Category: International(ised) prosecutions

Categories
Aggression International(ised) prosecutions Ukraine

Why a tribunal for aggression is unrealistic, why the ICC should step aside, and why a tribunal established by the UNGA is the optimal option

Bringing fresh ideas to an ongoing debate of some duration and substance rarely happens. But do read on for my brief take on why establishing a boutique tribunal to try Putin for the crime of aggression is unrealistic, and why there may be a more practical and achievable solution in investigating and prosecuting those most responsible for crimes being committed in the Russo-Ukrainian war – save for the crime of aggression.

Most agree that Putin’s war-making was unprovoked, unjustified, and unlawful. I say most because there are some who believe that Russia had legitimate reasons for initiating what Putin has characterized as Russia’s “special military operation.” Most also agree – or seem to agree despite any legitimate findings by an independent international tribunal – that Putin is guilty beyond any doubt of the crime of aggression. And many of those who have made their findings and conclusions of Putin’s guilt, call for the establishment of a tribunal with the singular purpose to try and convict Putin, expeditiously, for aggression. Of course, they envisage that a few others would also be charged and tried as well for aggression, but Putin is the great white whale (though it should be remembered that Moby Dick was both Ahab’s obsession and the prize he could not have).

Due process niceties aside (apologies for being a stickler), by all media accounts, academic panel discussions, and political rhetoric, Putin has been found guilty – and not just for the crime of aggression, but for war crimes and crimes against humanity. As those pushing for this boutique tribunal see it, setting up a tribunal to try Putin just for aggression would simplify matters of proof, and though not publicly espoused, could/would also serve as a midwife for establishing the crime of aggression as customary international law (CIL). Its adoption by the International Criminal Court (ICC), such as it is, does not make it so. Were a recognized and legitimate international tribunal for aggression established that would be a game-changer, perhaps crystalizing the crime of aggression as CIL – even if the United States, China, Russia, India, and most likely France and the United Kingdom and many more states would hold otherwise.

If only we had this boutique tribunal on aggression. How simplistically naive.

I remain optimistic that the day will come when the crime of aggression is unquestionably accepted as CIL. And yes, it is noble to herald the establishment of an international tribunal on aggression with jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute, and convict any head of state and others engaged in aggression wherever they may hail from.

But let’s get real.

It is an article of faith that Putin – an autocrat presumably running Russian affairs unimpeded by liberal democratic refinements and unconstrained by his inner circle of oligarchs and upper echelon-cum-latter-day apparatchiks – is responsible for and guilty of all crimes that have been and are being committed. Perhaps so. But as in any conflict or war, nothing is ever black and white – especially if viewed from all sides. Admittedly, some of my personal views are shaped by what I see in the media, but I also know, from professional experience, that there is much that I do not know.  That is why I am a firm believer in both substantive and procedural justice.

Support for one side of the conflict, even if it seems morally and legally just, does not prove guilt of the other side. For that, we need independent tribunals with a level playing field for any accused, irrespective of his or her national origin. Troublingly, we hear nothing of crimes or atrocities having been committed by Ukrainian soldiers, officers, or political elite, and thus query whether the legion of motley investigators collecting evidence against the Russian forces and associated private armies and mercenaries, are conducting any serious investigations against Ukrainians forces for any alleged crimes (see Amnesty International’s press release about Ukrainian fighting techniques endangering civilians here). If this war is like any other war since time immemorial, it is highly likely that crimes are being committed by all sides – though not necessarily (and certainly not in this war) on the same scale.

I have not heard of anyone objecting to Ukrainians not being subject to prosecution, but then I have not heard of any investigations being conducted against any Ukrainians. I raise this to stress that if we are committed to the rule of law and to eradicating impunity in all forms, then we should be up to objectively investigating and robustly prosecuting anyone alleged to have committed crimes. For that we need impartial tribunals.

Even were it possible (I think not, but do read on) to establish a tribunal to try Putin for aggression, it seems so result-oriented as to call into question its legitimacy – irrespective of the soundness of the ultimate quality of justice rendered. Yes, perceptions matter. And it’s as if it is a zero-sum game: aggression or nothing.

Let’s take stock – realistically.

We know that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will not countenance the notion of a tribunal dedicated exclusively to aggression or even inclusively to other crimes – whether it is established for Putin or others. The permanent members of the UNSC with veto power – the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France (the big five) – will not tolerate the existence of such a court. Their heads of states could easily find their heads on the proverbial chopping block. None of these states (as well as many more) have genuinely embraced the ICC’s adoption of the crime of aggression. Neither China nor Russia will countenance a UNSC tribunal as in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), even if the crime of aggression was not included as one of the statutory crimes.

That leaves the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The UNSC’s big five have no veto power to stop any discussion in its tracks, but virtually all have sufficient clout and persuasive influence (it would be a perversion to call it soft power considering the pressure attached with stimulative measures of negative consequences some if not all of the big five will apply), to sink any efforts by the UNGA to establish a tribunal that either exclusively or inclusively has aggression as one of its enumerated crimes. Another non-starter, though some are convinced otherwise.

The ICC, we know, has no jurisdiction to try Putin on aggression.

National courts which exercise universal jurisdiction may be less inclined to prosecute a head of state for aggression considering the immunity issue (arguably not an issue at an international court) – though not an issue with war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Where does that leave us?

The simple answer – which others I am sure have considered – is for the UNGA to establish an ad hoc international tribunal, dedicated to try war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed by anyone during the Russo-Ukrainian war, with a temporal jurisdiction to encompass events as far back as 2014 and spanning the territories of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and perhaps elsewhere. Without the crime of aggression, this is feasible. And the best option.

Were the UNGA to establish such a tribunal, it should take precedence over the ICC. Despite the headline-grabbing rhetoric of the Prosecutor and the abundance of resources offered to his office for investigating crimes in Ukraine, the ICC is only really suited to try but a very few cases – and even that may be a stretch if it is to seriously fulfill its mandate in dealing with other mass atrocity crimes in areas under its jurisdiction. Why, it can barely manage to eke out an occasional conviction as it is – even after years and years of preliminary examinations and investigations. No doubt there will be some turf-war push-back from the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (ICC OTP), but to paraphrase a line from the film Pulp Fiction, that is pride [and ego] talking. The simple truth is that it is much more efficient and effective to have an ad hoc tribunal dedicated to investigating and prosecuting anyone alleged to have committed mass atrocity crimes in the Russo-Ukrainian war.

