Category: Prosecution initiatives

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ICC International(ised) prosecutions Prosecution initiatives Right to truth

The right to truth at the ICC: beyond the question of the right forum

Photo Source: Reuters/Piroschka van de Wouw 2019
The International Criminal Court building is seen in The Hague, Netherlands, January 16, 2019. REUTERS/Piroschka van de Wouw
Photo Source: Reuters/Piroschka van de Wouw 2019

Author: Andrea Trigoso

The right to know the truth in cases of mass atrocities and grave violations of human rights has been recognized in various international and regional documents and human rights mechanisms. The International Criminal Court (ICC) deals as well with cases of mass atrocities. Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes entail grave violations of human rights on a large scale, and although the ICC is not a truth-seeking mechanism in stricto sensu, in the adjudication of the cases the judges make findings of facts. Therefore, beyond the assessment of whether the ICC is the right forum for unveiling truth about mass atrocities, a more grounded approach might be to look at the implications of the ICC as a truth-revealing forum from a rights-based approach, which amounts to bring to the discussion the issues that the application of notions of the right to truth may have at the ICC.

This post intends to start the discussion on this topic. For this purpose, it will briefly review the emergence, scope, and dimensions of the right to truth, and then explore the applicability of these notions to the ICC.

The right to truth 

The right to know the truth for victims of mass atrocities has been recognized in various international legal instruments and in many jurisdictions. One of the first instruments in recognizing this right was the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Articles 32 and 33 enshrined the right of families to know the fate of their relatives, and the obligation of the parties to the conflict to search for persons who were reported missing.

The evolution and expansion of the right to truth from international humanitarian law to human rights law is related to the search for accountability for the commission of enforced disappearances in Latin-America and the fight against impunity and blanket amnesties during authoritative regimes of the late 70’s and mid 80’s. The Organization of the American States and the United Nations (UN) established working groups to report on the issue in the second half of the 80’s. These organizations expanded the right beyond the information about the events related to missing or disappeared persons, to include information of other serious violations of human rights.

 In 1988 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights dealt with its first case, which was about the enforced disappearance of Manfredo Velaquez Rodriguez in Honduras. Although the American Convention on Human Rights does not explicitly include this right, the Court affirmed in its judgement the existence of the rights of the victim’s family to know his fate, and the obligation of the State to inform them. Since then, the right to truth has been developed in several decisions of the Court, and has also been recognized also by the European Court of Human Rights

The UN has also progressively studied and recognized the right to truth. Although only the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance grants the right to truth in a treaty, there are various soft law documents that address this right. In particular, the UN Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity provides the right to know the truth about the events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes through massive or systematic violations, recognizing a collective and an individual dimension, that concern the victim and their families and the peoples where these violations occurred. Additionally, the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law recognize as a measure of satisfaction the fulfillment of the right to truth.

Furthermore, the previously mentioned dimensions of the right to truth entail different right holders and different content. The individual dimension recognizes the direct victim or the relatives of the victim as the right holders, and the truth sought is related to the specific events that violated the human rights of the victim in question. On the other hand, the collective dimension refers to the society as the right holder, and it entails the truth about the causes, systems, and policies put in place for the commission of the grave, mass, and systematic human rights violations, and its consequences.

The right to truth in the ICC

The ICC Statute enshrines two provisions referring to the truth-seeking process in which the cases before the ICC are involved. Article 54 (1) indicates the duties and powers of the Prosecutor during the investigation, and it indicates that “in order to establish the truth” the Prosecutor should cover all the facts, including incriminating and exonerating circumstances. In addition, Article 69 (3) enables the Chambers to request the submission of all types of evidence (inculpatory or exculpatory) “with the purpose of establishing the truth in the proceedings.” Therefore, from a normative viewpoint, there is an underlying obligation to find the truth for the ICC.

As for the individual dimension of the right to truth at the ICC, it is often invoked article 68 (3) of the ICC Statute, which enables the participation of victims in the proceedings when their personal interests are affected. This provision is considered to have given an unprecedented victim’s participation in the proceedings of international criminal tribunals, because those personal interests may include the revelation of truth. However, there is the concern that the testimony of the victims, or the truth they reveal in the proceedings, may be judged under true or false discourses during the trial, which forces to judge the victims’ suffering in those parameters as well.

