 reiterated that Ebrahim Raisi had a key role in the 1988 massacre and should be “investigated for his involvement in past and ongoing crimes under international law, including by states that exercise universal jurisdiction.”
In its report, Blood-soaked secrets: Why Iran’s 1988 prison massacres are ongoing crimes against humanity, published in 2018, Amnesty International concluded that, in addition to committing the crime against humanity of murder in 1988, by extrajudicially executing thousands of political dissidents in secret, the Iranian authorities are committing the ongoing crimes against humanity of enforced disappearance, persecution, torture and other inhumane acts, including by systematically concealing the fate of the victims and the whereabouts of their remains.
UN Special Rapporteur on Iran, Javaid Rehman, in an interview with Reuters on 29 July 2021 called for an independent inquiry into the 1988 state-ordered executions and the role played by Ebrahim Raisi as Tehran Deputy Prosecutor. Prof. Rehman said that his office was ready to share gathered testimonies and evidence if the UN Human Rights Council or another body sets up an impartial investigation. He expressed concern at reports that some “mass graves” were being destroyed as part of a continuing cover-up.
Separately, in a report to the Human Rights Council, the UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances (WGEID) called for an “international investigation” into the 1988 massacre. The report, dated 4 August 2021, stated: “The Working Group reiterates the concerns expressed about the ongoing concealment of burial sites of those forcibly disappeared and allegedly executed between July and September 1988 across the country. The Working Group recalls that an enforced disappearance continues until the fate and whereabouts of the individuals concerned are established and joins the call for an international investigation into the matter.”
Photos of victims of Iran’s1988 massacre of political prisoners outside the US Congress, August 2021
In light of the concerns raised by the UN Special Procedures, some UN Member States are now also beginning to focus on the need for accountability and justice over the 1988 massacre.
In Sweden, a low-ranking perpetrator of the 1988 massacre, Hamid Noury, is currently in custody and on trial for his role as Assistant to the Deputy Prosecutor of Gohardasht Prison during the mass murders.
Furthermore, at the UN General Assembly Third Committee last week, Canada’s representative decried attempts by Iranian authorities to destroy evidence of the 1988 massacre, stating: “Families must be able to exercise their rights to remedy and to reparation. They deserve to know the truth.”
Similarly, the UK has urged Iran to allow the UN Special Rapporteur access to the country to “conduct research and investigations into human rights concerns reported there, including the events of 1988, and the reports of intimidation and destroyed evidence.”
The US State Department in a tweet marking the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances in August called on Iran to release political prisoner Maryam Akbari Monfared who has been held in Iranian prisons for 12 years for protesting the deaths of her family members in the 1988 massacres.
Meanwhile, Belgium’s Foreign Minister urged Iran in September to reveal the truth about the enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings of 1988. And the Prime Minister of Slovenia, whose country currently holds the EU’s rotating presidency, publicly supported an international Commission of Inquiry into the 1988 massacre in a speech last July.
While such public positions by world leaders are a welcome development, a UN investigation into the 1988 massacre is long overdue.
It’s high time the Human Rights Council once and for all challenges the impunity enjoyed by Iranian officials by adopting a resolution for an international investigation into the 1988 mass extra-judicial executions and enforced disappearances of thousands of political prisoners. It’s time for Iranian officials to be held to account. Accountability is vital for bringing closure to the families and for preventing similar mass atrocities by Iranian officials in response to ongoing protests by Iran’s people for political change.
Hanif Jazayeri is Secretary of London-based NGO Justice for the Victims of the 1988 Massacre in Iran (JVMI) and a news editor. His Twitter handle is @HanifJazayeri.
Relatives of enforced disappearance victims at the office of the European Commission of Human Rights in Huamanga, Ayacucho, located in the Huamanga municipality premises. July 1985. Photo: Ernesto Jimenez
In 2001 Peru entered a post-dictatorship and post-armed conflict transitional period. Since then, various transitional justice (TJ) mechanisms have been established to address the pillars of truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition required by the universal model of TJ. Nevertheless, after 20 years the TJ agenda receives little attention, as does the assessment of whether the TJ period has ended or if there are still pending challenges. This post briefly summarizes the current state of TJ in Peru and mentions some of the pending challenges for each TJ pillar.
1. The armed conflict in Peru
Soldiers escort Ramón Laura Yauli and Concepción Lahuana after declaring having been forcefully recruited by Shining Path. La Mar, Ayacucho. June 1985. Photo Abilio Arroyo- Caretas
During the closing decades of the last century, Peru went through an internal armed conflict and was subject to an authoritarian regime. According to the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the armed conflict began in 1980 with the public burning of the electoral amphorae in the village of Chuschis, perpetrated by the terrorist organization Sendero Luminoso – Shining Path (SL), and it lasted until 2000. In the last decade of that period, Alberto Fujimori, who was democratically elected as president in 1990, perpetrated a coup on April 5, 1992. With the support of the armed forces, Fujimori dissolved the Congress and established an antidemocratic regime that ended in November 2000, when he resigned by fax from Brunei, where he was attending the APEC summit.
It is worth mentioning that prior to the internal armed conflict, Peru had a military dictatorship, which had been established in 1968. The military junta appointed General Juan Velasco Alvarado as de facto president, who was himself deposed in 1975, after another coup. The new de facto president, General Francisco Morales Bermúdez installed a Constituent Assembly in 1979 and called for democratic elections in 1980.