My point is that the UNSC and the ICC are not the only game in town.  The UNGA established the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Hardly a perfect example, but a partnering model has  much to be said for it.  From a legitimacy point of view,  a tribunal is more likely to be widely accepted when it will investigate, prosecute, and judge all sides to the conflict – not just Putin, his cronies and stooges, Russian officers, and soldiers. Such a tribunal would require Ukraine to commit.  The crime of aggression not being on the table even for discussion, should enable a more focused and less detractive discussion for a quick establishment of a court.

The procedure can (and I advise should) be inspired by/modeled after the ICTY. Lessons learned over the years and from Mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunals can be applied – especially in the selection of judges (bluntly, some ICTY and ICTR judges were ill-qualified, and there should be no second tier judges as at the ICC).  The office of prosecution should have a unified structure with functional control over the investigative section, which should be subordinate to and under the direct supervision of the prosecutor and his or her deputies.

In sum, my humble advice is for those pushing for a boutique tribunal on aggression to abandon their Quixotic efforts (and rhetoric), as well as for the ICC OTP to support the establishment of a UNGA ad hoc tribunal dedicated to investigating and prosecuting anyone alleged to have committed mass atrocity crimes in the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Editor’s note: this post was first published on michealgkarnavas.net on 23 February 2023. I thank Michael very much for authorising the reproduction of the post on Maastricht Blog on Transitional Justice.

Categories
Bolivia ICC Preliminary examinations Uncategorized

Fiscal de la CPI concluye examen preliminar sobre Bolivia

El 14 de febrero de 2021 el Fiscal de la CPI anunció la terminación del examen preliminar sobre Bolivia. Según el Fiscal, los requisitos establecidos en el Estatuto de la CPI para la apertura de una investigación no habían sido cumplidos.

La situación en Bolivia fue remitida por el gobierno boliviano el 4 de septiembre de 2020. En el escrito de remisión, el gobierno afirmó que durante los bloqueos de carreteras que afectó gran parte del territorio nacional en agosto de aquel año, personas que participaban en los bloqueos impidieron deliberadamente el acceso de la población a suministros y servicios médicos. Según el gobierno, unas 40 personas infectadas de Covid-19 que necesitaban oxígeno de uso terapéutico y atención médica fallecieron, y muchas otras sufrieron daños físicos o mentales graves, como consecuencia de los bloqueos. El gobierno alegó que tal conducta constituye los crímenes de humanidad de asesinato y actos inhumanos previstos en el Artículo 7 incisos (1)(a) y (1)(k) del Estatuto, y que los organizadores de los bloqueos y las personas que participaron en ellos, a través de sus actos, atacaron deliberadamente a la población civil con el propósito de causar muertes, intimidación y sufrimiento, a fin de alcanzar sus objetivos políticos.

Bloqueo de carretera en El Alto, Bolivia, en protesta por el aplazamiento de las elecciones generales. Fuente: NY Times

Sin embargo, el Fiscal afirmó que, sobre la base de la información reunida, no existe fundamento suficiente para creer que los actos referidos constituyan asesinatos o actos inhumanos en el sentido del Artículo 7(1) del Estatuto, ni ataques contra la población civil como lo requiere tal artículo. En consecuencia, concluyó que no existe fundamento suficiente para proceder a una investigación y dio por concluido el examen preliminar.

La decisión del Fiscal me parece inobjetable.

Lo que sí considero objetable es que un Estado Parte del Estatuto de Roma remita una situación a la Fiscalía de la CPI sobre argumentos fácticos y jurídicos endebles (ver los argumentos en el informe final del Fiscal); tan endebles, que maculan el prestigio de la Procuraduría General del Estado boliviano – autor del escrito de remisión – y generan dudas acerca del real compromiso de Bolivia para con la CPI. Ello es así porque todo examen preliminar conlleva un uso de los recursos humanos y financieros finitos de la Fiscalía de la CPI, y soy de la opinión que los Estados Partes tienen la responsabilidad política de no causar malgastos de tales recursos. Una denuncia frívola como la remisión efectuada por Bolivia no puede concluir con otro resultado que la desestimación de la misma.

Jeanine Añez. Fuente: NorteOnline

En realidad, la remisión de la situación en Bolivia tuvo toda la apariencia de haber sido una táctica empleada por el entonces gobierno provisional de Jeanine Añes en su lucha política contra el ex presidente Evo Morales. Recordemos que, al momento de la remisión, la realización de la elección presidencial era inminente (se llevaría a cabo un mes más tarde, es decir, en octubre de 2020). Por medio de esta táctica, por cierto burda, los opositores de Evo Morales probablemente esperaban que una mayoría de la ciudadanía boliviana creyera que Evo Morales estaba detrás del presunto ataque contra la población civil.

Evo Morales. Fuente: elperiodico.com

En tanto que persona que cree en la justicia penal internacional – aun con sus defectos y limitaciones – entiendo que los Estados Partes del Estatuto de la CPI no deberían abusar de su derecho a remitir situaciones para una eventual investigación, a fin de no comprometer innecesariamente los recursos limitados de esta institución. Un ejercicio responsable de tal derecho debería perseguir que los recursos humanos y materiales de la CPI se empleen en la investigación de situaciones en las cuales sí se han cometido crímenes de la competencia de la CPI. De este modo, habría mejores chances de paliar en alguna medida el problema de la impunidad por tales crímenes y de satisfacer – ni más sea parcialmente – la sed de justicia de las víctimas.

Fabián Raimondo, Editor Ejecutivo de Maastricht Blog on Transitional Justice

Categories
International(ised) prosecutions Prosecution initiatives Reparations for victims Right to truth

El rol de la víctima en la CPI, a la luz de la investigación de la situación en Venezuela

Texto de la presentación virtual realizada por el Dr Fabián Raimondo para el Instituto Internacional de Responsabilidad Social y Derechos Humanos el 6 de diciembre de 2021.

Buenas tardes.