Additionally, a question that follows is whether the individual right holders of the right to truth that participated in the ICC proceedings may consider this right effectively realized. In particular, when whatever truth is revealed, is made by an international institution—the ICC—that most of the times is ignored or rejected in the societies where they live in, and its revelation about the particular circumstances of the human rights violations they suffered, may be contested in local (not necessarily legal or jurisdictional) fora. Another angle of this issue that must be brought to the table is whether the individual victims are in a position to demand the realization of this right to the ICC.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the truth revealed by the ICC not only includes the specific facts related to the criminal responsibility of the accused persons, but also the contextual elements of the crimes under the ICC jurisdiction, which entail the establishment of a plan, system, or policy, for the commission of the crimes. This detail is relevant when assessing the collective dimension of the right to truth because content-wise the ICC is a mechanism that can reveal the systems and policies put in place to commit mass and systematic human rights violations. However, the inevitable question that follows this assertion is, who is the collective right holder of the right to truth at the ICC? Is it “the international community as a whole” as invoked in the preamble of the ICC Statute, or is it the society of the country concerned in the ICC proceedings?

If the international community is the right-holder of the right to truth, would it mean that a right to truth for this “collective subject” has emerged? Would the international community (however defined it) would be in the position to demand the compliance of the right to truth to the ICC?

On the other hand, if the society of the country under investigation is the “collective subject”, would it mean that they are in a position to demand truth to the ICC? Is it possible, in practical terms, for societies located thousands of kilometers away from The Hague, with ongoing conflicts, to demand truth to the ICC? Or flipping the question, is it possible for the ICC to realistically communicate its findings to the society affected in the country situation, and thus comply with the collective dimension of the right? Can the truth revealed by the ICC influence the official narrative about the mass atrocities in the society in question?

These are questions that have been overlooked when referring to the right to truth at the ICC. Although it is not possible to answer them in this post, it is relevant to explore them in relation to the specific situations under investigation in the ICC. This approach will bring the assessment of the ICC proceedings closer to the societies where the crimes under its jurisdictions were committed, and will break the top-down approach bubble that the ICC analyses have had so far to combine them with a bottom-up approach that takes into account the actual effects of the proceedings in the people and societies concerned.

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Domestic prosecutions Guinea ICC International(ised) prosecutions Prosecution initiatives Reparations for victims Right to truth

¿Es tiempo de que la CPI investigue formalmente la situación en Guinea?

Photo//Mediaguinee

Autor: Fabián Raimondo

Luego del fallecimiento del presidente de Guinea Lansana Conté en diciembre de 2008, el capitán Moussa Damis Camara se convirtió por la fuerza de las armas en el nuevo presidente.  Camara prometió llamar a elecciones generales y alejarse del gobierno luego de estas. Sin embargo, poco después efectuó declaraciones públicas insinuado que podría presentarse como candidato a presidente, lo que causó numerosas protestas por parte de la sociedad civil. Así, la masiva manifestación pública congregada en el Estadio Nacional de Conakri el 28 de septiembre de 2009 en ocasión del día de la independencia fue violentamente reprimida por el gobierno, dando lugar a lo que hoy se conoce como “la masacre del 28 de septiembre”. 

© Nancy Palus/IRIN

La ONU estableció inmediatamente una comisión de investigación a fin de constatar las violaciones graves de derechos humanos perpetradas durante la masacre y de identificar a las personas responsables de tales violaciones. En su informe final de diciembre de 2009, la Comisión identificó 156 personas asesinadas o desaparecidas, 109 mujeres víctimas de violación o de otros crímenes sexuales, centenares de casos de tortura, decenas de detenciones arbitrarias en unidades militares o policiales, y apropiación indebida de bienes de los manifestantes y otros actos de pillaje. La Comisión constató también que, durante el día de la masacre y los días posteriores, el gobierno se abocó a destruir pruebas de los hechos, por medio de una limpieza del Estadio Nacional, del ocultamiento de restos mortales y de la alteración documentos médicos. La Comisión concluyó que Guinea violó múltiples disposiciones de tratados de derechos humanos y que los hechos constatados podrían calificarse como crímenes contra la humanidad, e individualizó a ciertas personas como posibles responsables de estos crímenes. Además, recomendó, entre otras medidas, que el gobierno provea informaciones útiles con respecto a las personas desaparecidas, que refiera la investigación de los hechos a la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) y que conceda una reparación adecuada a las víctimas.