Consequently, during the period of transition to a democratic government, an armed conflict started in Peru. Thus, the period in which mechanisms to deal with human rights violations committed during the military dictatorship should have been established, Peru had to face the uprising of terrorist violence, with young and weak democratic institutions, and an almost non-existent rule of law.
During the armed conflict, there were two terrorist organizations responsible for the attacks and mass atrocities. SL led by Abimael Guzmán, a group to which the TRC attributes the highest number of deaths (54%), and the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru (MRTA), to whom the TRC attributes 1.5% of deaths. The latter group extinguished after the Chavín de Huántar operation, in which the armed forces broke into the Japanese Embassy in Lima to rescue the hostages taken by the MRTA.
Shining Path, on the other hand, has not ceased to operate in Peru. After the capture of Abimael Guzmán in 1992, and the consequent dismantling of a large part of the organization, SL continues to operate in the zone of the Valley of the rivers Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro (VRAEM). This is despite the capture of other SL leaders such as Oscar Ramírez Durand (a.k.a comrade Feliciano) or Jorge Quispe Palomino (a.k.a comrade Jose). However, the current group is divorced from the initial ideology of Abimael Guzmán (pensamiento Gonzalo) and survives through illegal activities such as drug trafficking, extortion, and murders.
Furthermore, the armed forces and the police were also responsible for serious human rights violations. State agents, self-defense committees, and paramilitary groups were responsible for 37% of deaths and disappearances reported to the TRC. Emblematic cases that illustrate this period are the Cabitos military base, and the Frontón prison before the Fujimori dictatorship, and the cases of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, during the Fujimori dictatorship.
2.Truth, justice, reparations
Victims of the armed conflict giving their testimonies in the TRC. 21 June 2002. Photo: Reuters
After the end of the authoritarian regime, Peru started a period of transitional justice, which seems to be still ongoing. The transitional government of Valentín Paniagua created the TRC in June 2001, with the task of establishing the facts about the terrorist violence and the serious human rights violations that occurred in the preceding decades. The mandate of the Commission included the clarification of the political, social, and cultural conditions that permitted the conflict; assist the judiciary to establish the truth about the crimes committed by the terrorist organizations and State agents, as well as to identify alleged responsibilities; submit proposals for reparation, recommendations for institutional reforms, and the establishment of monitoring mechanisms for the recommendations. In August 2003, the final report of the TRC was presented. It gathered the testimonies of 17.000 victims and calculated the loss of 69.000 lives during the conflict. In addition, its recommendations on reparations fostered the comprehensive reparations program, and the findings on human rights violations and terrorist acts contributed to the prosecution of these cases.
Moreover, the judicial bodies have also made efforts towards the investigation and prosecution of terrorist acts and serious human rights violations. The judiciary created the National Criminal Chamber and endowed it with jurisdiction for cases of terrorism and serious human rights violations. The Office of the Public Prosecutor also created a specialized subsystem for the same type of crimes. Within the framework of these subsystems the SL leader, Abimael Guzmán, and the SL’s leadership were retried in 2005. The new trial followed a decision of the Constitutional Court that declared the previous trial null and void, because it was conducted in the military jurisdiction, in summary manner, and with “faceless judges.” In 2006, Abimael Guzmán was sentenced to life imprisonment along with other SL leaders, who never apologized to the victims.
Angelica Mendoza Ascarza – Mama Angelica. Founding member of the National Association of the Relatives of the enforced disappeared, kidnapped, and unlawful detainees (ANFASEP)- most visible victim of the Cabitos case
The human rights violations perpetrated by State agents have also been prosecuted within the aforementioned judicial system: illustrated in the cases of Accomarca, Cabitos, Barrios Altos, and la Cantuta. Alberto Fujimori was also tried for the facts that concern these last two cases, and he was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Nevertheless, the prosecution of these cases has presented a series of technical challenges (related to the evidence and principle of legality), as well as obstructions of political nature. Proof of this is that emblematic cases such as Accomarca and Cabitos were sentenced and reached final judgments only 31 and 35 years after the events occurred (with many defendants removed from the process for health or other reasons), and that there are cases from that period that are still in trial, or even remain at the investigation stage (see cases Manta y Vilca, Fronton, and Forced Sterilizations), because they are investigating mass crimes committed by high-ranking military personnel and political leaders.
Following the TJ framework, Peru has gradually implemented a comprehensive reparations plan (CRP) recommended by the TRC. In 2005, the Congress enacted a law creating the CRP that was composed of the following 6 programs: restitution of citizens’ rights, reparations in education, reparations in health, collective reparations, symbolic reparations, and facilitation for housing access. Additionally, this law and its regulations established that the High Level Multisectoral Commission (CMAN), and the Reparations Council (RC) -in charge of the registry of victims – would be in charge of the implementation of the CRP.
The aforementioned normative framework for reparations considers the relatives of the disappeared or killed persons, displaced persons, persons who were arbitrarily detained, tortured victims, victims of rape, kidnapped persons, members of the armed forces, the national police, self-defense committees, and civil authorities wounded or injured in actions that violated their human rights as beneficiaries of the CRP. Likewise, indirect victims are also beneficiaries of the CRP, considered as such: children who were the product of rape, minors who were part of self-defense committees, people unduly accused of terrorism, and people who were undocumented because of the conflict. Peasants and native communities, and other small rural villages affected by the violence and groups of organizations of non-returning displaced persons are also beneficiaries of the CRP as collective victims. The exception to these categories are former members of the terrorist organizations, even if they suffered human rights violations, and victims who have already received reparations for other decisions or State policies.