Antes que nada, agradezco públicamente al Instituto Internacional de Responsabilidad Social y Derechos Humanos por la invitación a exponer en este taller virtual. Como ustedes saben, mi presentación versará sobre la participación de la víctima en los procedimientos de la CPI, a la luz de la investigación de la situación en Venezuela. Durará unos 35-40 minutos, los que nos permitiría contar con tiempo suficiente para formular preguntas, ensayar respuestas y debatir cuestiones conexas.

Introducción

Venezuela ratificó el Estatuto de Roma de la CPI (Estatuto) el 7 junio de 2000. 

El Estatuto entró en vigor el 1 de julio de 2002. En consecuencia, la CPI tiene competencia respecto de los crímenes del Estatuto cometidos en Venezuela, o por nacionales de Venezuela en el exterior, a partir de la última fecha. 

En febrero de 2018, la Fiscalía de la CPI inició un examen preliminar de la situación en Venezuela desde abril de 2017. 

En septiembre del mismo año, Argentina, Canadá, Colombia, Chile, Paraguay y Perú — todos ellos Estados Partes del Estatuto — remitieron a la Fiscalía la situación en Venezuela, requiriendo la apertura de una investigación por crímenes de lesa humanidad presuntamente cometidos en Venezuela desde febrero de 2014. 

En el Informe sobre las Actividades de Examen Preliminar de 2020, publicado en diciembre del año pasado, la Fiscalía afirmó que existe base razonable para creer que miembros de las fuerzas de seguridad y las fuerzas armadas han participado en la comisión de crímenes de lesa humanidad, en particular, detención arbitraria, tortura, violación y persecución por motivos políticos. al menos desde abril de 2017. 

Fiscal de la CPI Karim Khan QC (izquierda) y Presidente de Venezuela Nicolás Maduro (derecha)

A comienzos de noviembre de este año, el Fiscal de la CPI visitó vuestro país y se reunió con el gobierno, como ustedes ya saben. Luego de que, el 3 de noviembre, anunció la terminación del examen preliminar, la decisión de comenzar una investigación y la adopción de un memorándum de entendimiento con el gobierno venezolano. Por medio de este memorándum, las partes acordaron que Venezuela adoptará las medidas necesarias para garantizar la administración de justicia en el país, establecer mecanismos de cooperación para facilitar el trabajo de la Fiscalía en Venezuela y trabajar “para que el principio de complementariedad tenga un efecto adecuado y significativo”, aunque confieso que el significado este último punto del memorándum no me queda claro. Como sea, les cuento que, en el lenguaje de la CPI, complementariedad significa que una situación o un caso será admisible ante la CPI solo si el Estado competente — Venezuela, en este caso — no puede o no quiere investigar o enjuiciar a las personas presuntamente responsables de un crimen del Estatuto. Les recuerdo que los crímenes del Estatuto comprenden el genocidio, los crímenes contra la humanidad, los crímenes de guerra y el crimen de agresión (Artículo 5 del Estatuto).

A esta altura, ustedes se estarán preguntando qué significan todas esas palabras técnicas, como “situación”, “examen preliminar”, “investigación” y “caso”, así que intentaré explicarlas, a fin de que podamos comprender un poco mejor las posibilidades de participación de la víctima en los procedimientos de la CPI.

Una situación fija los límites geográficos y temporales dentro de los cuales se llevan a cabo un examen preliminar, una investigación y, eventualmente, uno o más casos concretos; por ejemplo, la situación en Venezuela desde 2017 (“Venezuela I”).

Un examen preliminar es la actividad por medio de la cual la Fiscalía evalúa si existe base razonable para creer que se ha cometido o se está cometiendo algún crimen del Estatuto, si el Estado competente ha investigado o enjuiciado a las personas presuntamente responsables y si una investigación por la Fiscalía serviría los intereses de la justicia y las víctimas. 

En cambio, durante una investigación la Fiscalía se aboca a recoger pruebas de la comisión de crímenes del Estatuto, a identificar las personas presuntamente responsables y, eventualmente, a solicitar el libramiento de órdenes de detención y entrega contra las personas presuntamente responsables. El libramiento de tal orden da inicio a un caso en el contexto de una situación, como por ejemplo el caso de la Fiscalía contra el ex presidente Omar Al Bashir, relativo a la situación en el Sudán.

Si la persona objeto de la orden de detención y entrega se encuentra a disposición de la CPI, ya sea porque fue arrestada y entregada o porque se entregó voluntariamente, la Sala de Cuestiones Preliminares actuante procederá a informarle los cargos que se le imputan y los derechos que le asisten; y, de haber confirmado uno o más cargos, fijará una fecha para el comienzo del juicio (Arts. 60 y 61 del Estatuto).

Ahora bien, ustedes se preguntarán qué se entiende por víctima y cuáles son los requisitos y modalidades de participación de la víctima en tal contexto.

Concepto, requisitos y modalidades de participación

Según las Reglas de Procedimiento y Prueba, el término víctima comprende a las personas naturales que hayan sufrido daño como consecuencia de un crimen del Estatuto y a las instituciones cuyos algunos de sus bienes destinados a fines religiosos, educativos, artísticos, científicos o caritativos hayan sufrido daño como consecuencia de un crimen del Estatuto (Regla 85).

La definición de víctima ha sido objeto de una interpretación amplia por parte de las salas de la CPI, lo que ha dado lugar a una jurisprudencia que reconoce tal estatus no solo a la víctima directa, sino también a la indirecta. Víctima directa es aquella que fue objeto de un crimen del Estatuto y ha sufrido un daño como consecuencia de tal crimen; por ejemplo, una persona objeto de una violación sexual. En cambio, la víctima indirecta es aquella que ha sufrido daño como consecuencia de un crimen del Estatuto cometido contra una víctima directa, como podría ser el caso de aquella que ha sufrido daño psicológico como consecuencia del haber presenciado la comisión de un crimen del Estatuto particularmente violento o atroz, o el caso de aquella que haya sufrido daño como consecuencia del homicidio cometido contra alguno de sus progenitores o descendientes directos, siempre que los dos crímenes referidos puedan calificarse como crímenes de guerra, crímenes contra la humanidad o actos de genocidio, claro está.