El Estatuto de la CPI entró en vigor para Guinea el 1 de octubre de 2003; ergo, la CPI tiene competencia sobre genocidio, crímenes contra la humanidad y crímenes de guerra cometidos en el territorio o por ciudadanos de aquel país a partir de es fecha. Sobre esta base, el 14 de octubre de 2009 la Fiscalía de la CPI inició una investigación preliminar acerca de los eventos del 28 de septiembre. La Fiscalía determinó que existían razones suficientes para creer que ciertos crímenes contra la humanidad fueron cometidos en aquella ocasión y, desde comienzos de 2010, se ha concentrado en evaluar si Guinea está dispuesta a llevar adelante la investigación penal y el enjuiciamiento de los responsables o si realmente no puede hacerlo.

La investigación penal llevada a cabo por Guinea concluyó en diciembre de 2017 y, como resultado de aquella, se resolvió que 13 de los 15 imputados serían llevados a juicio. Sin embargo, 40 meses después, el juicio aun no ha comenzado. 

En tal contexto, resulta difícil creer que Guinea está realmente dispuesta a enjuiciar a las personas presuntamente responsables por los crímenes cometidos el 28 de septiembre y los días posteriores. Mientras tanto, las víctimas de aquellos crímenes siguen esperando que el enjuiciamiento comience y se lleve a cabo y que los daños causados a ellas se reparen adecuadamente.

Así las cosas, Maastricht Blog on Transitional Justice se pregunta si, a ya casi 12 años del inicio de la investigación preliminar por la Fiscalía de la CPI, no ya llegado el momento oportuno para que esta dé el importante paso de solicitar autorización para el inicio de una investigación formal sobre la situación en Guinea. Es que, tal como se afirma en el célebre adagio atribuido a Séneca, “nada se parece tanto a la injusticia como la justicia tardía.”

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EULEX International(ised) prosecutions Prosecution initiatives

Should an independent investigation be conducted into the allegation of corruption and misconduct of EULEX Kosovo?

First trial in Palace of Justice. Copyright: Eulex

Author: Renée de Geus

On 12 July 2021, former President of EULEX Judges (2014-2017), Malcolm Simmons, gave testimony to the Kosovo Assembly on serious allegations of corruption and misconduct by international judges, prosecutors and other senior staff that took place within the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo). Simmons claimed that during his time in office (2008-2017) he witnessed various incidents of interference in high-profile war crimes cases to secure convictions in the interest of the EU-facilitated Pristina-Belgrade normalization talks. In particular, his allegations included that trial panels had been manipulated, prosecutors and judges were pressured by senior Mission management to try certain cases despite an apparent lack of evidence, protected witnesses were threatened or offered inducements, andevidence was tampered with. Simmons assured the Kosovo Assembly that his testimony was supported by documentary and other evidence which he would be willing to disclose if the Assembly were to decide to launch a full inquiry into EULEX Kosovo and the UK Foreign Office would agree to waive Simmons’ legal obligations under the Official Secrets Act. Should such an inquiry be conducted, Simmons claimed that other former EULEX staff members would be willing to corroborate his allegations and testify to their own experiences.

In response to his testimony, EULEX Kosovo issued a statement in which it challenged Malcolm Simmons’ credibility. The press release suggested that he had deliberately spread false information out of resentment over the findings of a disciplinary board in three investigations that EULEX had initiated against him. It dismissed Simmons’ allegations as “a collection of ill-conceived and unsubstantiated conjectures, untruths and personal opinions” which are intended to discredit the work and reputation of EULEX Kosovo. If there had been any veracity to his story, the press release questioned why Simmons had continued his employment for the Mission and even applied to become President, did not officially report the alleged misconduct of EULEX staff to the appropriate EU authorities until to 2 September 2017, and failed to provide evidence to an independent investigation team to substantiate his allegations.