A reburial ceremony for victims who were killed in the conflict. Photo: ICTJ
The report on reparations in Peru from the Queen’s University of Belfast indicated that until April 2018 there were 226.727 people registered in the single registry for victims; 5.712 communities and rural villages, and 127 organized groups of non-returnees were registered for collective reparations. Of this total, the CMAN has given reparations to 1.852 (32.5%) rural villages and communities in fifteen departments. Additionally, the report indicates that individual financial reparations were granted to 98.132 beneficiaries; 12.082 people were registered in the Special Registry of Beneficiaries of Reparations in Education; 139.296 beneficiaries of the health reparations program joined the National Comprehensive Health Insurance. The report also points out that as symbolic reparations, the Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion (LUM) was created, which is a space for pedagogical and cultural commemoration, and the Monument “the eye that cries” was built as an initiative from the civil society. Finally, the report mentions that the Ombudsman’s Office registered around 2.000 victims of enforced disappearance, which has allowed their declaration of absence and access to related civil rights for their family members.
Despite the progress in reparations, there are still many challenges Peru must face. These include the many provisions and registries established for the victims, because they are confusing and mutually exclusive, which makes it difficult for victims to benefit from the reparations programs. Other challenges to execute the reparations program include the lack of coordination between the State entities, the misperception of reparations as social programs, the failure to institutionalize the budget for reparations, the lack of symbolic reparations that include public expressions, and the lack of political will to carry them out.
3. Guarantees of non-repetition
Regarding institutional reform, the Peruvian State has had limited activity. An illustrative example of this is the TRC recommendation for strengthening the independence of the administration of justice that entailed the establishment of an independent system for the appointment, evaluation, and sanction of magistrates (judges and prosecutors), and the reestablishment of the judicial career. An effort in this regard was made with the enactment of the law for the judicial career. However, no structural change or vetting system was proposed, and a large number of provisional magistrates continued to be appointed. The more visible impact of this failure in the institutional reform of the judiciary happened in 2018, when a systematic corruption web involving judges and prosecutors of the highest level, and members of the National Council of the Magistracy (CNM), the body that evaluates and appoints magistrates, was discovered to be appointing magistrates through unlawful means. After this finding, the CNM was dissolved and a National Board of Justice was created to investigate these events, remove the magistrates involved, and propose reforms for the appointment and evaluation of magistrates.
In addition, the TRC recommended measures for the armed forces and the police, which involved training in human rights, the introduction of civilian control in the intelligence services, and the definition of the police as a non-militarized civilian institution in the constitution. Even though there have been efforts to improve the human rights training for both institutions, they have not reviewed their protocols to ensure compliance with human rights standards, no civil controls have been introduced to the armed forces, and the constitutional definition of the police has not changed. The consequences of this lack of reform are evident in the mismanagement of public order crisis, especially when facing protests, which have left citizens dead and others injured in recent years (see protests of November 14, 2020 and the agricultural strike of December 2020)
Street art in Cusco. Photo: Unknown
Furthermore, the TRC recommendation to strengthen the presence of the State throughout the territory, especially in the most neglected and affected areas by the conflict, has been hardly implemented. The causes of the conflict, according to the TRC, are related to the absence of the State and exclusion in the political, social, and economic representation of a sector of the population. This link was so strong that the TRC found there was a relationship between the situation of poverty and social exclusion and the probability of being a victim of armed violence. After twenty years, these structures have not changed, and this scenario does not guarantee the non-repetition of the violent past.
4.A final remark
Twenty-one years after the armed conflict ended, is clear that the TJ period in Peru has not yet finished, and there is still a lot to do for each TJ pillar. In the current state of affairs, the reconstruction of the social tissue and the re-founding of a social pact that generates trust between citizens and in the Peruvian State institutions is a distant but urgent aspiration that could generate reconciliation in the country. Therefore, the introduction of a TJ agenda in the public policies is a task that cannot be further postponed by the Peruvian government.
PS. Some of the pictures were taken from Yuyanapaq, a graphic account of the conflict. It can be visited here
Familiares de desaparecidos acuden al Concejo Municipal de Huamanga, Ayacucho, van a rendir sus testimonios ante la oficina de la Comisión Europea de Derechos Humanos . Julio 1985. Foto: Ernesto Jimenez
En el año 2001 Perú entró en un periodo de transición post-dictadura y post-conflicto armado. Desde entonces se han recurrido a diversos mecanismos de justicia transicional (JT) con el objetivo de cubrir los pilares de verdad, justicia, reparación, y no repetición que requiere el modelo universal de JT. Sin embargo, 20 años después, casi nada se habla de la agenda de JT ni de si se ha superado ese periodo o si quedan desafíos pendientes. Este post resume brevemente el panorama actual de la JT en el Perú, y señala algunos desafíos pendientes de cada pilar de la JT.
a. Conflicto armado en el Perú
Efectivos del Ejército acompañan a los esposos Ramón Laura Yauli y Concepción Lahuana, quienes declararon haber sido reclutados a la fuerza por Sendero Luminoso. La Mar, Ayacucho, junio de 1985. Foto: Abilio Arroyo – Revista Caretas
En las últimas décadas del siglo pasado, Perú sufrió un conflicto armado interno y un gobierno antidemocrático. De acuerdo al informe final de la Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR), el conflicto armado se inició en 1980 con la quema pública de las ánforas electorales en la población de Chuschis, perpetrada por la organización terrorista Sendero Luminoso (SL) y duró hasta el año 2000. En la última década de ese periodo, Alberto Fujimori fue elegido democráticamente como presidente de la República (1990), quien el 5 de abril de 1992 dio un golpe de Estado. Con el apoyo de las Fuerzas Armadas, Fujimori disolvió el congreso nacional e instauró un orden antidemocrático que terminaría en noviembre de 2000, cuando renunció a la presidencia del Perú por fax desde Brunei, en donde se encontraba para asistir a la cumbre APEC.