A diferencia de los estatutos de los tribunales penales internacionales que la precedieron, el de la CPI consagra dos derechos importantes a favor de la víctima: el derecho a expresar opiniones y observaciones en el curso de los procedimientos y el derecho a obtener una reparación por el daño sufrido (Arts. 68 y 75, respectivamente).

¿Cuáles son los pasos a seguir para participar en los procedimientos? En primer lugar, la víctima debe enviar una solicitud de participación a la Dependencia de Víctimas y Testigos de la CPI. A tal fin se recomienda que utilice el formulario creado por la Dependencia, si bien, por el momento, no se encuentra disponible en castellano. En dicho formulario deben indicarse: la identidad del peticionario; la situación o el caso en el que se desea participar u obtener una reparación; el crimen del que se es víctima y el daño sufrido en consecuencia; el tipo de reparación que se persigue; las preocupaciones existentes en torno a la seguridad personal o de su familia; y, finalmente, si se cuenta con representación letrada o se desea contar con la representación letrada de un miembro de la Lista de Abogados de la CPI, como es mi caso, o de la Oficina Pública de la Defensa de las Víctimas.

Sede de la Corte Penal Internacional. La Haya, Países Bajos.

Si la solicitud es enviada durante el curso de una investigación, como la presente sobre la situación en Venezuela, la Dependencia toma nota de ella en el registro respectivo y la mantiene como información confidencial. No la transmite inmediatamente a la Sala de Cuestiones Preliminares interviniente. La enviará a la Sala cuando esta requiera que se le transmitan las solicitudes presentadas hasta el momento o cuando la víctima solicite autorización para expresar opiniones o preocupaciones con respecto a un incidente procesal concreto.

Las salas de la CPI aceptan o rechazan las solicitudes de participación sobre la base de los criterios establecidos en el Estatuto y las Reglas de Procedimiento y Prueba de la CPI, a saber, si existe fundamento razonable para creer que el peticionario ha sufrido daño físico, moral o psicológico, y si el daño resulta de la comisión de un crimen del Estatuto.

Cuando la investigación da lugar a un caso, la sala interviniente evalúa los méritos de las solicitudes de participación al comienzo de cada etapa procesal del caso en cuestión, es decir, al comienzo de la etapa preliminar del juicio, al comienzo del juicio y, de apelarse el veredicto o la sentencia pronunciada por la sala de juicio, al comienzo del procedimiento de apelación. Esto conlleva dos cosas. Una, que la autorización para participar en una etapa del proceso no implica autorización para participar en la etapa posterior; por ejemplo, una víctima autorizada a participar en la audiencia de confirmación de cargos podría no ser autorizada a participar en la fase siguiente, es decir, el juicio. También conlleva lo opuesto, esto es, que una víctima podría ser admitida a participar en una fase del proceso aun cuando no haya participado en la anterior; por ejemplo, una víctima que no haya participado en la audiencia de confirmación de cargos podría ser autorizada a participar en el juicio.

Ahora bien, es importante tener en cuenta que, una vez concedida la autorización a participar en una etapa concreta del proceso, la víctima puede ejercer su derecho a expresar opiniones y observaciones solo si sus intereses personales se encuentran afectados y si la sala interviniente lo considera apropiado (Artículo 68(3) del Estatuto).

Las posibilidades de participación de la víctima durante un examen preliminar son muy escasas, pero no por ello irrelevantes. En primer lugar, la víctima puede enviar información relativa a la comisión de crímenes del Estatuto, por medio de una comunicacióndirigida a la Fiscalía. Si bien el Estatuto no especifica el tipo y la calidad de información que la comunicación debería proporcionar, resulta evidente que debería ser lo suficientemente detallada y creíble para que la Fiscalía pueda valerse de ella a la hora de determinar si existe fundamento razonable para abrir una investigación. En segundo lugar, la víctima podría contar con la posibilidad de formular observaciones, luego de que la Fiscalía haya solicitado a la Sala de Cuestiones Preliminares que la autorice a comenzar una investigación (Art. 15(3); Regla 50(3)). 

Las oportunidades de participación durante una investigación, como la de la situación en Venezuela, también son muy escasas, pero no son insignificantes. Por ejemplo, cuando la Fiscalía comunica a los Estados Partes que ha decidido comenzar una investigación, y un Estado Parte del Estatuto cuestiona la admisibilidad de la investigación, la Sala de Cuestiones Preliminares podría autorizar a la víctima a presentar su opinión al respecto (Arts. 18(2) y 68(3) del Estatuto; Rule 55). Esto bien podría ocurrir en la investigación relativa a Venezuela, ya que el gobierno venezolano probablemente cuestione la admisibilidad de la investigación dentro de los 30 días contados a partir del día de la notificación de la apertura de la investigación, plazo que probablemente venza esta semana.

Sin dudas, las posibilidades de participación se acrecientan notablemente con la apertura de un caso. Durante la etapa preliminar del juicio, la víctima cuenta con varias oportunidades. En primer lugar, puede acceder, antes y durante la audiencia de confirmación de cargos, al expediente del caso, incluso a la prueba que será presentada por la Fiscalía y la defensa. En segundo lugar, la víctima tiene derecho a ser notificada de todos los desarrollos procesales ocurridos durante esta fase preliminar al juicio. En tercer lugar, tiene derecho a peticionar en relación con cualquier cuestión relativa a la admisibilidad y pertinencia de tal prueba, así como también el derecho a examinarla durante la audiencia de confirmación de cargos, por ejemplo, interrogando un testigo. En cuarto lugar, tiene derecho a asistir a las audiencias públicas tanto como a aquellas que son llevadas a cabo a puertas cerradas. Y, en quinto lugar, tiene derecho a formular observaciones relativas a toda otra cuestión que afecte sus intereses personales, siempre que la sala de cuestiones preliminares la haya autorizado a hacerlo. 

Como ya expliqué, si, luego de la audiencia de confirmación de cargos, la sala de cuestiones preliminares confirma uno o más cargos contra la persona imputada, fijará una fecha para el comienzo del juicio. Durante el juicio solo podrán participar las víctimas de los crímenes que forman parte de los cargos confirmados, siempre que sus intereses personales se vean afectados y la sala de juicio lo encuentre apropiado. Las posibilidades de participación de la víctima durante el juicio también son relativamente amplias, por ejemplo:

  • Puede asistir a audiencias públicas y a puertas cerradas.
  • Puede presentar alegatos de apertura y de clausura de juicio.
  • Puede ofrecer testigos.
  • Puede interrogar testigos o al acusado.