In reply, Simmons claimed to have informed the European Union (EU) of alleged misconduct within EULEX Kosovo on multiple occasions in the period between 2013-2016 and had emails to prove this. He confirmed that in 2017 the European External Action Service had initiated an investigation into his allegations, but had no confidence that the investigators in charge would conduct a proper investigation since these were the same individuals who had previously ruled against Simmons in the course of disciplinary proceedings initiated by EULEX and were in possession of his private emails that had been obtained during an illegal hacking of his account. Simmons repeatedly requested the EU to appoint an independent investigation team to address his allegations, but these requests went unanswered.

In his testimony, Malcolm Simmons provided the Kosovo Assembly two specific examples of high-profile war crimes cases in which interference allegedly occurred, namely Kleçka and Drenica. Simmons had acted as Presiding Judge in the retrial of the Kleçka case against Fatmir Limaj et al.  He alleged that the then President of EULEX Judges had attempted to interfere by informing him that the Mission expected the defendants to be convicted and that Simmons’ job might depend on the outcome of the retrial. Simmons claimed that the evidence in Kleçka was so weak that the case should not been brought to trial and the Retrial Panel therefore acquitted the accused of all charges. In its press release, EULEX Kosovo argued that Simmons’ allegations in relation to Kleçka are refuted by the fact that Simmons did not only keep his job, but was appointed to President of EULEX Judges the following year. It further suggested that Simmons could have recused himself if he had felt the evidence was insufficient to bring the case to court.  Another former EULEX judge in Kleçka contested Simmons’ allegation that the evidence had been too weak to constitute a credible prima facie case.

Malcolm Simmons also alleged that the Trial Panel in the Drenica II case had been manipulated.  He claimed that a judge from the mobile unit, of which he was in charge at the time, had been assigned to this case without his knowledge and in violation of the random case allocation system in place.  When Simmons subsequently requested that the appointment of this judge to the Drenica II case be revoked, he claims to have been told by the acting President of EULEX Judges that the Mission was “pleased” with the composition of the Trial Panel as it would likely “get the right result.”  The requests of the Defence in the Drenica cases to hear the evidence of Judge Simmons on this issue were denied.  In his testimony, Simmons pointed out that in 2018 the Constitutional Court of Kosovo considered this to be in breach of the accused’s right to a fair trial.  In its press release, EULEX Kosovo responded that the Defence never raised any objections to the composition of the Trial Panel during the main trial.  This is correct, as the Defence only became aware of the possible manipulation of the Trial Panel after the pronouncement of the verdict in first instance.  EULEX Kosovo reminded Simmons that in 2019 a panel of the Constitutional Court composed of only Kosovo judges unanimously dismissed a renewed request for constitutional review of the composition of the Trial Panel in Drenica II.  This Decision was reached following a critical Report of the European Commission on the manner in which the local judiciary had handled the Drenica cases.

The allegations of the former President of EULEX Judges do not merely affect the legacy of EULEX Kosovo, but are also relevant to the proceedings before the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC). Pursuant to Article 37 of the Law on the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, evidence collected by EULEX Kosovo may be admissible in the proceedings before the KSC.  Moreover, Rule 157(2) of the KSC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides that the KSC may also take judicial notice of adjudicated facts extracted from the final judgements of EULEX Kosovo. All three war crimes cases that are currently pending before the KSC, contain charges that relate to cases previously tried by EULEX Kosovo. In particular, the Indictment filed in the case against Hashim Thaçi et al. charges the defendants inter alia for participating in the same joint criminal enterprise as the accused in the Kleçka and Drenica cases.