Cabe mencionar que, con anterioridad al conflicto armado interno, Perú sufrió una dictadura militar instaurada tras el golpe de Estado de 1968. La junta militar nombró al general Juan Velasco Alvarado como presidente de facto, quien fue depuesto tras otro golpe de Estado en 1975. El nuevo presidente de facto, el general Francisco Morales Bermúdez, convocó a una Asamblea Constituyente en 1979 y elecciones democráticas en 1980.
Así que, durante el periodo de transición a una democracia, un conflicto armado estalló en el Perú. En el periodo en el cual se tendría que haber buscado mecanismos para lidiar con la masiva violación de derechos humanos perpetradas por el gobierno militar, el Perú tuvo que afrontar la escalada de violencia terrorista con instituciones democráticas nacientes y aún débiles, y con un estado de derecho casi inexistente.
Ahora bien, durante el conflicto armado hubo dos organizaciones terroristas responsables de los ataques y crímenes masivos. SL, liderado por Abimael Guzmán, grupo al que la CVR adjudica el mayor número de víctimas fatales (54% ); y el Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (MRTA), a quien la CVR le adjudica el 1.5% de víctimas fatales, y que se desintegró luego de que las Fuerzas Armadas liberaran, por medio del operativo Chavín de Huántar, a los rehenes tomados por el MRTA en la Embajada de Japón en Lima.
Por su parte, SL no ha cesado de operar en el Perú. Luego de la captura de Abimael Guzmán en 1992 y la consecuente desarticulación de gran parte de la organización, SL se ha mantenido operando en las zonas de Valle de Río Apurímac Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM), aun cuando se han capturado a otros líderes como Oscar Ramírez Durand —camarada Feliciano— o Jorge Quispe Palomino —camarada José—. Sin embargo, los remanentes senderistas del VRAEM están divorciados de la ideología inicial (pensamiento Gonzalo) de Abimael Guzmán, y sobreviven por sus actividades relacionadas al tráfico de drogas, la extorsión y los asesinatos.
Por otro lado, las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía también fueron responsables de graves violaciones a los derechos humanos. Los agentes del Estado, los comités de autodefensa y los grupos paramilitares fueron responsables por el 37% de muertos y desaparecidos reportados a la CVR. Como casos emblemáticos podemos citar el caso del cuartel los Cabitos, y el penal del Frontón pre-dictadura fujimorista, y los casos el de Barrios Altos y la Cantuta, durante la dictadura fujimorista.
b. Medidas de justicia transicional: verdad, justicia, reparación
Víctimas dan su testimonio ante la CVR -21 Junio 2002- Fotografía : Reuters
Tras la caída del régimen dictatorial, el Perú entró en un periodo de justicia transicional, del que parecería no haber salido aún. El gobierno de transición de Valentín Paniagua creó la CVR en junio de 2001, con el encargo de esclarecer los hechos sobre la violencia terrorista y las graves violaciones de derechos humanos de las últimas décadas. Dentro de su mandato, la CVR debía esclarecer las condiciones políticas, sociales y culturales que permitieron el conflicto; contribuir al esclarecimiento por los órganos jurisdiccionales de la verdad sobre los crímenes cometidos por las organizaciones terroristas y agentes del Estado y a la determinación de responsabilidades; elaborar propuestas de reparación; recomendar reformas institucionales; y establecer mecanismos de seguimiento de sus recomendaciones. En agosto de 2003, se entregó el informe final de la CVR, el cual reunió los testimonios de 17.000 víctimas, y calculó la pérdida de 69.000 vidas durante el conflicto. Además, sus recomendaciones sobre reparaciones han impulsado el Programa Integral de Reparaciones (PIR) y sus descubrimientos sobre las violaciones de derechos humanos y actos terroristas han contribuido para la judicialización de estos casos.
Por otro lado, desde los órganos judiciales, se han hecho esfuerzos para investigar y judicializar los casos de actos terroristas y graves violaciones de derechos humanos. El Poder Judicial creó la Sala Penal Nacional, con jurisdicción en casos de terrorismo y graves violaciones de derechos humanos. El Ministerio Público creó un subsistema especializado para el mismo tipo de delitos. Dentro de estos órganos especiales, es que se reabre el proceso al líder de SL —Abimael Guzmán— y su cúpula dirigencial en 2005, después de que el Tribunal Constitucional declarara nulo el proceso judicial anterior, por haber sido sumario, en el fuero militar, y con jueces “sin rostro”. Al año siguiente, Abimael Guzmán fue condenado a prisión perpetua junto con otros líderes de SL, quienes nunca ofrecieron disculpas a las víctimas de sus crímenes.