Ahora bien, tengamos en cuenta que la víctima tiene derecho a contar con representación letrada a lo largo de todos los procedimientos y, de hecho, siempre participa a través de su representante legal. Incluso las notificaciones procesales son dirigidas al representante legal y no a la víctima personalmente. 

Más allá de su participación en los procedimientos en calidad de víctima, esta también podría participar como testigo; en tal caso, la víctima tendrá un doble estatus ante la CPI: víctima y testigo. Ahora bien, existen algunas diferencias considerables entre ambos modos de participación, por ejemplo: (i) la participación como víctima es voluntaria, mientras que el prestar declaración testimonial no lo es; para que esto ocurra es necesario que la víctima sea citada a declarar por la Fiscalía, la defensa o el representante legal de víctimas;  (ii) como ya dije, la participación como víctima podría ocurrir en cualquier fase del proceso; sin embargo, el prestar declaración testimonial solo podría ocurrir en la etapa de juicio; y (iii) como también ya dije, la participación de la víctima como tal en los procedimientos siempre se lleva a cabo por medio del representante legal; por el contrario, el testigo declara por sí mismo.

En otro orden de cosas, siempre deberíamos tener presente que la participación de la víctima en los procedimientos podría conllevar riesgos para su seguridad personal o la de su familia. Por esta razón es importante que la víctima evalúe tales riesgos antes de presentar la solicitud de participación y que, una vez presentada, se abstenga de contárselo a propios y a extraños. Además, una vez que haya sido aceptada como participante, debería comunicar todo temor por su seguridad a su representante legal, a fin de que este considere la posibilidad de peticionar la adopción de medidas de protección adecuadas.

Finalmente, quiero hacer unas muy breves consideraciones acerca del derecho a obtener reparación.

El procedimiento de reparación puede llevarse a cabo solo si persona acusada fue encontrada culpable de un crimen y si la víctima de tal crimen peticiona el otorgamiento de una reparación.

Si la petición es aprobada, la sala interviniente decide el tipo de reparación a otorgar. Puede ser individual o colectiva, según si está destinada a una víctima o a un grupo de víctimas, respectivamente. Los tipos de reparación comprenden la indemnización pecuniaria, la restitución de bienes apropiados ilegítimamente, la rehabilitación — tal como un tratamiento médico — y la satisfacción — es decir, medidas tales como una disculpa pública, una conmemoración o la construcción de un monumento de la memoria —.

Bueno, mi presentación termina en este momento, ya que no quiero restar tiempo para formular preguntas, ensayar respuestas y debatir ideas. Muchas gracias por vuestra atención.

Categories
International(ised) prosecutions Kosovo Specialist Chambers Prosecution initiatives

The opening of the first trial before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers

KSC Chambers. Foto: KSC

On 15 September 2021, the first trial against a former member of the Kosovo Liberation Army (“KLA”) commenced before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (“KSC”).  The Indictment charges Salih Mustafa, a.k.a. Commander Cali, with four counts of war crimes allegedly committed at the Zllash/Zlaš detention facility in Kosovo during the period between 1 and 19 April 1999.  The charges against Mr. Mustafa include: arbitrary detention, cruel treatment and torture of at least six Kosovo Albanian civilians, and the murder of one of them.  Mustafa is alleged to be individually responsible for these crimes under various modes of liability, including: direct commission, participation in either a basic or extended joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”), ordering, instigating, aiding and abetting, and superior responsibility.  On 5 October 2020, a pre-trial judge confirmed the Indictment against the accused.  In response, Mr. Mustafa has entered a plea of not guilty protesting his innocence.

In his opening statement, Specialist Prosecutor Jack Smith called the case against Mr. Mustafa “a milestone” for the KSC and the development of international criminal justice in general. Smith emphasized on multiple occasions that this internationalized criminal court had been created by the people of Kosovo, who had been driving force behind the work of his Office.  He stressed the importance for victims to know that their voices are heard and those persons most responsible for crimes committed during the hostilities will be held accountable.  In his view, the KSC have the opportunity to demonstrate that international criminal justice can be administered in a “thorough, reasoned, transparent, efficient, and fair [manner]” and “that trials do not need to take years to complete”.  The Specialist Prosecutor expressed his hope that the work of the KSC – including the case against Mr. Mustafa – would contribute to justice, the acceptance of facts and “ultimately to some healing.”

The opening of the trial against Salih Mustafa coincides with the 10-year anniversary of the start of the investigation into the alleged involvement of senior KLA officials in organ theft and other crimes against humanity in Albania.  These grave accusations stemmed from a 2011 Council of Europe Report that ultimately gave rise to the creation of the KSC.  Pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Law on the Specialist Chambers, the KSC’s subject matter jurisdiction shall be limited to crimes that relate to this report.  However, the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office (“SPO”) has hitherto failed to explain whether the Mustafa case is sufficiently close-related to the Council of Europe to fall within the KSC’s jurisdictional scope.

Accused (behind) and counsel for accused (front). Photo: balkaninsight.com

In light of the fact that the criminal proceedings against Salih Mustafa were initiated after a 10-year investigation into the most heinous offences that were allegedly committed by some of the highest-ranking KLA officials, one might wonder whether this case is truly the milestone the Specialist Prosecutor presents it to be. To determine which persons bear the greatest responsibility, international justice institutions are usually guided by the level of seniority of the suspect, the gravity of the crimes committed and the scale on which these offences occurred.  However, according to the Indictment Mr. Mustafa held a lower-level position of BIA-Unit Commander within the Llap Operational Zone and the alleged crimes did not occur on a massive scale.