At this stage, an independent and impartial investigation into the allegation made by Judge Simmons, might be in the interest of all parties involved. Such an investigation could assess the reliability of the work of EULEX Kosovo and put an end to the long-standing allegations of corruption and misconduct. This may also be of influence on how the legacy of EULEX Kosovo will be appraised by history. Furthermore, if the KSC wishes to rely upon the facts and evidence of EULEX Kosovo, it must be satisfied that this material is safe to use and has been obtained in accordance with international standards. An independent investigation could assist the KSC in making this determination. Moreover, if conducted in a transparent manner, such an investigation might also serve to improve the trust of the Kosovo Albanian population in the fairness of the proceedings against former members of the KLA and increase local support for the work of the KSC.  Finally, when Kosovo was asked to establish the KSC, the EU issued a statement recognizing this was “a sensitive and difficult decision” for Kosovo to make, but one that was necessary to demonstrate “it has nothing to hide in connection with the 2011 Council of Europe Report’s allegations.”  Parallels can be drawn with Simmons’ call for an independent investigation into his claims. If the EU would be willing to cooperate with an external investigation into EULEX Kosovo, this would send a powerful message to the people of Kosovo demonstrating that it holds itself to the same standards it previously required of Kosovo.

Renée de Geus is editor of Maastricht Blog on Transitional Justice, PhD Researcher at Maastricht University, and Lecturer at Erasmus School of Law.

Categories
Prosecution initiatives

Acerca del deber de sancionar

Author: Fabián Raimondo

En este posteo quiero hablarles acerca del deber de sancionar un tipo específico de violaciones manifiestas o graves de los derechos humanos: aquellas que podrían calificarse jurídicamente como actos de genocidio, crímenes contra la humanidad o crímenes de guerra.

Al respecto paso a formular cuatro observaciones a la luz del derecho internacional que considero fundamentales. 

La primera es que los Estados Partes de ciertos tratados relativos a delitos internacionales se encuentran obligados a sancionar las personas responsables de tales delitos, tal como se desprende de la Convención para la Prevención y la Sanción del Delito de Genocidio (Art. 1), de las cuatro Convenciones de Ginebra de 1949 (Arts. 49, 50, 129 y 146, respectivamente), de la Convención contra Desapariciones Forzadas (Art. 6) y de la Convención contra la Tortura (Art. 4), por ejemplo.

La segunda es que, conforme a la jurisprudencia de la Corte Internacional de Justicia en materia de genocidio, a los estudios de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional en materia de crímenes contra la humanidad y a los del CICR en materia de crímenes de guerra, el derecho internacional consuetudinario establece obligaciones similares, tales como las de sancionar a las personas responsables de genocidio, de crímenes contra la humanidad o de crímenes de guerra. Que estas obligaciones también emanen del derecho consuetudinario es de gran importancia, ya que no todos los Estados son partes de los tratados que establecen la obligación de sancionar aquellos delitos.

La tercera es que los tratados relativos a delitos internacionales no obligan a los Estados Partes a imponer (o a no imponer) un tipo determinado de sanción, sino que, más bien, parecen brindarles la facultad de determinar el tipo de sanción a aplicar y de individualizar la cuantía de esta. Por ejemplo, la Convención para la Prevención y la Sanción del Delito de Genocidio habla de “sanciones eficaces” (Art. 5); la Convención contra la Desaparición Forzada habla de ‘sanciones apropiadas que reflejen la extrema gravedad” de este delito (Art. 7); las Convenciones de Ginebra hablan de “sanciones penales efectivas” y la Convención contra la Tortura habla de “penas adecuadas que reflejen la gravedad” de este delito (Art. 4.2).

La última es la siguiente: a fin de determinar si el tipo de sanción y su cuantía son eficaces, apropiados o adecuados, tal como requerido por los tratados mencionados y por otros similares, los Estados deberán tener en cuenta la gravedad de la conducta criminal, el grado de participación criminal de la persona convicta en aquella conducta, las circunstancias personales de esta persona, así como toda otra circunstancia atenuante o agravante. En mi opinión, el desafío mayor al respecto consiste en determinar si ciertas sanciones especiales, de carácter esencialmente restaurador y no necesariamente penal, serían compatibles con las obligaciones internacionales de sancionar penalmente un acto de genocidio, un crimen contra la humanidad o un crimen de guerra.

Así las cosas, en un contexto de justicia de transición, ¿la imposición de una sanción esencialmente de carácter restaurador violaría las obligaciones internacionales de sancionar los actos de genocidio, los crímenes contra la humanidad y los crímenes de guerra?

Fabián Raimondo is the Editor-in-Chief of Maastricht Blog on Transitional Justice and Associate Professor of Public International Law at Maastricht University.