Angelica Mendoza Ascarza – Mamá Angelica- Fundadora de la la Asociación Nacional de Familiares de Secuestrados, Detenidos y Desaparecidos del Perú – rostro emblemático del caso Cabitos
Dentro de estos subsistemas, se han judicializado también casos de violaciones de derechos humanos perpetrados por agentes del Estado, como los casos Accomarca, Cabitos, Barrios Altos y la Cantuta. Alberto Fujimori fue juzgado también por los hechos que conciernen a estos dos últimos casos y se le condenó a 25 años de cárcel. No obstante, es necesario resaltar que la judicialización de estos casos ha presentado una serie de retos de corte técnico (en relación a la evidencia y tipificación), así como obstaculización política. Prueba de ello es que casos emblemáticos como Accomarca y Cabitos hayan logrado alcanzar una sentencia 31 y 35 años después de ocurridos los hechos (con varios de los imputados apartados del proceso por razones de salud u otras) y que hayan casos de ese periodo que aún están en juicio oral o incluso en etapa de investigación (ver casos Manta y Vilca, Frontón, y Esterilizaciones Forzadas), porque incluyen dentro de los acusados a altos mandos militares y políticos, como ex ministros de Estado.
Siguiendo el marco de la JT, el Perú ha ido paulatinamente implementando el plan integral de reparaciones (PIR) recomendado por la CVR. En 2005, mediante una ley, se creó dicho plan que estaría compuesto de seis programas: restitución de derechos ciudadanos; reparaciones en educación; reparaciones en salud; reparaciones colectivas; reparaciones simbólicas; y promoción y facilitación al acceso habitacional. Mediante esta ley y su reglamento se estableció que la Comisión Multisectorial de Alto Nivel (CNAM) y el Consejo de Reparaciones (CR) —este último a cargo del registro único de víctimas—, estarían a cargo de la implementación del plan de reparaciones.
Según el marco normativo, los beneficiarios de este plan son los siguientes: familiares de personas desaparecidas o asesinadas; los desplazados; las personas encarceladas arbitrariamente; las víctimas de tortura, violación sexual o secuestros; miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas, de la Policía Nacional, de los Comités de Autodefensa y autoridades civiles heridas o lesionadas en acciones violatorias de sus derechos humanos. Así mismo, son beneficiarias del PIR las víctimas indirectas, consideradas como tales: los hijos producto de violaciones sexuales, los menores de edad que pertenecieron a un Comité de Autodefensa, personas indebidamente acusadas por terrorismo y con orden de captura, y las personas que resultaron indocumentadas a causa del conflicto. También son beneficiarias del PIR las víctimas colectivas que incluyen a las comunidades campesinas, nativas y otros centros poblados afectados por la violencia y grupos de organizaciones de desplazados no retornantes provenientes de las comunidades afectadas. Están excluidos del PIR los miembros de organizaciones subversivas, aunque hayan sufrido violaciones de derechos humanos, y aquellas personas que ya hayan recibido reparaciones por otras decisiones o políticas de Estado.
Familiares de víctimas asesinadas llevan ataúdes durante una ceremonia de re-entierro. Foto: ICTJ
El informe sobre reparaciones en el Perú de la Universidad Queen Mary de Belfast señala que, hasta abril de 2018, había 226.727 personas inscritas en el registro único de víctimas; y 5.712 comunidades y centros poblados y 127 grupos organizados de no retornados inscritos para las reparaciones colectivas, de los cuales la CMAN ha reparado 1.852 (32,5%) centros poblados y comunidades en quince departamentos. Además, el informe indica que se han otorgado reparaciones económicas individuales a 98.132 beneficiarios, 12.082 personas han sido inscritas en el Registro Especial de Beneficiarios de Reparaciones en Educación, y se afilió al Seguro Integral de Salud a 139.296 beneficiarios del programa de reparaciones en salud. Asimismo, indica que, como reparación simbólica, se crearon el Lugar de la Memoria, Tolerancia e Inclusión Social (LUM), que es un espacio de conmemoración pedagógico y cultural, y el Monumento El Ojo que Llora, impulsado desde la sociedad civil. Por último, el Informe señala que la Defensoría del Pueblo había registrado alrededor de 2.000 víctimas de desaparición forzada, lo que permitió su declaración de ausencia y el acceso al ejercicio de derechos civiles relacionados por parte de sus familiares.
A pesar de los avances en reparaciones, existen aún muchos retos, como la existencia de varios registros y disposiciones sobre beneficios para las víctimas que al ser excluyentes entre sí confunden y dificultan el acceso de las víctimas a las reparaciones, la falta de coordinación entre entidades estatales, la confusión de reparaciones con programas sociales, la falta de institucionalización de presupuesto, la ausencia de reparaciones simbólicas que contemplen expresiones públicas, y la falta de voluntad política.
c. Garantías de no repetición
En lo que concierne a reforma institucional, el Estado peruano ha tenido actividad limitada. Un ejemplo de ello es que dentro de las recomendaciones de la CVR para tal reforma se propuso fortalecer la independencia de la administración de justicia mediante un sistema independiente de designación, evaluación y sanción de magistrados, y el restablecimiento de la carrera judicial para jueces y fiscales. Se hizo algún esfuerzo en este sentido con la promulgación de la ley de la carrera judicial, pero no se promovieron cambios estructurales ni de depuración de funcionarios, y se siguieron nombrando un gran número de magistrados provisionales. El impacto más grave de la deficiencia en las reformas se ha visibilizado en 2018, cuando se descubrió una mafia que involucraba jueces y fiscales del más alto nivel, y miembros del Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura (CNM) —el órgano que evalúa y nombra a los magistrados— en nombramientos indebidos. Este descubrimiento ha significado la disolución del CNM y la creación de la Junta Nacional de Justicia encargada de investigar estos hechos y destituir a los magistrados involucrados, así como de proponer reforma para el nombramiento y evaluación de magistrados.