The Specialist Prosecutor’s claims that the work of the KSC will contribute to providing justice to all victims of grave international crimes and offers Kosovo the opportunity to leave the war behind it once and for all may sound promising, but are difficult to reconcile with the selective mandate of the special court.  After all, the KSC’s subject matter jurisdiction precludes the court from delivering justice equally to the victims of the Serbian regime.  These victims have been hampered in their quest for justice before domestic courts, as there is no extradition treaty in force between Kosovo and Serbia.  If the KSC wish to contribute to reconciliation in Kosovo, it is of the utmost importance that the Court will, at the very least, be sensitive to the suffering of those victims as well. 

Finally, although the KSC were created under domestic law by the Kosovo Assembly, this was done under pressure from the United States and the European Union.  For this reason, local support among the Kosovo Albanian population for this special court remains low.  The fact that the KSC are located abroad will likely make it more difficult for the local population to follow the proceedings and gain a better understanding of the special court’s work.  This could pose a serious problem to Specialist Prosecutor’s hopes that the work of the Court will lead to the acceptance of facts that eventually might lead to reconciliation and healing.  Under these circumstances, it is all the more important that the trials before the KSC will be conducted in a truly fair and transparent manner as was advocated by the Specialist Prosecutor, while the Court must show to be cognizant of the broader historical context in which the armed conflict in Kosovo occurred.  To avoid the impression of partiality, the SPO should refrain at all times from referring to places in Kosovo as being part of Serbian territory.

Renée de Geus, Editor, Maastricht Blog on Transitional Justice

Categories
ICC International(ised) prosecutions Prosecution initiatives Right to truth

The right to truth at the ICC: beyond the question of the right forum

Photo Source: Reuters/Piroschka van de Wouw 2019
The International Criminal Court building is seen in The Hague, Netherlands, January 16, 2019. REUTERS/Piroschka van de Wouw
Photo Source: Reuters/Piroschka van de Wouw 2019

Author: Andrea Trigoso

The right to know the truth in cases of mass atrocities and grave violations of human rights has been recognized in various international and regional documents and human rights mechanisms. The International Criminal Court (ICC) deals as well with cases of mass atrocities. Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes entail grave violations of human rights on a large scale, and although the ICC is not a truth-seeking mechanism in stricto sensu, in the adjudication of the cases the judges make findings of facts. Therefore, beyond the assessment of whether the ICC is the right forum for unveiling truth about mass atrocities, a more grounded approach might be to look at the implications of the ICC as a truth-revealing forum from a rights-based approach, which amounts to bring to the discussion the issues that the application of notions of the right to truth may have at the ICC.

This post intends to start the discussion on this topic. For this purpose, it will briefly review the emergence, scope, and dimensions of the right to truth, and then explore the applicability of these notions to the ICC.

The right to truth 

The right to know the truth for victims of mass atrocities has been recognized in various international legal instruments and in many jurisdictions. One of the first instruments in recognizing this right was the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Articles 32 and 33 enshrined the right of families to know the fate of their relatives, and the obligation of the parties to the conflict to search for persons who were reported missing.

The evolution and expansion of the right to truth from international humanitarian law to human rights law is related to the search for accountability for the commission of enforced disappearances in Latin-America and the fight against impunity and blanket amnesties during authoritative regimes of the late 70’s and mid 80’s. The Organization of the American States and the United Nations (UN) established working groups to report on the issue in the second half of the 80’s. These organizations expanded the right beyond the information about the events related to missing or disappeared persons, to include information of other serious violations of human rights.

 In 1988 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights dealt with its first case, which was about the enforced disappearance of Manfredo Velaquez Rodriguez in Honduras. Although the American Convention on Human Rights does not explicitly include this right, the Court affirmed in its judgement the existence of the rights of the victim’s family to know his fate, and the obligation of the State to inform them. Since then, the right to truth has been developed in several decisions of the Court, and has also been recognized also by the European Court of Human Rights

The UN has also progressively studied and recognized the right to truth. Although only the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance grants the right to truth in a treaty, there are various soft law documents that address this right. In particular, the UN Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity provides the right to know the truth about the events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes through massive or systematic violations, recognizing a collective and an individual dimension, that concern the victim and their families and the peoples where these violations occurred. Additionally, the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law recognize as a measure of satisfaction the fulfillment of the right to truth.

Furthermore, the previously mentioned dimensions of the right to truth entail different right holders and different content. The individual dimension recognizes the direct victim or the relatives of the victim as the right holders, and the truth sought is related to the specific events that violated the human rights of the victim in question. On the other hand, the collective dimension refers to the society as the right holder, and it entails the truth about the causes, systems, and policies put in place for the commission of the grave, mass, and systematic human rights violations, and its consequences.

The right to truth in the ICC

The ICC Statute enshrines two provisions referring to the truth-seeking process in which the cases before the ICC are involved. Article 54 (1) indicates the duties and powers of the Prosecutor during the investigation, and it indicates that “in order to establish the truth” the Prosecutor should cover all the facts, including incriminating and exonerating circumstances. In addition, Article 69 (3) enables the Chambers to request the submission of all types of evidence (inculpatory or exculpatory) “with the purpose of establishing the truth in the proceedings.” Therefore, from a normative viewpoint, there is an underlying obligation to find the truth for the ICC.

As for the individual dimension of the right to truth at the ICC, it is often invoked article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute, which enables the participation of victims in the proceedings when their personal interests are affected. This provision is considered to have given an unprecedented victim’s participation in the proceedings of international criminal tribunals, because those personal interests may include the revelation of truth. However, there is the concern that the testimony of the victims, or the truth they reveal in the proceedings, may be judged under true or false discourses during the trial, which forces to judge the victims’ suffering in those parameters as well.

Additionally, a question that follows is whether the individual right holders of the right to truth that participated in the ICC proceedings may consider this right effectively realized. In particular, when whatever truth is revealed, is made by an international institution—the ICC—that most of the times is ignored or rejected in the societies where they live in, and its revelation about the particular circumstances of the human rights violations they suffered, may be contested in local (not necessarily legal or jurisdictional) fora. Another angle of this issue that must be brought to the table is whether the individual victims are in a position to demand the realization of this right to the ICC.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the truth revealed by the ICC not only includes the specific facts related to the criminal responsibility of the accused persons, but also the contextual elements of the crimes under the ICC jurisdiction, which entail the establishment of a plan, system, or policy, for the commission of the crimes. This detail is relevant when assessing the collective dimension of the right to truth because content-wise the ICC is a mechanism that can reveal the systems and policies put in place to commit mass and systematic human rights violations. However, the inevitable question that follows this assertion is, who is the collective right holder of the right to truth at the ICC? Is it “the international community as a whole” as invoked in the preamble of the ICC Statute, or is it the society of the country concerned in the ICC proceedings?

If the international community is the right-holder of the right to truth, would it mean that a right to truth for this “collective subject” has emerged? Would the international community (however defined it) would be in the position to demand the compliance of the right to truth to the ICC?

On the other hand, if the society of the country under investigation is the “collective subject”, would it mean that they are in a position to demand truth to the ICC? Is it possible, in practical terms, for societies located thousands of kilometers away from The Hague, with ongoing conflicts, to demand truth to the ICC? Or flipping the question, is it possible for the ICC to realistically communicate its findings to the society affected in the country situation, and thus comply with the collective dimension of the right? Can the truth revealed by the ICC influence the official narrative about the mass atrocities in the society in question?

These are questions that have been overlooked when referring to the right to truth at the ICC. Although it is not possible to answer them in this post, it is relevant to explore them in relation to the specific situations under investigation in the ICC. This approach will bring the assessment of the ICC proceedings closer to the societies where the crimes under its jurisdictions were committed, and will break the top-down approach bubble that the ICC analyses have had so far to combine them with a bottom-up approach that takes into account the actual effects of the proceedings in the people and societies concerned.

Categories
Domestic prosecutions Guinea ICC International(ised) prosecutions Prosecution initiatives Reparations for victims Right to truth

¿Es tiempo de que la CPI investigue formalmente la situación en Guinea?

Photo//Mediaguinee

Autor: Fabián Raimondo

Luego del fallecimiento del presidente de Guinea Lansana Conté en diciembre de 2008, el capitán Moussa Damis Camara se convirtió por la fuerza de las armas en el nuevo presidente.  Camara prometió llamar a elecciones generales y alejarse del gobierno luego de estas. Sin embargo, poco después efectuó declaraciones públicas insinuado que podría presentarse como candidato a presidente, lo que causó numerosas protestas por parte de la sociedad civil. Así, la masiva manifestación pública congregada en el Estadio Nacional de Conakri el 28 de septiembre de 2009 en ocasión del día de la independencia fue violentamente reprimida por el gobierno, dando lugar a lo que hoy se conoce como “la masacre del 28 de septiembre”. 

© Nancy Palus/IRIN

La ONU estableció inmediatamente una comisión de investigación a fin de constatar las violaciones graves de derechos humanos perpetradas durante la masacre y de identificar a las personas responsables de tales violaciones. En su informe final de diciembre de 2009, la Comisión identificó 156 personas asesinadas o desaparecidas, 109 mujeres víctimas de violación o de otros crímenes sexuales, centenares de casos de tortura, decenas de detenciones arbitrarias en unidades militares o policiales, y apropiación indebida de bienes de los manifestantes y otros actos de pillaje. La Comisión constató también que, durante el día de la masacre y los días posteriores, el gobierno se abocó a destruir pruebas de los hechos, por medio de una limpieza del Estadio Nacional, del ocultamiento de restos mortales y de la alteración documentos médicos. La Comisión concluyó que Guinea violó múltiples disposiciones de tratados de derechos humanos y que los hechos constatados podrían calificarse como crímenes contra la humanidad, e individualizó a ciertas personas como posibles responsables de estos crímenes. Además, recomendó, entre otras medidas, que el gobierno provea informaciones útiles con respecto a las personas desaparecidas, que refiera la investigación de los hechos a la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) y que conceda una reparación adecuada a las víctimas.

El Estatuto de la CPI entró en vigor para Guinea el 1 de octubre de 2003; ergo, la CPI tiene competencia sobre genocidio, crímenes contra la humanidad y crímenes de guerra cometidos en el territorio o por ciudadanos de aquel país a partir de es fecha. Sobre esta base, el 14 de octubre de 2009 la Fiscalía de la CPI inició una investigación preliminar acerca de los eventos del 28 de septiembre. La Fiscalía determinó que existían razones suficientes para creer que ciertos crímenes contra la humanidad fueron cometidos en aquella ocasión y, desde comienzos de 2010, se ha concentrado en evaluar si Guinea está dispuesta a llevar adelante la investigación penal y el enjuiciamiento de los responsables o si realmente no puede hacerlo.

La investigación penal llevada a cabo por Guinea concluyó en diciembre de 2017 y, como resultado de aquella, se resolvió que 13 de los 15 imputados serían llevados a juicio. Sin embargo, 40 meses después, el juicio aun no ha comenzado. 

En tal contexto, resulta difícil creer que Guinea está realmente dispuesta a enjuiciar a las personas presuntamente responsables por los crímenes cometidos el 28 de septiembre y los días posteriores. Mientras tanto, las víctimas de aquellos crímenes siguen esperando que el enjuiciamiento comience y se lleve a cabo y que los daños causados a ellas se reparen adecuadamente.

Así las cosas, Maastricht Blog on Transitional Justice se pregunta si, a ya casi 12 años del inicio de la investigación preliminar por la Fiscalía de la CPI, no ya llegado el momento oportuno para que esta dé el importante paso de solicitar autorización para el inicio de una investigación formal sobre la situación en Guinea. Es que, tal como se afirma en el célebre adagio atribuido a Séneca, “nada se parece tanto a la injusticia como la justicia tardía.”

Categories
EULEX International(ised) prosecutions Prosecution initiatives

Should an independent investigation be conducted into the allegation of corruption and misconduct of EULEX Kosovo?

First trial in Palace of Justice. Copyright: Eulex

Author: Renée de Geus

On 12 July 2021, former President of EULEX Judges (2014-2017), Malcolm Simmons, gave testimony to the Kosovo Assembly on serious allegations of corruption and misconduct by international judges, prosecutors and other senior staff that took place within the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo). Simmons claimed that during his time in office (2008-2017) he witnessed various incidents of interference in high-profile war crimes cases to secure convictions in the interest of the EU-facilitated Pristina-Belgrade normalization talks. In particular, his allegations included that trial panels had been manipulated, prosecutors and judges were pressured by senior Mission management to try certain cases despite an apparent lack of evidence, protected witnesses were threatened or offered inducements, andevidence was tampered with. Simmons assured the Kosovo Assembly that his testimony was supported by documentary and other evidence which he would be willing to disclose if the Assembly were to decide to launch a full inquiry into EULEX Kosovo and the UK Foreign Office would agree to waive Simmons’ legal obligations under the Official Secrets Act. Should such an inquiry be conducted, Simmons claimed that other former EULEX staff members would be willing to corroborate his allegations and testify to their own experiences.