Igualmente, la CVR propuso algunas medidas para las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional, que implican formación en derechos humanos, la introducción de control civil en los servicios de inteligencia y la definición de la policía como institución civil no militarizada en la constitución. Si bien se han realizado esfuerzos para mejorar la formación en derechos humanos, aún no se han revisado los protocolos de aquellas fuerzas para que se ajusten a dichos estándares. Tampoco se han introducido controles civiles a las Fuerzas Armadas, ni se ha introducido en la constitución cambios en la definición de la Policía. El impacto de ello se ve reflejado en el manejo del orden público, sobre todo frente a la protesta social, que ha dejado en los últimos años ciudadanos muertos y heridos ( ver protestas del 14 de Noviembre de 2020 y el paro agrario de Diciembre 2020).
Mural en la ciudad de Cusco. Fuente de Foto desconocida.
Por otro lado, la recomendación de fortalecer la presencia del Estado en todo el territorio, especialmente en las zonas más afectadas por el abandono y la violencia, ha sido poco implementada. Las causas de conflicto, según la CVR, están relacionadas con esta ausencia del Estado y con la exclusión en la representación política, social y económica de un sector de la población, al punto tal que existía una relación entre situación de pobreza y exclusión social y la probabilidad de ser víctima de violencia armada. Estas estructuras, después de veinte años no han cambiado, y este escenario no garantiza la no repetición del pasado de violencia.
d. Reflexión final
Veintiún años después de terminado el periodo de violencia, es claro que el periodo de JT en el Perú no han concluido y que todavía hay que trabajar desde todos los pilares de la JT. Ahora mismo la reconstrucción del tejido social y la refundación de un pacto social que genere confianza entre ciudadanos y con las instituciones del Estado produciendo la reconciliación, es una aspiración lejana pero urgente que hace impostergable la introducción de una agenda de JT en las políticas públicas del gobierno peruano.
Pd. Algunas de las fotos pertenecen a Yuyanapaq, el relato visual del conflicto armado interno en el Perú. Se puede ver más aquí .
Search in Tamaulipas. Foto: Comisión Nacional de Búsqueda.
Mexico is undeniably experiencing a human rights crisis. Since 2006, the year that the administration of former President Felipe Calderon launched a so-called “War on Drugs”, the State’s armed forces have engaged in confrontations with numerous armed drug-trafficking groups operating across the country. This has fueled a spike in human rights violations and abuses. One of the most telling symptoms of the crisis is the alarming number of missing persons in the country– over 90,000, according to governmental records. Entrenched corruption in the justice system, as well as a lack of resources to adequately respond to the rise in violations, have ensured that perpetrators are rarely brought to account. This has resulted in a climate of generalized impunity.
Against this background, some scholars and practitioners have pondered over the applicability of transitional justice (TJ) measures for Mexico, specifically for the victims of the War on Drugs and the era of government repression known as the Dirty War (1960s-1980s). Certainly, the country does not fit a traditional TJ scenario as it is neither transitioning from an authoritarian to a democratic regime nor moving from a conflict to a post-conflict scenario. And still, in the context of its current human rights and impunity crisis, the Mexican government has implemented some measures and programs traditionally adopted in TJ settings. It also has a record on implementing some TJ measures in the past, albeit with limitations. More importantly, perhaps, the country has a strong presence of victims’ associations calling for truth and justice for those who have endured violations. But beyond debates of applicability– the biggest question is whether the State has the political will to apply a holistic transitional justice agenda.
Truth Commission of Ayotzinapa. Photo: Secretaría de Gobernanción.
The TJ agenda under Mexico’s current President
Current President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (2018-2024), known as AMLO, hinted at the possibility of adopting transitional justice measures during his presidential campaign. His proposed Peace and Security Plan made peace-building a priority, stating that “it [was] necessary to … adopt models of transitional justice that guarantee the rights of the victims.” His campaign also included what he named “Listening Forums,” consultation spaces where his team met with groups of victims across the country to discuss relevant human rights issues. The Peace and Security Plan noted that these Forums had evidenced that access to justice was a pending issue for most victims, and as such, it would be a priority for AMLO’s administration.
Upon assuming office in 2018, AMLO took some steps that suggested some commitment to victims’ rights and to the adoption of transitional justice measures. With great symbolic value, one of his first actions as President of Mexico was the establishment of the Commission for Truth and Access to Justice for the case of the 43 missing students from Ayotzinapa. The Commission has made important progress in determining some key perpetrators and in continuing the outstanding work that the IACHR did for the case. It has also ensured that the families of the victims and their accompanying allies actively participate in its implementation. But indeed, the work of the commission is limited to the extent that it is addressing a singular case. It might even be argued that it is creating an unfair hierarchy of victims, by securing access to truth and justice for a small group, while excluding access for the broad majority.
Another important development has been the establishment of the National System for the Search of Missing Persons. It comprises a federal-level search commission, state-level search commissions for all Mexican states, and specialized units within state-level prosecution offices for the crime of disappearances. Innovatively, the law separates the search for the missing persons from the criminal investigation, so that the search is not delayed. Moreover, the law acknowledges that disappearances might be committed by state and non-state actors, something of much relevance to Mexico, given that the majority of these crimes are committed by the latter.
The creation of the system and the law from which it emanated was the result of lobbying efforts by the families of missing persons and their international and local allies. At the start of his administration, AMLO appointed Karla Quintana, a renowned human rights expert, as the Head Commissioner for the National System. Under her leadership, the System has taken important steps, such as drafting a standardized protocol for the search of missing persons, carrying out dozens of open-field searching missions across the country, and creating a center for the identification of human remains in northern Mexico.
Along with the System, AMLO’s administration also approved the creation of an extraordinary mechanism for forensic identification, known as MEIF. It is yet another example of a measure commonly adopted in TJ scenarios. The MEIF was envisioned as a tool to cope with the forensic crisis that the country is experiencing, by which an estimate of 52,000 unidentified bodies lie in government facilities, like burial pits and morgues. Presumably, some of those bodies belong to those missing in the country. This past month, AMLO also announced the creation of the “Presidential Commission for Truth, Justice, Reparation, Memory, and Non-Recurrence” for the victims of the Dirty War period. The name suggests a broad mandate seeking to address multiple victims’ rights. Yet, as the mandate has not been published, it remains to be seen what this new commission will seek to accomplish.
These actions show some degree of political will to address the human rights crisis of the country, through the adoption of measures traditionally associated with transitional justice. However, the scope of these measures is mostly limited to the fulfillment of the right to truth and particularly, to the duty to determine the whereabouts of missing persons derived from this right. The collective aspect of the right to truth is generally excluded from these measures. Moreover, no specific extraordinary programs have been established to guarantee the rights to justice, reparations and non-recurrence for the victims during his administration, suggesting that a genuine commitment to uprooting impunity has been absent.
Memorial, Truth Commission of Guerrero. Photo: Secretaría de Gobernación.
Truth, justice, and reparation measures in the past
AMLO’s administration is not the first to adopt measures from the transitional justice repertoire. Most notably, former President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) established a special prosecutor’s office, known as FEMOSPP, to investigate and prosecute federal authorities implicated in crimes committed during the Dirty War. Unlike AMLO’s, Fox’s administration took place during a transition period, marked by the end of the PRI-party regime, which ruled the country for over 70 years. FEMOSPP opened between 700 to 1000 investigations leading to around a dozen indictments; yet it is unclear whether it achieved any convictions. Beyond criminal investigations, it also published a large report –similar to one that would be published by a truth commission–detailing the context in which violations took place. While it was a first notable effort to apply transitional justice measures in Mexico, its results were limited.
Mexico also has a precedent of two truth commissions at the state level. The first one was established in 2011 in Guerrero, a state that experienced the rise of guerrilla movements and a consequent wave of government repression during the Dirty War. (It is also the state where the Ayotzinapa case took place, suggesting the urgent need for guarantees of non-repetition). In 2014, the Commission concluded that the State had committed enforced disappearances, torture and extrajudicial killings. The second commission was established in 2014 in Oaxaca, in response to the government repression against a broad coalition social movement known as APPO. Here, the commission concluded that the local government had been implicated in human right violations.
During the administration of Enrique Pena Nieto (2012-2018), and following nation-wide mobilizations, the government approved the Victims’ Law, which established the National System for Attention to Victims. Akin to Colombia’s victims’ system under law 1448, the Mexican system consists of state-based commissions across the country that may provide victims with access to assistance measures, legal support, and reparations. The implementation of the law, however, has been extremely slow and the System has operated with insufficient budget and personnel, making access to benefits for victims difficult. In spite of its operational issues, the System is yet another notable effort to respond to the mass victimization that has come with the rise in violence in the country and that is typical to transitional justice scenarios.
Overall, these scattered measures have contributed to the fulfillment of the rights to truth, justice, and reparations to some victims in Mexico, albeit in an insufficient manner. The vast majority of victims, however, have remained excluded, and those who were able to access benefits did so in a limited form.
Transitional justice in Mexico? Some steps forward, many more ahead
To remedy its situation of generalized impunity, Mexico has adopted measures traditionally associated with transitional justice contexts. In previous administrations, the government has experimented with the creation of a special prosecution office, two local truth commissions, and the establishment of a reparations system, which is still operating. Under current President Lopez Obrador, important actions have been taken to fulfill the right to truth of the families of missing persons.
Notwithstanding the progress made by these initiatives, none have been adopted as part of a holistic transitional justice agenda. This has limited the ability of these measures to positively contribute to the dismantling of structures of impunity, the meaningful redress of victims, and the cease of violence in the country. If indeed the current administration has taken important steps to fulfill the right to truth, the State has a huge debt when it comes to the right to justice. Out of the 92,000 cases of missing persons, only 35 have reached a guilty verdict. As such, it is not surprising that the families of the victims have little hope that perpetrators will ever be brought to account. Firm steps should also be taken to guarantee the non-repetition of violations. Of particular concern is the increased militarization of the country and the continuation of the War on Drugs. It is unlikely that disappearances stop as long as a militarized approach to security continues, as it has been proved that this strategy has been a key factor for the increase of violence and the empowerment of drug cartels in Mexico. In the meantime, victims will continue to mobilize and demand that their rights to truth, justice, and reparations are fulfilled. It is because of their relentless commitment to the fight against impunity that the government has been pushed to take some action. Some public servants within the government have been key allies in ensuring these measures are implemented. And still, a holistic transitional justice agenda will remain an unlikely possibility for Mexico without the firm commitment of the State –as a whole– to uproot impunity once and for all.