In response to his testimony, EULEX Kosovo issued a statement in which it challenged Malcolm Simmons’ credibility. The press release suggested that he had deliberately spread false information out of resentment over the findings of a disciplinary board in three investigations that EULEX had initiated against him. It dismissed Simmons’ allegations as “a collection of ill-conceived and unsubstantiated conjectures, untruths and personal opinions” which are intended to discredit the work and reputation of EULEX Kosovo. If there had been any veracity to his story, the press release questioned why Simmons had continued his employment for the Mission and even applied to become President, did not officially report the alleged misconduct of EULEX staff to the appropriate EU authorities until to 2 September 2017, and failed to provide evidence to an independent investigation team to substantiate his allegations.

In reply, Simmons claimed to have informed the European Union (EU) of alleged misconduct within EULEX Kosovo on multiple occasions in the period between 2013-2016 and had emails to prove this. He confirmed that in 2017 the European External Action Service had initiated an investigation into his allegations, but had no confidence that the investigators in charge would conduct a proper investigation since these were the same individuals who had previously ruled against Simmons in the course of disciplinary proceedings initiated by EULEX and were in possession of his private emails that had been obtained during an illegal hacking of his account. Simmons repeatedly requested the EU to appoint an independent investigation team to address his allegations, but these requests went unanswered.

In his testimony, Malcolm Simmons provided the Kosovo Assembly two specific examples of high-profile war crimes cases in which interference allegedly occurred, namely Kleçka and Drenica. Simmons had acted as Presiding Judge in the retrial of the Kleçka case against Fatmir Limaj et al.  He alleged that the then President of EULEX Judges had attempted to interfere by informing him that the Mission expected the defendants to be convicted and that Simmons’ job might depend on the outcome of the retrial. Simmons claimed that the evidence in Kleçka was so weak that the case should not been brought to trial and the Retrial Panel therefore acquitted the accused of all charges. In its press release, EULEX Kosovo argued that Simmons’ allegations in relation to Kleçka are refuted by the fact that Simmons did not only keep his job, but was appointed to President of EULEX Judges the following year. It further suggested that Simmons could have recused himself if he had felt the evidence was insufficient to bring the case to court.  Another former EULEX judge in Kleçka contested Simmons’ allegation that the evidence had been too weak to constitute a credible prima facie case.

Malcolm Simmons also alleged that the Trial Panel in the Drenica II case had been manipulated.  He claimed that a judge from the mobile unit, of which he was in charge at the time, had been assigned to this case without his knowledge and in violation of the random case allocation system in place.  When Simmons subsequently requested that the appointment of this judge to the Drenica II case be revoked, he claims to have been told by the acting President of EULEX Judges that the Mission was “pleased” with the composition of the Trial Panel as it would likely “get the right result.”  The requests of the Defence in the Drenica cases to hear the evidence of Judge Simmons on this issue were denied.  In his testimony, Simmons pointed out that in 2018 the Constitutional Court of Kosovo considered this to be in breach of the accused’s right to a fair trial.  In its press release, EULEX Kosovo responded that the Defence never raised any objections to the composition of the Trial Panel during the main trial.  This is correct, as the Defence only became aware of the possible manipulation of the Trial Panel after the pronouncement of the verdict in first instance.  EULEX Kosovo reminded Simmons that in 2019 a panel of the Constitutional Court composed of only Kosovo judges unanimously dismissed a renewed request for constitutional review of the composition of the Trial Panel in Drenica II.  This Decision was reached following a critical Report of the European Commission on the manner in which the local judiciary had handled the Drenica cases.

The allegations of the former President of EULEX Judges do not merely affect the legacy of EULEX Kosovo, but are also relevant to the proceedings before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC). Pursuant to Article 37 of the Law on the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, evidence collected by EULEX Kosovo may be admissible in the proceedings before the KSC.  Moreover, Rule 157(2) of the KSC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides that the KSC may also take judicial notice of adjudicated facts extracted from the final judgements of EULEX Kosovo. All three war crimes cases that are currently pending before the KSC, contain charges that relate to cases previously tried by EULEX Kosovo. In particular, the Indictment filed in the case against Hashim Thaçi et al. charges the defendants inter alia for participating in the same joint criminal enterprise as the accused in the Kleçka and Drenica cases.

At this stage, an independent and impartial investigation into the allegation made by Judge Simmons, might be in the interest of all parties involved. Such an investigation could assess the reliability of the work of EULEX Kosovo and put an end to the long-standing allegations of corruption and misconduct. This may also be of influence on how the legacy of EULEX Kosovo will be appraised by history. Furthermore, if the KSC wishes to rely upon the facts and evidence of EULEX Kosovo, it must be satisfied that this material is safe to use and has been obtained in accordance with international standards. An independent investigation could assist the KSC in making this determination. Moreover, if conducted in a transparent manner, such an investigation might also serve to improve the trust of the Kosovo Albanian population in the fairness of the proceedings against former members of the KLA and increase local support for the work of the KSC.  Finally, when Kosovo was asked to establish the KSC, the EU issued a statement recognizing this was “a sensitive and difficult decision” for Kosovo to make, but one that was necessary to demonstrate “it has nothing to hide in connection with the 2011 Council of Europe Report’s allegations.”  Parallels can be drawn with Simmons’ call for an independent investigation into his claims. If the EU would be willing to cooperate with an external investigation into EULEX Kosovo, this would send a powerful message to the people of Kosovo demonstrating that it holds itself to the same standards it previously required of Kosovo.

Renée de Geus is editor of Maastricht Blog on Transitional Justice, PhD Researcher at Maastricht University, and Lecturer at Erasmus School of Law.