The right to know the truth in cases of mass atrocities and grave violations of human rights has been recognized in various international and regional documents and human rights mechanisms. The International Criminal Court (ICC) deals as well with cases of mass atrocities. Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes entail grave violations of human rights on a large scale, and although the ICC is not a truth-seeking mechanism in stricto sensu, in the adjudication of the cases the judges make findings of facts. Therefore, beyond the assessment of whether the ICC is the right forum for unveiling truth about mass atrocities, a more grounded approach might be to look at the implications of the ICC as a truth-revealing forum from a rights-based approach, which amounts to bring to the discussion the issues that the application of notions of the right to truth may have at the ICC.
This post intends to start the discussion on this topic. For this purpose, it will briefly review the emergence, scope, and dimensions of the right to truth, and then explore the applicability of these notions to the ICC.
The right to truth
The right to know the truth for victims of mass atrocities has been recognized in various international legal instruments and in many jurisdictions. One of the first instruments in recognizing this right was the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Articles 32 and 33 enshrined the right of families to know the fate of their relatives, and the obligation of the parties to the conflict to search for persons who were reported missing.
The evolution and expansion of the right to truth from international humanitarian law to human rights law is related to the search for accountability for the commission of enforced disappearances in Latin-America and the fight against impunity and blanket amnesties during authoritative regimes of the late 70’s and mid 80’s. The Organization of the American States and the United Nations (UN) established working groups to report on the issue in the second half of the 80’s. These organizations expanded the right beyond the information about the events related to missing or disappeared persons, to include information of other serious violations of human rights.
In 1988 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights dealt with its first case, which was about the enforced disappearance of Manfredo Velaquez Rodriguez in Honduras. Although the American Convention on Human Rights does not explicitly include this right, the Court affirmed in its judgement the existence of the rights of the victim’s family to know his fate, and the obligation of the State to inform them. Since then, the right to truth has been developed in several decisions of the Court, and has also been recognized also by the European Court of Human Rights
Furthermore, the previously mentioned dimensions of the right to truth entail different right holders and different content. The individual dimension recognizes the direct victim or the relatives of the victim as the right holders, and the truth sought is related to the specific events that violated the human rights of the victim in question. On the other hand, the collective dimension refers to the society as the right holder, and it entails the truth about the causes, systems, and policies put in place for the commission of the grave, mass, and systematic human rights violations, and its consequences.
The right to truth in the ICC
The ICC Statute enshrines two provisions referring to the truth-seeking process in which the cases before the ICC are involved. Article 54 (1) indicates the duties and powers of the Prosecutor during the investigation, and it indicates that “in order to establish the truth” the Prosecutor should cover all the facts, including incriminating and exonerating circumstances. In addition, Article 69 (3) enables the Chambers to request the submission of all types of evidence (inculpatory or exculpatory) “with the purpose of establishing the truth in the proceedings.” Therefore, from a normative viewpoint, there is an underlying obligation to find the truth for the ICC.
As for the individual dimension of the right to truth at the ICC, it is often invoked article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute, which enables the participation of victims in the proceedings when their personal interests are affected. This provision is considered to have given an unprecedented victim’s participation in the proceedings of international criminal tribunals, because those personal interests may include the revelation of truth. However, there is the concern that the testimony of the victims, or the truth they reveal in the proceedings, may be judged under true or false discourses during the trial, which forces to judge the victims’ suffering in those parameters as well.
Additionally, a question that follows is whether the individual right holders of the right to truth that participated in the ICC proceedings may consider this right effectively realized. In particular, when whatever truth is revealed, is made by an international institution—the ICC—that most of the times is ignored or rejected in the societies where they live in, and its revelation about the particular circumstances of the human rights violations they suffered, may be contested in local (not necessarily legal or jurisdictional) fora. Another angle of this issue that must be brought to the table is whether the individual victims are in a position to demand the realization of this right to the ICC.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the truth revealed by the ICC not only includes the specific facts related to the criminal responsibility of the accused persons, but also the contextual elements of the crimes under the ICC jurisdiction, which entail the establishment of a plan, system, or policy, for the commission of the crimes. This detail is relevant when assessing the collective dimension of the right to truth because content-wise the ICC is a mechanism that can reveal the systems and policies put in place to commit mass and systematic human rights violations. However, the inevitable question that follows this assertion is, who is the collective right holder of the right to truth at the ICC? Is it “the international community as a whole” as invoked in the preamble of the ICC Statute, or is it the society of the country concerned in the ICC proceedings?
If the international community is the right-holder of the right to truth, would it mean that a right to truth for this “collective subject” has emerged? Would the international community (however defined it) would be in the position to demand the compliance of the right to truth to the ICC?
On the other hand, if the society of the country under investigation is the “collective subject”, would it mean that they are in a position to demand truth to the ICC? Is it possible, in practical terms, for societies located thousands of kilometers away from The Hague, with ongoing conflicts, to demand truth to the ICC? Or flipping the question, is it possible for the ICC to realistically communicate its findings to the society affected in the country situation, and thus comply with the collective dimension of the right? Can the truth revealed by the ICC influence the official narrative about the mass atrocities in the society in question?
These are questions that have been overlooked when referring to the right to truth at the ICC. Although it is not possible to answer them in this post, it is relevant to explore them in relation to the specific situations under investigation in the ICC. This approach will bring the assessment of the ICC proceedings closer to the societies where the crimes under its jurisdictions were committed, and will break the top-down approach bubble that the ICC analyses have had so far to combine them with a bottom-up approach that takes into account the actual effects of the proceedings in the people and societies concerned.
